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Abstract: Losing By Winning: America’s Challenge Waging Counterinsurgency Warfare is an 
analytical study of America’s experience waging counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippine- 
American, Vietnam and Iraq Wars. In each war, counterinsurgency warfare was applied to 
achieve the strategic objectives of American Foreign Policy as outlined by the President of the 
United States at the outset of each war. Initially, large swaths of the American electorate and 
political class favored achieving the strategic objectives of each war studied. Over time, as 
counterinsurgency tactics were put to use, and made headway towards achieving the strategic 
objectives of the conflict, public support for each war precipitously declined over time and either 
jeopardized the ability of the United States to complete its counterinsurgency campaign or lose 
them altogether. This occurred because images of atrocities and perceptions of violations of the 
laws of warfare (both real or imagined) were formed in the minds of Americans which created a 
political dynamic where the American public and their elected leaders in Washington D.C. could 
no longer legitimize continuing to support the ongoing war. The analytical insights drawn from 
this study give one an understanding of the unique challenges that confront the United States in 
employing counterinsurgency warfare to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States in 
the wars its fights. 
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Theoretical Framework Description 
To succinctly explain my thesis in a clear and coherent manner, I created a theoretical 
model to explain the existential factors that make it so difficult for the United States to fight and 
win wars against insurgencies. In totality, the analytical framework of my thesis describes a 
process that plays out in each case study. The model explains the reasons why it is so difficult for 
the United States to win wars against enemies that wage asymmetrical warfare in order to 
achieve their political goals. 
I trace a process that starts by explaining the nature of the military adversary (insurgency) 
and how the United States chooses to fight the insurgency in war (counterinsurgency). 
Descriptions of the insurgency describe the political and military nature of the insurgency and its 
military and political objectives in war. Counterinsurgency, a military and political strategy 
designed to pacify the insurgency, is the tactical approach applied by the quash the political and 
military goals of the insurgency. The reason the United States fights counterinsurgency wars is 
because policymakers deem them to be necessary to further the interests of American Foreign 
Policy. 
To defeat an insurgency, the United States employs its military to do so (although other 
government agencies oftentimes assist in the process). The Armed Forces of the United States is 
an institution with multiple service branches (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines). Each has its 
own unique history, organizational culture, standards of protocol, leadership and strengths and 
weaknesses in employing counterinsurgency warfare. All of these aforementioned factors, and 
many others, embody American military culture and shape the fighting force that will confront 
the insurgency on the battlefield 
The American military doesn’t act autonomously in wartime. The President of the 
United States and Congress directly control the operational decisions made by the military. As 
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Commander in Chief, the President of the United States has to rally public opinion to support the 
war. In crafting policy, the President of the United States can choose to either adopt a hands-on 
or hands-off approach to overseeing the counterinsurgency operations. This is done by making 
executive decisions that will shape the behaviors of the civilian and military leaders responsible 
for managing the conflict. Without Congress providing authorization and financial support, the 
military cannot employ a strategy to defeat the insurgency. Without rallying public support for 
war, the President and Congress cannot maintain legitimacy to continue counterinsurgency 
operations while the war is in progress. If the counterinsurgency campaign loses political 
legitimacy before it ends on terms favorable to the United States, the entire mission runs the risk 
of failure. Such a situation means that the United States will fail to achieve the strategic 
objectives set forth in the beginning of the conflict and could set back the strategic interests of 
the United States and diminish its standing in the world. For these reasons, maintaining control 
over the levers of power that control wartime decision-making is crucial for the 
counterinsurgents if they hope to pacify the insurgency they are confronted with fighting. 
On the civilian side of the equation, American political leaders and the general population 
view counterinsurgency wars from within the framework of their Liberal Conscience. Broadly 
speaking, the Liberal Conscience is an explanation of a worldview that, while not mutually 
exclusive to Americans, explains how a great number of them think on matters pertaining to war 
and peace. The Liberal Conscience is a product of American values, beliefs and political culture. 
In wartime, the Liberal Conscience leads civilian leaders and citizens alike to support fighting 
wars to advance noble causes and defeat ill-liberal enemies. However, once war ensues and the 
true nature of the war is revealed, the Liberal Conscience leads American civilian leaders and 
citizens to ultimately recoil from supporting war. This problematic dynamic is explained in detail 
in each case study of my thesis. 
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I argue that aforementioned state of affairs exists due in part to the fact that images (both 
real and imagined) from war play a decisive role in molding public perceptions of the utility of 
fighting the war. In the beginning of a war, when events sending off troops are occasions of great 
pomp and circumstance, support for war is at its highest levels. Once grisly images of dead 
soldiers, perceived violations of the laws of war and massive destruction make their way back to 
the United States, politicians and citizens’ alike turn against the war and push policymakers. to 
end the same conflict they once thought was so important to fight. 
This model attempts to explain a unique phenomenon that takes place each time the 
United States chooses fights a war against an insurgency. I explain how the aforementioned 
theoretical model has played out in American wars against insurgencies in the Philippine- 
American War of 1898, Vietnam War and the Iraq Wars. The analytical conclusions drawn from 
my study shed light on the hurdles and challenges the American military faces in winning wars 
against insurgencies. 
1  
Introduction 
The United States has had a long and controversial history with employing 
counterinsurgency warfare. The most ardent proponents of counterinsurgency warfare 
call it a benevolent form of warfare whose purpose is not to kill as many of the enemy as 
possible but instead to “win the hearts and minds” of the host population. The purpose of 
the counterinsurgency is to offer the host population a better standard and quality of 
living from what they’d experience from living under the insurgency. Critics of 
counterinsurgency warfare, such as Col. Gian Gentile and Douglas Porch and many 
American Cultural Anthropologists argue that it is indistinguishable from any other form 
of warfare and that its culturally insensitive predispositions are derived straight from the 
playbooks of colonial powers. These critics see counterinsurgency warfare as a 
sugarcoated military doctrine that is indistinguishable from any other form of warfare. 
Debates of the utility of counterinsurgency warfare have raged throughout American 
history. Nonetheless, the American public and their elected representatives  in 
Washington have, at times, called upon the American military to implement it to defeat 
insurgencies deemed to be a threat to American national interests. In my study, I do not 
intend to take sides in the ongoing debate surrounding counterinsurgency warfare and its 
utility. Instead, I set out to examine the ways in which the United States wages 
counterinsurgency warfare and how the American public perceives the conduct of the 
American military in its implementation of it. 
Key questions arise from in the debate over the utility waging counterinsugency 
warfare. Should the United States invest the time, resources, blood and treasure to alter 
the internal political dynamics of another country? Can the United States advance its 
strategic  interests  by  engaging  in  such  an  endeavor?  There  is  no  question  that 
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policymakers should ponder these important questions in deciding whether or not to wage 
a counterinsurgency campaign against an enemy employing asymmetrical tactics on the 
battlefield. 
Throughout the 19th  Century the United States waged a number of small-scale 
 
counterinsurgency campaigns against Indian Tribes throughout the American frontier. 
The lessons learned from these campaigns forged an understanding of what it would take 
to perform counterinsurgency warfare in the minds of officers would come of age to lead 
America’s first sustained counterinsurgency operation in the Philippine-American War 
(1898-1902). Did a sense of invincibility give political leaders such as Theodore 
Roosevelt a sense of overconfidence that their Filipino adversaries would be easily 
defeated? Would the possession of overwhelming firepower and military resources 
jaundice the eyes of American military leaders in Vietnam and Iraq to the danger of 
employing conventional methods of war against an insurgency? 
The difficulties in waging counterinsurgency warfare have reared their ugly head 
in each case study I examined. The most important factor that has impeded the ability of 
the United States to wage counterinsurgency warfare is the revelation of unsavory 
behavior in combat (or the perception of it) by the American military.  Such 
circumstances alter public and political support for a war that was initially popular with 
policymakers and the general alike. For the military, the challenge of employing 
counterinsurgency warfare is not repeated tactical failures on the battlefield. Instead, the 
biggest challenge to winning counterinsurgency wars lie in the inability of the military to 
create positive perceptions of their conduct in war and to keep the hearts and minds of 
policymakers and civilians supportive of their mission. 
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A lively debate surrounding counterinsurgency warfare in the United States 
continues today in military, academic and political circles across the country largely due 
in part to the publishing of the US Army & Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual FM-324 and its subsequent employment during the Iraq War. Was FM-324 a 
revolutionary new invention or did it derive its intellectual foundation from previous 
American wars? Books and journal articles on counterinsurgency warfare, have been 
supplanted with more publications in recent years. These have subsequently reopened old 
debates surrounding a peculiar form of warfare oftentimes misunderstood or ignored in 
the highest quarters of the American military. Questions regarding the morality and 
effectiveness of counterinsurgency warfare are now regularly discussed amongst defense 
policy wonks. One burning question inspired me to conduct this study. Why has the 
United States been so ineffective at winning wars against insurgencies despite the fact 
that the military is so good at performing counterinsurgency operations tactically? 
In this study, I examine the reasons why the United States chooses to fight wars 
and why policymakers and citizens alike oftentimes choose to end them prematurely. 
Upon the outset of military conflict, the American liberal conscience provokes 
policymakers and citizens to support war to advance noble causes. In this study, I 
showcase exactly how this scenario played out in three separate wars. It is important to 
understand how Americans think about war as we approach understanding why they 
oftentimes recoil from supporting counterinsurgency military campaigns. 
To undo strong pro-war sentiment in the United States, many politicians, media 
elites, and civilians today would probably agree that an increase in casualties incurred by 
the  American  military  would  bring  about  such  circumstances.        In  Choosing Your 
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Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force, Peter D. Feaver and 
Chistopher Gelpi argue that the American public will accept casualties if a mission is 
defined by a nation’s leadership.1 I intend to add a corollary to this argument. I believe 
that the American public will support incurring casualties in a counterinsurgency war if 
Americans perceive their soldiers to be acting within the acceptable boundaries of the 
laws of warfare. Such a supposition implies that the American public is phobic to the 
manner in which the United States fights, or is perceived to be fighting, 
counterinsurgency warfare. 
If insurgencies are deemed to be a threat to American national interests (as they 
are in all three case studies) why is that the United States has been so hesitant to embrace 
a military strategy capable of defeating them? My findings reveal that when called upon 
by policymakers to implement counterinsurgency warfare, the American military is 
successful in achieving the tactical objectives of counterinsurgency operations. However, 
wars are not won solely on the field of battle. They must be won in the hearts and minds 
of the American public and their elected representatives in Washington D.C. After all, it 
is these latter individuals who control the levers of power, purse strings, and the authority 
to order the military to continue or end war. This study will showcase factors that mold 
public perceptions of counterinsurgency warfare and how these perceptions (either real or 
imagined), can work to undermine the ability of the United States to achieve its strategic 
objectives in counterinsurgency wars. The implications drawn from my study provide 
grist for those who believe that existential factors, outside of military tactics, play a 
 
 
 
 
1 Gelpi, Christopher, and Peter Feaver. Choosing Your Battles : American Civil-Military Relations 
and the Use of Force. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pg. 7 
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decisive role in determining the outcome of counterinsurgency wars in the American 
experience. 
Chapter 1 – Are Counterinsurgency Wars Legitimate 
 
To wage war legally the President of the United States and his subordinates in the 
Department of Defense must make a compelling case to the American public and its 
representatives in Congress if they are to authorize, appropriate and initiate a war on 
behalf of the United States of America. In each case study, the President of the United 
States laid forth a set of defined strategic objectives to accomplish, by means of war, and 
the American public and Congress achieving them. By authorizing war, both the 
American public and Congress entrusted the military and its commanders to develop a 
strategy to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States. In the beginning of the 
Philippine-American, Vietnam and Iraq Wars military intervention was initially  viewed 
as legitimate. Counterinsurgency warfare was but one possible strategy the military had 
at its disposal. Since the United States faced insurgencies in each conflict (Aguinaldo’s 
Nationalist Forces, the Vietcong and Sunni/Shiite extremist groups), it was only natural 
that the United States would employ a strategy best suited to defeat these adversaries – 
counterinsurgency warfare. 
Following this train of logic one comes to the conclusion that counterinsurgency 
warfare is a legitimate form of warfare the American public and its representatives in 
Washington see as a viable option to defeat insurgent movements deemed to be a threat 
to the foreign policy interests of the United States. Critics of counterinsurgency warfare, 
most notably Douglas Porch, the Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs at 
the Naval Postgraduate School and Colonel Gian Gentile, a History Professor at the 
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United States Military Academy at West Point (and former soldier who commanded 
counterinsurgency operations in the Iraq War) see things differently. Their views, along 
with those of many cultural anthropologists, see counterinsurgency warfare as an 
illegitimate form of warfare. They lambast its proponents for sugarcoating what is, in 
reality, a brutal form of fighting indistinguishable from other brutal methods of combat. 
Due to its brutal nature, they argue, counterinsurgency warfare is incapable of 
accomplishing its stated objective of “winning the hearts and minds” of indigenous 
populations deemed to be vital to protecting and earning their support.   Furthermore, 
these critics see counterinsurgency warfare as a weapon of American  imperialism 
brought down upon indigenous populations enmeshed in civil wars the United States has 
no business in participating in. Understanding the arguments of  counterinsurgency 
critics, and the logic behind them, is necessary because critics of counterinsurgency offer 
useful insights into the problematic nature of counterinsurgency warfare. The criticisms 
they describe advance the narrative that counterinsurgency warfare has been ineffective 
and that historical revisionists have used it as a tool to sell war to the American public. 
While I disagree with their supposition that counterinsurgency warfare has been tactically 
ineffective, I do believe that their criticisms are quite useful in understanding how 
counterinsurgency warfare can mold negative perceptions and images of war. After all, it 
is these images and perceptions which shape the views of the American public and 
Congress. Since the continued prosecution of the counterinsurgency wars I examined 
were contingent on maintaining positive perceptions, and images, in the eyes of each 
party, it is important to understand the factors that led to the negative perceptions of 
counterinsurgency  warfare  that  came  about  during  each  conflict.     For  it  is      these 
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perceptions and images of war which played a defining role in undermining the ability of 
the United States to achieve its stated strategic objectives in the Philippines, Vietnam and 
Iraq Wars. 
Unlike many military historians and political scientists (myself included), Col. 
Gian Gentile saw counterinsurgency operations up close and personal in the Iraq War. He 
commanded a cavalry squadron responsible for executing counterinsurgency  operations 
in Baghdad in 2006. His personal experiences in Iraq spawned the belief that the 
simplistic counterinsurgency doctrine described in the  Army’s Counterinsurgency 
Manual FM-324 was incapable of defeating the insurgency he was pitted against in Iraq 
in 2006.2  In Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency Warfare, 
 
Col. Gentile advances the argument that American counterinsurgency doctrine as 
described in FM-324 creates a misleading narrative about the true nature of 
counterinsurgency warfare. He claims that one section in the manual “was a jumble of 
dreamy statements that bordered on some mixture of philosophy, theory, and military 
operational history.”3 Gentile felt that this gobbledygook of military terminology 
embodied in FM-324 flew in the face of what he witnessed in Iraq and that its 
implementation was useless in what was, from his perspective, a pure civil-war between 
Sunni and Shiites. 
Not only is Gentile critical of counterinsurgency strategy as described in 
American doctrine, but he is critical of the entire underlying historical narrative that has 
been advanced throughout the years that has framed counterinsurgency warfare  as 
capable of “winning the hearts and minds” of local indigenous populations caught amidst 
 
 
2 Gentile, Gian P. Wrong Turn : America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency. 2013., xvi 
3  Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 23. 
6  Ibid., 98. 
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sectarian conflicts. He criticizes counterinsurgency proponents such as David Galula, 
Kimberly Kagan, John Nagl, Samantha Power and even the co-author of  FM-324, 
General David Petraeus for using counterinsurgency and its subsequent nation-building 
operations as a tool to justify American intervention abroad.4 As a trained Historian, Col. 
Gentile argues that counterinsurgency advocates have created a false revisionist historical 
narrative to justify the legitimacy of counterinsurgency doctrine and its purported 
successes throughout history. In an article published in the New York Times in 2005, 
Gentile  rebutted  columnist  David  Brooks  for  arguing  that  counterinsurgency warfare 
helped the British win in Malaya and the United States turn the tides of the war in its 
favor in Vietnam: 
The myth is built on certain historical “lessons” or “models,” like the 
British in Malaya. But if you look at the case of Malaya, you will see a context 
that is radically different from Vietnam and, more important, present-day Iraq. 
The example of Malaya is often cited by those who believe that there is a template 
to follow for “winning” in Iraq . Such reductionist templates are    seductive 
because they offer easy-to-understand solutions for complex problems.5 
 
To round out his well-written and forcefully argued indictment of 
counterinsurgency warfare as implemented by the United States in Vietnam, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Gentile advances the argument that a failure in strategy and policy spawned 
America’s problems in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and not, as some argue, the 
wrongheaded military strategies employed by generals neglecting the virtues of 
counterinsurgency warfare.6 Gentile’s experience commanding soldiers in Iraq, and the 
images of the war he describes, provide grist for critics of counterinsurgency warfare who 
see it as indistinguishable from other types of war where lives are lost, physical and 
 
 
4 Gentile, America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency, 7. 
9  Ibid., 201. 
10  Ibid., 202. 
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mental wounds incurred, property destroyed, and money lost to achieve strategic 
objectives based on false narratives and unachievable strategic objectives. 
Douglas Porch sees counterinsurgency warfare as a tool of Western societies to 
justify the legitimacy of their imperialistic campaigns of military conquest. Like Gentile, 
Porch sees counterinsurgency operations from the nineteenth century as influencing 
subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns in the 20th and 21st centuries.7 He dubs 
counterinsurgency proponents as “COIN-dinistas” and states that they are: 
basically romantics, whose strategic communications target politics and 
society at home while they profess to apply paternalistic theories onto biddable 
populations required to show gratitude for their improved conditions by outing 
pistoleros, bandits, terrorists, and insurgents in their midst.8 
 
Porch also sees “COIN-dinistas” as historical revisionists claiming that a well- 
crafted counterinsurgency strategy could have won the Vietnam War. Such views, he 
claims, are premised on: 
assertions that victory is sabotaged by silent anti-COIN  conspiracies 
struck among unimaginative conventional soldiers wedded to their big war 
bureaucratic interests, cowardly politicians, and a general public whose stamina 
for the sacrifices required for national greatness has gone soft under the influence 
of democratic institutions that corrode popular will.9 
 
Porch sees America’s failure in Vietnam as being the result of an American failure to 
truly understand the dynamics of the Cold War strategic environment it was confronted 
with during the Vietnam War era.10 As a result of being in a strategic position incapable 
of achieving American interests, Porch sees counterinsurgency tactics in Vietnam as 
being incapable of changing the outcome of the war in America’s favor. 
 
 
 
7 Porch, Douglas. Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013., 318. 
8 Porch, Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War, 319. 
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Porch’s distaste for counterinsurgency warfare rears its head in his description of 
it. He sees counterinsurgency as a form of fighting which spawns indiscriminate killing, 
human rights abuses, violations of the laws of war and reinforcing of an imperialist 
mentality that can spawn views of racial superiority and even foment genocide.11 In his 
manifesto decrying counterinsurgency warfare in all ways, shapes and forms, Porch 
rounds out his critique with an insightful observation warning political scientists and 
historians about the dangers of perpetrating historically revisionist narratives to justify 
counterinsurgency warfare: 
Assertions of COIN success based in shoddy research and flawed and 
selective analysis of cases are not only an historical error. Such an abuse of the 
record of the past as the basis for professional and institutional imperatives can 
lead to people getting killed because they fail to convey that each insurgency is a 
contingent event in which doctrine, operations, and tactics must support a viable 
policy and strategy, not the other way around.12 
 
Altogether, the arguments elicited by Douglas Porch, Col. Gian Gentile are 
important to understand as they shed light on a narrative being advanced by former 
soldiers and scholars highly critical of the historical premises and the accuracy of claims 
by counterinsurgency proponents that such a form of warfare is benevolent in nature and 
capable of “winning the hearts and minds” of indigenous populations if properly executed 
by an outside occupation military force. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11Ibid., 340. 
12Ibid., 337-338. 
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Chapter 2 – The Logic of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
 
The Logic of Insurgency 
 
In the Philippine War of 1898, Vietnam and Iraq Wars, the United States has 
found itself confronted with enemies that were neither visually identifiable nor centrally 
assembled on the battlefield. With inferior numbers and resources to wage war, the 
enemies of the United States strategically avoided taking on the larger and better 
equipped American military in head-to-head confrontations on the battlefield. Instead, 
America’s enemies chose to adopt guerilla tactics that played to their strengths and 
exploited the weaknesses of the conventionally postured American military. By changing 
the nature of fighting on the battlefield and dictating war on their terms, insurgents 
altered the trajectory of war to terms favorable to their political and military interests 
rather than that of the United States. 
Military leaders and policymakers responsible for planning, training and 
executing America’s wars would have benefited from understanding the organizational 
dynamics of insurgent movements. Understanding the nature of insurgencies requires a 
concrete definition of what they are and what they embody. Many different scholars and 
dyed-in-the-wool revolutionaries have attempted to capture the essence of insurgencies 
by identifying their political goals and operational tendencies in a manner that 
encapsulates the dual nature of insurgency warfare. Oftentimes, the  term insurgent is 
used synonymously with the term guerilla. According to Robert Taber, “a guerilla war  is 
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a revolutionary war, engaging a civilian population, or a significant part of such a 
population, against the military forces of established or usurpative governmental 
authority.”13 
Insurgents fight a war that is at its heart a political struggle but oftentimes 
conducted militarily. For an insurgent, earning political support from the host population 
is far more important than killing the enemy on the field of battle. Fidel Castro and his 
successful guerilla campaign against the Batista Regime in Cuba in 1959 is but one 
example of a guerilla war that was conducted successfully without a large number of 
casualties on either side during the conflict. 
Douglas Porch focuses his definition of insurgency on the military nature of the 
conflict by arguing that insurgency is “a much older tactic by which relatively diminutive 
groups of fighters utilized surprise as a force multiplier to carry out ambushes, sabotage, 
and raids to harass and forage on the margins of large clashes of armies.”14. The US 
Army Field Manual FM 3-24 describes the term insurgency by relaying the ways in 
which political and military tactics are combined by insurgents: 
An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 
constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Stated 
another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle 
designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, 
occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.15 
 
In its definition of insurgency, the Rand Corporation adds the additional caveat 
that in modern-times, insurgencies have blossomed into multinational movements that 
 
13 Taber, Robert. War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare. 1st [Brassey's] ed.. ed. 
Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002., 7 
14 Porch, Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War,4 
15 United States. Department of the, Army, and Command United States. Marine Corps Combat 
Development. "Counterinsurgency." Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army : Headquarters, 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Dept. of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 
2006., 1-2 
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have grown in size, scope and prominence around the world and are not confined to the 
borders of one specific nation-state. The advent of globalization and global 
interdependence has allowed for insurgencies to expand their scope of influence beyond 
the confines of individual nation-states. 
All types of insurgencies have common characteristics. They  are 
organized movements to overthrow existing ruling structures by a combination of 
force and popular appeal. Their grievances, be they political, religious, ethnic, or 
economic, usually have some resonance in the population. While the traditional 
definition of insurgency has stressed armed opposition to national governing 
systems and authorities, with globalization has come the growth of insurgencies 
that are multinational in identity, reach, and aims.16 
 
Movements such as Marxism and Islamism are well-known examples of globalized 
insurgencies that aim to overthrow an existing political order in favor of their desired 
ideology. These movements cross borders and have shown the ability to recruit members 
from all corners of the world. By doing so, they made substantial progress in advancing 
their ideological and political goals. 
A war that is a political struggle and a military conflict seems like a novel concept 
that is a product of the enlightened thinking on behalf of the world’s modern military 
strategists. In reality, insurgent warfare is nothing new. As John Nagl argues “The 
essential features of guerilla warfare- the tactics of applying weakness against strength 
and the clever use of terrain to conceal guerilla forces from the enemy’s main body- have 
barely changed since the days of the Romans and Persians.”17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Gordon, John, and David C. Gompert. War by Other Means : Building Complete and Balanced 
Capabilities for Counterinsurgency. Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency. 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2008, xxix 
17  16: Nagl, John A. Learning to eat soup with a knife: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 2005, 16 
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Since insurgency warfare has been around since the dawn of western civilization, 
the world’s most prominent military scholars have long been aware of its presence. The 
first documented reference to insurgent warfare occurs in Sun Tzu’s famous treatise The 
Art of War. 
All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; 
when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, 
that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When 
he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general 
and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage arrogance. Keep him under a strain 
and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally 
out when he does not expect you. These are the strategist’s keys to victory.18 
 
Insurgency was also mentioned by the famous Prussian Military Theorist Carl von 
Clausewitz. In On War, Clausewitz argues that “guerilla war is the extension of politics 
by means of armed conflict.”19 The most successful insurgents have been those that have 
combined politics and armed conflict to achieve their political objectives. Whether its 
successful revolutionary figures such as Mao Tse-Tung, Fidel Castro or Ho Chi Minh, 
each of these successful revolutionary leaders understood the concepts of insurgent 
warfare in theory and were able to apply it in practice. 
The Logic of Counterinsurgency 
 
One might think that the American military, the best equipped and most powerful 
military in the history of the world, would understand how to fight a form of warfare that 
is, perhaps, as old as western civilization itself. Except for a brief period during the 
Indian Wars of the 19th Century, the United States has oftentimes struggled mightily to 
defeat insurgencies decisively in sustained counterinsurgency campaigns. In the 
Philippine  War  of  1898,  Vietnam  and  Iraq  Wars,  America’s  failure  to     efficiently 
 
 
18 Cleary, Thomas F., and active th century B. C. Sunzi. The Art of War. 1st ed.. ed. Boston : [New York]: 
Shambhala ; Distributed in the United States by Random House, 1988., 168 
19 Taber, War of the Flea, 16 
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dismantle the political and military infrastructure of its insurgent opposition cost the 
United States a great deal of blood and treasure that need not have been spent if 
counterinsurgency warfare was understood by the military hierarchy and its soldiers. 
In the case of the United States, failing to pacify insurgencies in a timely fashion 
and with precision had devastating consequences for the counterinsurgency campaigns in 
the Philippines, Vietnam and Iraq. There is little room for error in a struggle that is, at its 
core, a political and military campaign for winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the host 
population. Carl von Clausewitz adds further understanding to the state of affairs that 
will ensue if counterinsurgents do not swiftly dismantle the political and military 
infrastructure of the insurgents: 
Since it needs time to be effective, a state of tension will develop while the two 
enemies interact. This tension will gradually relax, if the insurgency is suppressed in 
some places and slowly burns itself out in others, or else it will build up to a crisis: a 
general conflagration closes in on the enemy, driving him out of the country before he is 
faced with total destruction.20 
 
Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign is contingent upon 
convincing the host population that the counterinsurgents offer a better life for the host 
population than under that of the insurgents. Scholars of counterinsurgency have 
attempted to encapsulate this broad goal by honing in on the specific tactics and strategies 
that need to be employed by counterinsurgents to do such a thing. Robert Thompson 
argues that there are five core principles of counterinsurgency that must be employed if 
the government hopes to achieve its strategic objectives in a counterinsurgency 
campaign: 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993., 479-480 
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1) The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free 
independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and 
viable 
2) The government must function in accordance with the law 
3) The government must have an overall plan 
4) The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the 
guerillas. 
5) In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas 
first.21 
 
Frank Kitson believes that counterinsurgency tactics can be successfully employed by 
defeating the insurgents if three distinct tactical objectives are achieved. Kitson uses the 
analogy of dividing a fish into three separate parts (head, body and tail) to relay his ideas 
on counterinsurgency: 
In attempting to counter subversion it is necessary to take account of three separate 
elements. The first two constitute the target proper, that is to say the Party or Front and its 
cells and committees on the one hand, and the armed groups who are supporting them 
and being supported by them on the other. They may be said to constitute the head and 
the body of a fish. The third element is the population and this represents the water in 
which the fish swims. Fish vary from place to place in accordance with the water in 
which they are designed to live, and the same can be said of subversive organizations. If a 
fish has got to be destroyed it can be attacked directly by rod or net, providing it is in the 
sort of position which gives these methods a chance of success. But if rod and net cannot 
succeed by themselves it may be necessary to do something to the water which will force 
the fish into a position where it can be caught. Conceivably it might be necessary to kill 
the fish by polluting the water, but this is unlikely to be a desirable course of action.22 
 
Other scholars have been more succinct in their description of counterinsurgency 
warfare. General David Petraeus describes counterinsurgency as “the military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government 
to defeat an insurgency.”23  David Kilcullen, a contemporary of General Petraeus who 
 
 
 
 
21 Lindsay, Kennedy, and Robert Grainger Ker Thompson. Defeating Communist Insurgency : 
Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. 3rd imp.. ed. London: Chatto & Windus, 1967. ,50-60 
22 Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping. London ; Boston: 
Faber and Faber, 1991., 49 
23 US Army,  Counterinsurgency, 1-2 
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served as his Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor in the Iraq War, describes 
counterinsurgency as: 
An umbrella term that describes the complete range of measures that 
governments take to defeat insurgencies. These measures may be political, 
administrative, military, economic, psychological, or informational, and are 
almost always used in combination.24 
 
David Ucko adds further clarity to the definition of counterinsurgency by 
describing three key features of counterinsurgency that he argues must be employed by 
the counterinsurgents if they hope to defeat their unconventional adversaries on the field 
of battle: 
1) A medium-to-high level of hostile activity targeting the stabilizing forces, 
whether foreign or local; this is also known as a nonpermissive operational 
environment. 
2) An underlying state-building initiative, of which the military stabilization 
effort is but a subset. State-building is here loosely understood as primarily 
nonmilitary assistance in the creation or reinforcement of state structures, 
culminating in the formation of a government that is, at very least, able to 
maintain stability in the territory under its jurisdiction. 
3) The deployment of ground troops to conduct operations in the midst of a local 
civilian population.25 
David Galula describes counterinsurgency as a more process-oriented campaign 
that must be conducted efficiently and effectively if it hopes to succeed in its goals: In his 
book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice Galula argues that 
counterinsurgency is “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order 
to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing 
order.”26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2010., 1 
25 Ucko, David H. 2009. The new counterinsurgency era: transforming the U.S. military for modern 
wars. Washington, D.C.: Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press.,10 
26Galula, David. Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. New York: Praeger.1964., 4 
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Colleen Bell elaborates on the nature of a more process oriented campaign of 
conducting counterinsurgency operations by focusing on the importance of “Economic 
development, institutional development and the gathering of cultural and ethnographic 
intelligence in an effort to become better acquainted with the host culture and its societal 
needs.”27 
Altogether each scholar mentioned adds something different to the multifaceted 
definition of counterinsurgency warfare. Despite being an age-old concept, few scholars 
have written extensively about the nature of counterinsurgency warfare as conducted by 
the United States military. It was not until 2006 that counterinsurgency as an academic 
study made a comeback in academia and the think-tank community. A plethora of 
academic studies have been conducted since then on a wide array of aspects surrounding 
the dynamics of counterinsurgency warfare. With violent insurgencies raging throughout 
the Middle East, Africa and across the globe it appears that for the foreseeable future 
counterinsurgency warfare will maintain itself as a viable military and political option for 
nation-states seeking to bring stability to states enmeshed in sectarian strife or civil war. 
Understanding the unique dynamics of counterinsurgency warfare and the United States’ 
experience employing, adds further clarity understanding three of America’s most 
defining military struggles of the 20th and 21st centuries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27Bell, Colleen. Civilianising warfare: Ways of war and peace in modern counterinsurgency. Journal of 
International Relations and Development, 14, 3, 309-332. Jan 1, 2011., 312 
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Chapter 3 –Strategic Interests & Counterinsurgency 
A laymen’s definition of the term strategy would likely entail an answer of 
something along the lines of “a plan to accomplish a goal or specific task.” However, this 
definition doesn’t encompass the entire picture needed when defining the subject in the 
context of international relations. Strategy is a multifaceted term that simultaneously 
describes the interconnected nature of diplomacy and war within the context of a given 
countries’ foreign policy. Such views are reflected by military theorists such as   Prussian 
soldier and scholar Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). Clausewitz described strategy as 
“the connecting ligament between war and politics.”28 Contemporary definitions of 
strategy within the field of Political Science fall along similar lines. In The Masks of War: 
American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis Carl H. Builder defines strategy as: “a 
concept for relating means to ends.”29 In foreign policy, all strategies have a purpose, 
which is to achieve the end goals (whatever they may be) of a country’s foreign policy. 
The United States has always employed a strategy (for better or for worse) to 
achieve its foreign goals. A more descriptive definition of the nature of the term strategy 
is needed to encapsulate the true meaning of the term within the context of American 
Foreign Policy. To secure its foreign policy objectives, by means of employing 
counterinsurgency warfare, the United States simultaneously employs three specific and 
distinct levels of strategies: 
1) National Security Strategy 
2) Doctrinal Strategy 
3) Tactical Military Strategy 
 
 
 
28 Reus-Smit, Christian, and Duncan Snidal. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. International 
Relations. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008., 559 
29 Builder, Carl H. The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. Baltimore: Johns 
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Studying America’s implementation of counterinsurgency warfare within the 
context of each strategy sheds light on the successes and failures (both real and imagined) 
of America’s implementation of counterinsurgency warfare during each war examined in 
my study. The implications that can be drawn from understanding the multifaceted nature 
of counterinsurgency warfare will shed light on the problematic nature employing it to 
achieve the strategic objectives of American Foreign Policy. The results garnered from 
my study will be of great importance to scholars, policymakers, soldiers and students 
alike who seek to gain a greater understanding of the factors which have undermined the 
ability of the United States to perform textbook counterinsurgency strategies in wars 
where its employment was deemed to be necessary to achieve the strategic interests of 
American Foreign Policy. 
Counterinsurgency & US National Security Strategy 
 
The United States protects its national security interests at home and abroad by 
means of employing a national security strategy premised on deterring its adversaries and 
utilizing the capabilities of the United States to project its power in order to safeguard its 
national security interests and objectives.30 Hard power, or military force, is but one tool 
the United States has at its disposal. The United States can also employ soft power to 
persuade its adversaries through coercive diplomacy and foreign aid payments rather than 
by force. Despite the dichotomy between these two competing strategies, both are 
employed towards the same end; achieving the strategic objectives of American Foreign 
Policy. 
 
 
30 US Army, Field Manual 100-5. Fighting Future Wars. New Edition: Published with the Institute of Land 
Warfare Association of the US Army. Brassey’s (US). A Maxwell MacMillan Company. Washington,  New 
York, London., Pg. 1-3 
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World events and shifts in the global balance of power routinely alter national 
security threats to the United States. Throughout American history, great powers have 
come and gone and wars have started and finished almost without pause since the United 
States declared itself a nation-state. When the United States declared independence from 
Great Britain in 1776, it took nearly a century before the United States was free of 
national security threats from within its own borders. After the Civil War and periodic 
border skirmishes with Native Americans during the latter portion of the 19th Century, the 
 
United States found itself for the first time lacking a domestic threat to its national 
security. 
New threats to American national security emerged. The leading colonial powers 
of the 19th Century (Great Britain, Germany, Spain, France and Russia) saw the United 
States as a newfound peer on the world stage and thus a potential threat to their national 
security interests. The United States pivoted its national security strategy to counter the 
challenges posed by their newfound international adversaries. In 1823, President James 
Monroe articulated what became known as The Monroe Doctrine in his State of the 
Union Speech. The Monroe Doctrine set forth the guiding principles of American 
national security strategy in the years leading up to the Spanish-American War and the 
outbreak of hostilities in the Philippines. The Monroe Doctrine warned European powers 
to cease their colonial pursuits in Latin America and stay out of the Western 
Hemisphere.31 When the Spanish failed to heed this warning the United States had no 
qualms with declaring war and expelling her presence from the Western Hemisphere. As 
a result of this policy, the United States took control of Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico and the 
 
 
31United States. US Department of State. Monroe Doctrine: 1823. 
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Philippines. When an insurgency developed in the Philippines posing a threat to 
American rule of the archipelago, the military was sent in to perform counterinsurgency 
operations in order to protect the strategic interests of the United States in, what was 
believed to become, a geopolitical location of great importance to American economic 
and military interests in the South Pacific. 
By the mid-1960s, the multi-polar world of the pre- World War II era was no 
more. The United States faced a newfound strategic adversary in the Soviet Union. After 
World War II, the Soviet Union was seen by the American political establishment as the 
biggest ideological, political and national security threat to the United States. No other 
world power at the time could rival the economic, political and military clout of the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet style communism posed the most pressing 
political and economic threat to the United States and its allies abroad. The Truman 
Administration calibrated its national security strategy in NSC-68 to contain the spread of 
communism before it could do further damage to American interests. At the root of 
Containment was a calculated strategy to support and defend noncommunist regimes 
around the world vulnerable to falling under the Soviet sphere of influence. As 
communist-backed insurgencies erupted throughout much of the Third World in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the United States found itself confronted with a  political 
challenge in the French colony of Vietnam. After Ho-Chi Minh led a successful 
communist insurgency and expelled the French from the peninsula in 1954, the United 
States took a stand in Vietnam to prevent the country from falling to communism and 
into the Soviet sphere of influence. The United States cemented an alliance with Ngo 
Dinh Diem and propped up a noncommunist political regime in South Vietnam under  his 
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leadership. The Americans robustly supported Ngo Dinh Diem, a French-educated 
Catholic with strong anti-communist political leanings, to serve as a bulwark against their 
communist adversary in the north. The United States sent inordinate amounts of 
economic and military support to the Diem Regime over the course of the next decade as 
it was believed by many policymakers at the time that a failure to do so would embolden 
the Soviet Union and cause a cascading effect of falling dominoes where surrounding 
countries in Southeast Asia would fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. 
Eventually, Cold War tensions dissipated and the Soviet Union fell apart under 
the weight of its own economic policies. The United States emerged from the Cold War 
as a sole global hegemonic power with the world’s largest economy and most powerful 
military. To fuel its economic and military machine, the United States depended on a 
steady flow of oil from the Middle East. As a result, the Middle East grew in strategic, 
political and economic importance to the United States. In the Shah of Iran, the United 
States had a key ally in the region to enable its economic pursuits in the region. The 
United States failed to understand the fragile nature of his political regime and was 
caught flat-footed when the Shah was deposed in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. After 
storming the American embassy and kidnapping American diplomats, Iran became a 
regional adversary of the United States in the Middle East. To quell the threat from the 
Islamic Republic, the United States provided diplomatic, economic and military support 
to regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in his war against the Iran. Having cemented a 
temporary alliance with the United States in the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein believed 
would have American backing and political support going forward. Saddam Hussein 
miscalculated the political posturing of its ex-ally and found himself fighting his    former 
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ally in the Gulf War of 1991. The United States subsequently saw Saddam Hussein as a 
madman hell-bent on gobbling up territory in the Middle East and  destabilizing the 
region. The United States believed Hussein had a massive stockpile of chemical and 
biological weapons at his disposal. Having used such weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, and 
on his own civilians, policymakers in the United States believed there was a high degree 
of likelihood he would do so again. Saddam’s game of cat and mouse with UN Weapons 
inspectors confirmed this belief in the eyes of officials in the Bush Administration. To 
preemptively dispel the future threat Saddam Hussein allegedly posed to geopolitical 
stability in the Middle East and to the national security interests of the United States, the 
Bush Administration made the case for war and invaded Iraq to topple Saddam’s regime 
in 2003. 
Counterinsurgency & Doctrinal Strategy 
 
Throughout American military history counterinsurgency warfare has been but 
one small component of the overall makeup of American military doctrine. The United 
States crafts military doctrine with the intention that the principles outlined in  the 
treatises will serve as a sort of guiding light capable of regulating the behavior, and 
mindset, of all soldiers involved in the war effort. More specifically, the United States 
Army defines military doctrine as: 
The statement of how America’s Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct 
war and operations other than war. It is the condensed expression of the Army’s 
fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events in operations other than war, and 
deterring actions detrimental to national interests. As an authoritative statement, doctrine 
must be definitive enough to guide specific operations, yet remain adaptable enough to 
address diverse and varied situations worldwide.32 
 
 
 
 
 
32 US Army Field Manual 100-5. Fighting Future Wars. 1-1. 
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The first time counterinsurgency warfare was described in American military 
doctrine was in the context of General Order in 1863. General Order served as the 
guiding doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare for the United States in the Civil War, 
Indian Wars and in the Philippine-American War. After America’s counterinsurgency 
campaign in the Philippines, the doctrine and the practice of counterinsurgency warfare 
were effectively forgotten both by the military establishment and left to the purview of 
Special Forces performing unconventional war tactics.33  Counterinsurgency warfare  was 
 
described intermittently in The 1980 Marine Corps Guide and the Marine Corps “Small 
Wars” Manual before its first official canonization in American military doctrine in the 
US Army & Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24. Prior to the 
implementation of FM 3-24 counterinsurgency warfare strategy was interspersed within 
the context of conventional military doctrine rather than as an altogether separate form of 
warfare. Since insurgents hide within the civilian population, and derive their legitimacy 
from their ability to exert control over the host population, a military performing 
conventional military operations involving cavalry charges, artillery shelling and aerial 
bombing raids will be ill-suited to fighting an asymmetrical conflict. American soldiers 
trained to believe that superior military power could defeat any enemy would  grapple 
with the unintended consequences of this conviction in the  Philippine-American, 
Vietnam and Iraq Wars. 
Counterinsurgency & Tactical Military Interests 
 
The Army defines tactics as the specific execution of battles and engagements.34 
Tactical  operations  are  designed  with  the  ultimate  goal  of  making  progress towards 
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winning a war and achieving the strategic objectives in the conflict. FM 3-24 describes 
counterinsurgency tactics as a combination of offensive, defensive and stability 
operations.35 The nature of these tactics could be as simple as building roads and schools 
or as complex as conducting cordon-and-search operations in a dense urban environment 
or executing a targeted propaganda campaign geared towards ending a sectarian conflict. 
In theory, all counterinsurgency tactical operations are all conducted with the intent that 
they will lead to the pacification of the insurgency and the achievement of the strategic 
objectives in the military conflict. The problematic nature behind achieving this ideal is at 
the root cause as to why it is so difficult for the United States to achieve its strategic 
objectives in counterinsurgency wars and why the American public has so often 
relinquished its support for counterinsurgency warfare despite the fact of its tactical 
success in pacifying insurgencies deemed to be a threat to the national security interests 
of the United States. 
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Chapter 4 – Liberalism & the American Psyche 
When the United States conducted counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippines, 
Vietnam and in Iraq, the fighting itself directly influenced a number of key constituencies 
in the American public. American soldiers, policymakers, and civilians alike were 
personally impacted by the nature of the counterinsurgency wars themselves. Americans 
tend to view counterinsurgency warfare as an act distinctly separate from political life. 
Insurgents pitted against the United States think differently. They see  their military 
tactics in a strategic context; as being part of a broader political conflict against the 
United States. In each war examined in this study, insurgencies fighting the United States 
conducted targeted propaganda campaigns designed to turn the American public against 
supporting the war effort. By turning public opinion against the war, insurgents believe 
they will limit the ability of the United States to continue performing counterinsurgency 
operations. Once the United States reneges from its counterinsurgency campaign 
commitments, the strategic objectives of the war (which were initially supported 
overwhelmingly) are compromised and the insurgents win political control over the host 
population. 
The logical conclusion a student of military affairs can draw from this dynamic is 
twofold. First, the United States needs to wage counterinsurgency warfare more 
efficiently if it hopes to have a fighting chance in defeating insurgencies on the battlefield 
and in the hearts and minds of the populace they hope to secure loyalty from. Secondly, 
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the US military needs to be cognizant of the fact that fighting counterinsurgency 
campaigns in a heavy-handed manner will cause American public opinion to turn against 
the war effort which will ultimately undermine the popular strategic objectives the 
military was sent to accomplish at the outset of the conflict. The best way to understand 
why Americans will turn against counterinsurgency wars can be done by exploring the 
manner in which Americans view war. The values of liberalism provide a strategic 
context in which one can understand this enigma. 
Historically, the United States has been a country reluctant to fight wars. 
Diplomacy has always been the preferred course of action to achieve America’s foreign 
policy objectives going all the way back to the earliest deliberations of the Continental 
Congress in the 1770s when numerous diplomatic overtures were made to King George 
III asking him to give the colonists representation in Parliament. It was not until all 
diplomatic channels were exhausted that the colonists took up arms against the British. 
The United States has never been a society, like Caesar’s Rome, or Napoleon’s France, 
whose societal instincts favored war over diplomacy to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives. 
From its earliest days, the American psyche has been molded by thinkers that 
preached peace instead of war. Thomas Paine, one of the leading liberal thinkers of the 
American Revolution, saw war as a defective practice that would inevitably stunt 
American political development. Instead, Paine proposed that war could be mitigated 
through constructive activities like commerce and trade.36 Other liberal thinkers, such as 
Jeremy Bentham, articulated policies that urged diplomacy, trade, arms reductions and 
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the abandonment of colonial ambitions to usher in an era of peace rather than conflict.37 
Paine and Bentham’s strain of liberalism was a continuation of the school of thought 
advocated by thinkers such as Kant and Montesquieu and their ideas were held in high 
esteem by the founding fathers and their contemporaries in positions of power in the 
United States. 
In the years after the American Revolution, political leaders in the United States 
continued articulating beliefs reminiscent of earlier liberal thinkers. Most Americans at 
the time practiced a progressive version of Protestantism that preached liberal values such 
as individualism, economic self-sufficiency and rationalism. Behind the liberal veneer 
that dominated the public sphere, a state of affairs emerged that posed a serious threat to 
the post-revolution liberal order: power politics. The United States was a growing 
superpower in a world dominated by realpolitik. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans created 
a buffer that allowed the United States to cast a blind-eye to the continental wars that 
engulfed Europe throughout the 19th Century. By the dawn of the 20th Century this  state 
of affairs would quickly change. The United States adopted a more proactive approach to 
foreign affairs by growing its navy and increasing its trading partners abroad. If it were to 
survive in a world defined by great colonial powers like Great Britain and Spain the 
United States would need to develop an outward looking foreign policy that was capable 
of positioning the country in position where it could stand toe to toe with its strategic 
adversaries who happen to be actively working to extend their spheres of interest in the 
Western Hemisphere. 
Political leaders such as Secretary of the Navy Alfred Thayer Mahan, and his 
Deputy Teddy Roosevelt, urged a call to arms to counter the new threat emanating    from 
37 Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience, 33. 
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Spain. These leaders, along with a compliant press, blended liberal values like anti- 
colonialism and freedom from oppression to push America into war. The United States 
began to act more like a colonial power and not a liberal nation. Its leaders had 
repackaged Thomas Jefferson’s Manifest Destiny and applied it to foreign affairs in order 
to establish regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Despite its success as a 
domestic ideology, the liberal movement was void of a thinker at the time that could 
effectively articulate the liberal position in foreign policy debates. As Samuel Huntington 
argues, liberalism failed as an ideology of foreign affairs for three reasons: 
1) It was indifferent to foreign affairs. 
2) Its application of domestic solutions to international affairs. 
3) Its search for objectivity in foreign affairs.38 
 
The brutality and carnage that played out in the Philippine-American War struck a 
chord which awoke the sleeping American liberal conscience. As it became clear that the 
United States was fighting a bloody counterinsurgency campaign in an effort to civilize 
our “little brown-brother,” liberal voices began to emerge critical of war as a tool of 
foreign policy. When the United States Senate convened the hearings on war crimes in 
the Philippines in 1899, a myriad of newspapers, politicians, organizations and 
intellectuals spawned a liberal awakening which culminated in the founding of the Anti- 
Imperialist League. To these liberal elites, who occupied positions of powers in American 
social, political and economic circles, the United States of America was a country 
founded upon the principles of peace, tolerance and self-determination as opposed to 
conquest and colonialism. 
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In the years following America’s first experiment with colonialism abroad and its 
first liberal backlash at home, a new trend would emerge in debates over war and peace. 
Liberal thinkers, embodied in such figures as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Lyndon Johnson preached an end to war through international organizations and 
treaties while at the same time supporting wars against enemies whose very presence on 
the world stage was anathema to the liberal creed. Whether it was fighting the Quadruple 
Alliance, Axis Powers, Global Communism or Islamic fundamentalism, the American 
public has not been hesitant to support going to war to defeat its illiberal enemies. 
Rather than see each war through its conclusion before a judgment was rendered 
on its legacy, the American public has oftentimes recoiled from war during its 
implementation. This schizophrenic state of affairs in the United States has been 
problematic for the American military. On one hand, the American public demands that 
they go to war to defeat their illiberal enemies but on the other they are told that the way 
they fight the war is inconsistent with American values. The United States is supportive 
of going to war, naturally against war in perpetuity, and prone to start wars for the greater 
good of humanity all at the same time. These inherently contradictory positions define 
American thinking as it pertains to matters of war and peace. This state of affairs is 
problematic for every policymaker, soldier and citizen in the United States who must 
make a decision as to whether or not to authorize, fight or vote to support the war effort. 
Understanding America’s liberal intellectual roots, its support for wars against 
illiberal enemies, and its general aversion to warfare, provides one with an analytical 
framework to understand the problematic nature of employing counterinsurgency warfare 
to  achieve  the  strategic  objectives  of  American  Foreign  Policy.     It  is  within    this 
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framework that I will explain why the American public recoils from supporting a form of 
warfare that has been described by its advocates as benevolent and by its detractors as 
imperialistic, brutal and ill-conceived. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 – American Military Culture & Civil-Military Relations 
In order to understand why the United States has oftentimes failed in its quest to 
create positive public perceptions of its tactically successful counterinsurgency 
campaigns, a further analysis of American military culture is needed. In The American 
Culture of War, Adrian Lewis advances the argument that a nation’s culture “decisively 
influences the way a nation conducts war.”39 Understanding the state of  American 
culture, and its impact on the military, is a prerequisite to understanding the mindset of 
American military leaders and the troops under their command  responsible for 
performing counterinsurgency operations. Another important aspect of  American 
military culture is impact of the most recently fought war on the mindset of top military 
brass and the troops under their command. Officers who cut their teeth on the battlefield 
as Second Lieutenants and Captains eventually become Colonels and Generals as time 
goes on. The lessons they learned from fighting in previous wars plays a decisive role in 
shaping the organizational culture of the fighting force they train and command on the 
battlefield. In The Professional Soldier Morris Janowitz alludes to this state of affairs in 
his study of American military culture: 
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Dogmatic doctrine is a typical organizational reflex reaction to future 
uncertainties. What has happened in the past becomes a powerful precedent for future 
engagements. Military leaders who have experienced combat develop prestige and 
reputation…..40 
 
In addition to shaping military culture, leaders of the  military establishment 
shape national security strategy, military doctrine, civil-military and congressional 
relations. They also play a role in international diplomacy by means of their military 
attaches abroad and multilateral institutions and treaties to which the United States is a 
signatory party. Moreover, the military establishment is also intimately involved in an 
ongoing public relations campaign in order to maintain good relations with the media and 
broader civilian populace. A good public relations image is of the utmost important to the 
military establishment. If the military establishment is incapable of maintaining 
credibility in the public sphere, they risk alienating the elected officials whose support 
they need in order to authorize and fund their military campaigns. Civilian leaders 
oftentimes share the brunt of this burden. They are the ones responsible for answering to 
the President and Congress and the American public. The actions of the soldiers below 
them in the chain of command are just as much their responsibility as they are of the 
individual soldiers themselves. When it comes to molding public perceptions of 
counterinsurgency warfare, and the images of this form of warfare which molds these 
perceptions, the American public has come to view the images of civilian leaders 
responsible for starting the war just as much representative of the war effort itself as the 
images of the individual atrocities committed in the counterinsurgency campaign 
themselves.   In   the   United   States,   civilian   leaders   responsible   for   drafting   and 
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implementing military policy and strategy are more often than not seen as symbols of war 
by the broader American public rather than the individual military outfits, their officers 
and the names of individual soldiers performing the actions which civilian personnel are 
held responsible for. Despite working towards achieving the same strategic objectives, 
civilian leaders and soldiers underneath them in the chain of command have uniquely 
different experiences and theories of how the military should perform counterinsurgency 
operations in practice. The clashing of these two diametrically opposed organizational 
cultures is at the root cause as to why the United States has yet to perform a textbook 
counterinsurgency campaign; perfect in every measurable metric, and perceived as a 
success throughout the duration of the entire campaign itself. 
In the American military, the culture of each military service branch is distinctly 
unique. Each separate culture has a profound influence in shaping the psyche of the 
soldiers in it. The organizational culture of each service branch subsequently yields a 
different type of soldier. Soldiers are trained differently in each service branch in order 
maximize their performance and efficiency within the broader context of their own 
service’s mission. Despite serving under the same organizational umbrella in the 
Department of Defense, the psychological mindset of an Army infantryman fighting in 
face-to-face combat in the swamps of the Philippines ends up being much different from 
that of a Navy technician monitoring signals intelligence from a base in the United States. 
Soldiers serving in uniquely different service branches develop different opinions on how 
best to carry out their orders in order to achieve the tactical military objectives of the war. 
Despite sharing commonly held values such as honor, bravery, valor and patriotism, 
servicemen and women in different Services and branches of the military are far from 
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uniform in their behavior and approach to fighting counterinsurgency warfare. They tend 
to believe that their particular service branch, and the capabilities of it, is best suited to 
achieve the strategic objectives of the war itself. 
The psyche and worldview of an individual soldier, even within the same military 
branch, is far from uniform. According to Morris Janowitz, each soldier falls within one 
of three categories within the military establishment: heroic leaders, military managers 
and military technologists.41 Heroic leaders are nationalistic, patriotic and strongly 
embody the archetypical “warrior type”. They are typically (but not exclusively) enlisted 
soldiers that will fight in infantry units where combat will be fiercest and  most 
dangerous. Without heroic leaders within its ranks, a military may lose morale when 
times are tough undermining the ability of the military to fight and win on the field of 
battle. Troops who are the antithesis of the warrior ethos may be prone to go MIA or 
defect to the enemy camp based on their own narrow self-interests rather than doing 
what’s best for the military whose uniform they bare. The historic image of George 
Washington enduring the elements at Valley Forge and training his men to fight on 
through the brutal weather of 1779 is but one example of a “heroic leader” embodying 
the warrior ethos. 
Military managers have a different set of character traits. Military managers think 
strategically and are concerned with conducting war in a rational and methodical way to 
further the political interests of their country. They play a major role in formulating the 
chain of command and building the institutional structures in which the military operates. 
President William McKinley’s Secretary of the Navy Alfred Thayer Mahan is the 
quintessential  “military  manager.”  His  role  in  shaping  the  national  security strategy, 
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doctrine and naval tactics in the 1890s played a significant role in shaping the modern 
American Navy. The navy’s subsequent victories in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba and 
Manila Bay in the Spanish-American War would not have been possible if Mahan, and 
his subordinates in the US Navy, had not performed their duties as military managers 
responsibly. 
Military technicians are a different from their warrior and managerial counterparts 
in that they are not naturally creatures of the military establishment. They are typically 
professionals in their own right with training in areas such as computing, engineering, 
and the biological sciences. The military technician is employed to research and develop 
technology that will help the military modernize its fighting force in order to fight its 
wars more efficiently. Historically, military technicians have played a major role in 
developing new weapons systems, armor, mechanized vehicles and communications 
technology for use in each distinct service branch in the military. Without the cultivation 
of astute military technicians, in programs such as the Manhattan Project, the United 
States military wouldn’t have been able to develop the atomic bomb that allowed it to 
defeat the Japanese and end World War II. Superior weaponry and technology is a game 
changer in war which determines the nature of the war itself and the fighting which takes 
place within it. 
As classically liberal values changed the face of American society, so too did they 
change American military culture. Since its founding, the United States has adopted more 
progressive social policies. Changing public perceptions on matters of civil rights and 
gender equality have reflected themselves in American military culture. During the times 
of the founding fathers, inalienable rights articulated in the Declaration of  Independence, 
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and later codified in the Constitution, were possessed exclusively by white men of 
privilege. By the dawn of the 21st Century, those same liberal values were guaranteed to 
all segments of society regardless of an individual’s wealth, race, religion or country of 
origin. Racists that justified segregation in the military oftentimes argued that minorities 
were less capable then their white counterparts on the field of battle. Such sentiments 
were patently false. Soldiers of color have played decisive roles in every single war 
fought by the United States and proved to be as capable as their white counterparts even 
during times when they were fighting to preserve freedoms for others that they 
themselves were denied at home. 
During the Philippine-American War of 1898, minorities served in segregated 
units and were relegated to the lowest levels of the chain of command receiving the least 
desirable assignments. They were treated as second-class soldiers for no other reason 
other than the color of their skin. Harry Truman brought about a profound change to 
American military culture by desegregating the Armed Forces in 1948. Over time, the 
military adapted its policies to reflect changes in American public opinion on matters 
pertaining to race. At the dawn of the Vietnam War, the military had grown into a fully 
integrated institution that had already seen the pinning of its first African-American Four- 
Star General. Three decades later at the outset of the Iraq War, women and minorities 
played a major role in every aspect of the preparation and execution of the war effort. 
Over time, the Armed Forces changed its approach to fighting war altogether. 
The military that fought the Philippine-American War had a much more expansive view 
of the use of force than did their counterparts in Vietnam and later Iraq. Changes and 
adaptations to military doctrine reflected an evolving view of the utility of force and  how 
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best to employ it. Over time, the military as an institution adopted stricter enforcement of 
the laws of war and tighter regulations governing the rules of engagement in combat. 
Harsher penalties for violating the Uniformed Code of Military Justice and a more 
thorough and robust judicial system were developed. Despite all of the legal mechanisms 
and additional safeguards meant to make war less inhumane, counterinsurgency warfare 
has continued to elicit strong feelings of resentment in the eyes of the American public in 
lieu of the fact that the military has adapted more progressive internal and external 
policies to its approach of employing counterinsurgency warfare. America’s reticence to 
embracing the nature of counterinsurgency warfare, even if proven successful, has 
remained a constant throughout American military history. 
I. Images of Atrocities & Perceived Violations of the Laws of War 
 
Visual imagery has a profound impact in molding perceptions of war in the minds 
of the American public. Prior to the invention of the camera, an individual’s imagination, 
drawings and portraits were the sole means for one to visualize images of warfare. 
Popular images of warfare included the gallant pose of George Washington leading his 
men in a rowboat across the Delaware River. Photographer Matthew Brady changed 
these perceptions through the lens of his camera. Artistically embellished portraits were 
replaced with gruesome images of dead bodies overflowing from trenches and wounded 
soldiers hobbling from the battlefields in Antietam and Gettysburg. Such images elicited 
strong emotions from Americans. Media elites found that they could employ visual 
imagery to forge a certain viewpoint or reinforce a particular position on a given topic 
based upon the visual images they relayed to their audience. As Time Magazine writer 
Lance  Morrow  argues:  “still  and  video  images  are  mainlined  into  a      democracy’s 
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emotional bloodstream without the mediation of conscious thought.”42 With the ability to 
selectively filter the images coming into the homes of average Americans, the media 
found itself emboldened with a newfound power to shape public perceptions of war 
throughout the United States. This state of affairs put added pressure on policymakers 
responsible for crafting national security policy. Instead of debating issues of war and 
peace over long periods of time, elected officials were expected to act more rapidly in 
order to meet the demands of their constituents. As Political Scientist Andrew Bacevich 
notes,  “by  exacerbating  fears  and  stoking  passions,  the  news  media  create     public 
predispositions for action (or inaction) that take precedence over any calculus of long 
range policy considerations, thereby making it impossible for elites to play their 
accustomed role.”43 By eliciting strong emotional feelings in the minds of its viewers, the 
news media can instantly impact how an individual feels towards a particular event. This 
situation causes an individual to make an immediate conclusion about an event that is 
complex in nature and deserving of a thorough analysis in order to fully grasp the 
circumstances behind the image and its context within the broader war itself. 
In each of war documented in this study, specific images from each war molded 
public perceptions of utility of the war effort before, during and after each war. As 
previously stated, images have the ability to both encourage and discourage the use of 
military force. They can spark a military conflict or prevent one before its starts. More 
importantly, images have the ability to change public perceptions of the perceived status 
of the war while it’s taking place. Regardless of the success or failure of the tactical 
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military operations taking place at the time, images of war never lose their ability to alter 
the trajectory of a military conflict. In fact, the insurgencies the United States was pitted 
against in each war were consciously aware of this dynamic and attempted to calibrate 
their military operations to alter public perceptions of the war in the United States at 
strategically planned time periods of their choosing. The perceptions created from these 
images, both real and imagined, have historically undermined public support  for 
tactically successful counterinsurgency operations making progress on the battlefield in 
achieving the strategic objectives set forth by the American public and Congress in the 
beginning of the war. 
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Case Study 1: The Philippine War of 1898 
 
By the dawn of the 20th Century the United States had effectively established 
political control over the entirety of the North American continent. It appeared as if the 
founding fathers vision of manifest destiny was complete. Hostile Indian Tribes had been 
defeated and the western frontier was awash with settlers looking for economic 
opportunity in the rugged frontier of the American West. The United States now stretched 
from sea to shining to sea. Having consolidated its power domestically, the United States 
found itself quickly rising into a global power alongside the likes of established colonial 
powerhouses such as Germany, Great Britain, Spain, France and Russia. 
Having annexed Hawaii under questionable legal circumstances in 1898, the 
United States found itself in a strategic position to expand its economic opportunities in 
Asia. Corporate interests and their enablers in Washington saw access to  Chinese 
markets as a boon for business. The only roadblock that stood in the way of the United 
States and its newfound ambitions in the Far East and in the Western Hemisphere was the 
aging and declining Spanish empire. Finding themselves mired in a costly occupation in 
Cuba, which later turned out into a full throttled war against the United States, the 
Spanish  found  themselves  ill-prepared  to  bolster  their  paltry  naval  contingent     and 
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occupation forces in their colonial outpost in the Philippines. The McKinley 
Administration soon realized the war with Spain would soon come to an end if the United 
States finished off the last remnants of their pacific fleet in the Philippines. Upon the 
guidance of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Teddy Roosevelt, the United States jumped 
at the opportunity to take advantage of the Spain’s vulnerability in the Philippines. Spain 
maintained a presence in the Philippines largely due in part to the fact that few other 
global powers wanted to expend the resources necessary to govern the country. The 
United States saw this as a perfect opportunity to establish itself as a world power and a 
strategic player in the Pacific. 
At the time, the American public was eager for commercial and territorial 
expansion abroad. Politically, the Spanish-American War and the spoils reaped from it 
benefitted the McKinley Administration, congressional republicans and their big-business 
allies eager for a springboard in which to access economic markets in Asia. The jingoistic 
version of American nationalism supported by the electorate and reinforced by the 
policies of the McKinley Administration and its enablers had its intellectual roots in a 
deep-seated belief in American exceptionalism. Proponents of American exceptionalism 
in both major political parties saw the American experiment with democracy and 
individual liberty as beacon of light and hope in a world occupied by a world of imperial 
powers. Proponents of American exceptionalism honestly believed that if American 
values were spread abroad (to less civilized nations like the Philippines) the world would 
become a better place. 
Proponents of American exceptionalism included political elites such as Alfred 
Thayer Mahan and future presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. When 
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the American public saw images in Hearst Newspapers of Spanish concentration  camps 
in Cuba, it was seen as an affront to the United States, and its values, in its own backyard. 
The American public was outraged and demanded action. The spark that ignited the 
flames of war took place on February 15, 1898 when the U.S.S. Maine exploded in 
Havana Harbor. Quickly thereafter, the United States declared war on Spain and sent a 
formidable military contingent to fight the Spanish occupation force in Cuba and naval 
fleet stationed throughout the Western Hemisphere. From the beginning of the Spanish- 
American War, the United States exerted its military prowess with reckless abandon 
against an inferior Spanish fighting force. After winning a bloody war in Cuba and 
decimating the Spanish fleet in Manila, the United States supplanted Spain as the leading 
world power in the Western Hemisphere and reaped the bounty of its conquest (Guam, 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines) when Spain surrendered its colonies upon the 
ratification of the Treaty of Paris on April 11, 1899. 
During the Paris Peace Conference with Spain, President McKinley was urged by 
his hawkish advisors to annex the Philippines (despite concerns from cabinet members 
such as Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long and Secretary of State John Day).44 
Conventional wisdom among pro-annexation or as they were referred to in the media as 
“imperialist” politicians, at the time, held that possession of the Philippines would lead to 
trade expansion and an improved strategic capability of the U.S. Navy in Pacific  Ocean. 
It was also good politics. The American public was overwhelmingly pro-imperialist and 
Republican gains at the ballot box in 1898 reinforced this state of affairs. Republicans in 
Congress were the biggest supporters of American expansion at the dawn of the 20th 
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Century. Their leaders in Washington pushed for full annexation of all of the territories 
seized in the war with Spain. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), the Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was among the biggest advocates of annexing the 
Philippines to advance America’s economic interests. Lodge believed that if the United 
States was to become a global superpower it need not worry about the views of its global 
adversaries. For Lodge and his allies in the McKinley Administration and Congress,   the 
United States was to pursue a foreign policy of trade expansion regardless of the concerns 
of its foreign colonial adversaries.45 
Swayed by his hawkish advisors and their Republican enablers in Congress, 
McKinley pushed for complete annexation of the Philippines at the Paris Peace 
Conference and sealed the deal in the final treaty negotiations with the Spanish. The only 
concession of any significance the United States made during the negotiations was a 
payment of $20,000,000.46 Unable to sway McKinley from annexing the Philippines, 
Secretary Day quietly advised McKinley that if he were to colonize the Philippines, the 
United States would face stiff resistance from the Filipino populace and their nationalist 
leader Emilio Aguinaldo.47 Secretary Day's critical views of annexing the Philippines 
were premised on a popular belief that the archipelago was ungovernable and that further 
military intervention would prove to be a costly endeavor. Prophetically, Secretary Day 
was spot on with his assessment. Estimates show that the Philippine War cost the  United 
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States $300,000,000; which today would amount to approximately $8,690,000,000.48&49 
Secretary Day’s views critical of intervention of the Philippines were challenged by 
media elites such as William Randolph Hearst and his popular newspaper of record The 
New York Times. Other regional papers such as Inter-Ocean, The Troy Times and The 
Call parroted such views in regional markets across the country. American entry into the 
Philippines marked the beginning of a tit-for-tat battle between pro-imperialist and anti- 
imperialist newspapers, intellectuals, public figures and politicians that would dominate 
American political discourse over the next four years. 
Upon sending an occupation force to the Philippines, President McKinley 
instructed military and civilian officials under his command to proceed with the utmost 
caution in their execution of the war. McKinley was uniquely aware that a military 
campaign outside the American continent could be construed as a war of conquest and 
colonialism if not executed with caution and restraint by its practitioners. McKinley’s 
orders were laid forth in a foreign policy vision which he called Benevolent Assimilation. 
McKinley was acutely aware that a carefully executed war was critical not only establish 
American rule over the Philippines but also to maintain public support for the war. 
McKinley   articulated   his   views   of   the   nature   of   benevolent   assimilation   in   a 
memorandum carefully designed to inform military leaders of his desire to see the 
military act cautiously in their execution of military operations in the Philippines.50 In his 
proclamation, McKinley ordered the Philippines to be managed under military rule until a 
civilian commission could stand to provide stable governance of the country. Success   in 
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this mission would be contingent upon pacifying Aguinaldo’s insurgency and starting a 
nation-building operation in earnest. McKinley wanted to convey the image to the 
American public that the United States decided to go to war in the Philippines "not as 
invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their 
employments, and in their personal and religious rights.51 
The views articulated in McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation would 
 
serve as policy guidance to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States in the 
Philippines. With McKinley's views in mind, America's military and civilian leaders in 
the Philippines found themselves tasked with the responsibility of crafting a military 
strategy and an accompanying civilian governing model that worked in conjunction with 
each other. This meant that civilian and military leaders in the Philippines had to adopt a 
multi-pronged approach to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States in a way 
that had never been done before in the history of the American military. Not only would 
US commanders be responsible for using conventional methods to counter the 
Aguinaldo's insurgents when necessary, but the military would also be responsible for 
executing a counterinsurgency strategy to convince the Filipino natives that they would 
be better off to side with the United States rather than Emilio Aguinaldo and his 
nationalist followers. McKinley felt this goal was obtainable. The Spanish had done little 
to bring the comforts of western civilization to the Philippines during their time 
controlling the country. This meant that the United States had to essentially rebuild the 
Filipino society from scratch and create a system of governance conducive to their  needs 
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as a people. By showing the Filipinos that the United States was committed to rebuilding 
their country, McKinley’s best hopes were that the United States would be welcomed 
with open-arms for their benevolent efforts to rebuild their country and that the citizens 
of the Philippines would accustom themselves to accepting the clear benefits of being a 
protectorate of the United States. 
For the United States, victory in the Philippines would come about if the conflict 
was short in duration, low in cost, politically expedient for Republicans and  the 
McKinley Administration and economically beneficial to corporate interests with stakes 
in American acquisition of the archipelago. All of these goals were contingent upon 
successfully winning the trust and support of the Filipino populace. In a letter to General 
Elwell Otis (Second in Command to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt at the outbreak of the 
war), McKinley articulated a desire for the United States to accomplish these goals with 
the utmost care: 
Am most desirous that conflict be avoided.... Time given the insurgents cannot 
hurt us and must weaken and discourage them. They will come to see our benevolent 
purpose and recognize that before we can give their people good government our 
sovereignty must be complete and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most essential just 
now.52 
 
President McKinley was astutely aware of the potential for a hostile war to occur. His 
decision-making process and public statements with regards to the use of military force 
show that he wanted a pinpoint operation that served both American and  Filipino 
interests simultaneously. This idealistic goal failed to come to fruition in the years to 
come. 
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Despite initial expectations that the Philippine War would be conducted in a 
professional and compassionate manner, a troubling ideology was being advanced within 
the US military that would undercut the ability of the United States to wage a benevolent 
campaign. A famous army song called "Civilize'em with a Krag" revealed the views that 
many in the military held at the time. "The "Krag", short for Krag-Jorgensen, was a 
standard issue military rifle used by American soldiers at the time. This song   articulated 
the belief that many American troops believed that the Filipino people were savages and 
could only be tamed through sheer force.53 Such views were reinforced in political 
discourse at the time and in the eyes of journalists who saw the United States as force for 
good and a beacon of light to a people from a dark and savage world. Such views were 
expressed in publications such as The National Geographic whose writers argued that the 
United States was fighting in the Philippines as “fit representatives of humanity, 
invincible in war yet generous to fallen foes, subjugators of lower nature, and conquerors 
of the powers of primal darkness.”54 Views of cultural superiority held by many 
prominent elites in the United States at the time provide context in which to understand 
why some American servicemen may have felt little remorse about waging indiscriminate 
warfare against a civilian population unlike themselves. A climate hospitable to racism 
spawned a military culture where such views became commonplace. This mindset of 
cultural superiority had a tremendous impact on the behavior of the American military in 
the Philippines. Given the state of Jim Crow Laws and segregationist policies in the 
United States, and even in the Armed Forces, it isn’t very surprising that the military 
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became an institution where discriminatory attitudes and beliefs festered. What surprised 
the average American was how these beliefs actually influenced military conduct in the 
war and how these views would later create a climate where violations of the laws of war, 
acts of indiscriminate killing, property destruction and torture were performed in an 
attempt to achieve the primary strategic objective of benevolent assimilation. To the 
elites of the day who shaped the views of the country such a state of affairs seemed 
counterintuitive and contradictory. Their perceptions of the behavior of the American 
military in the Philippines was precisely the type of actions they expected from 
authoritarian regimes and colonial empires and not from a country founded on the ideals 
of liberty and justice for all. 
Views of cultural superiority prevalent in the military at the time did not negate 
the fact that there were officers in the chain-of-command that opposed the heavy-handed 
approach to employing counterinsurgency warfare favored by some elements in  the 
media and political elite. One such commander was Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell. 
Bell believed that a more peaceful and conciliatory approach to counterinsurgency 
warfare would be more effective in winning the war in the Philippines. His views on 
counterinsurgency strategy more closely resemble those of contemporary military 
theorists in the United States who meticulously devise and implement their 
counterinsurgency campaigns within the confines of the laws of war. Reports from Brig. 
General Franklin Bell’s personal papers corroborate his belief that a more careful 
approach to counterinsurgency warfare was needed if the United States was to achieve its 
strategic objectives in the Philippines: 
We have got to continue to live among these people. We have got to govern them. 
Government by force alone cannot be satisfactory to Americans. It is desirable that a 
 Government be established in time which is based upon the will of the governed. This 
can be accomplished satisfactorily only by obtaining and retaining the good will of the 
people…Our policy heretofore was calculated to prevent the birth of undying resentment 
and hatred. This policy has earned for us the respect and approval of a large majority of 
the more intelligent portion of the community. We cannot lose their support by now 
adopting measures as may be necessary to suppress irreconcilable and disorderly.55 
 
Likewise, General Arthur MacArthur articulated similar beliefs. He explicitly ordered 
American troops under his command to refrain from engaging in acts of violence against 
the native population. Instead he ordered his subordinates to practice cordial relations 
with the local inhabitants.56 
The guiding military strategy that was employed throughout the Philippine War 
 
was premised on the ideals set forth by leaders such as McKinley, Bell and MacArthur. 
However their best intentioned efforts were undermined by lower-level military officers 
who received near full autonomy over counterinsurgency operations in their regional 
spheres of command. As a result of this state of affairs, counterinsurgency operations 
designed by leading policymakers and generals at the highest levels of the chain of 
command were oftentimes undermined by the soldiers executing the commands in the 
field. To an extent, coercive methods can defeat an insurgency in theory if the 
counterinsurgents are successful in killing all of the insurgents and establishing their 
political authority over the population. However in doing this, the counterinsurgents run 
the risk of alienating the same people whose support they need to in order to maintain 
the legitimacy of their political authority. In the process of a counterinsurgency campaign 
waged with excessive force, the successive nation-building operation becomes 
compromised. The more physical destruction a military commits in the process of 
destroying the insurgency, the more likely it will be that the counterinsurgency  campaign 
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will increase in cost, yield more casualties, and provide visual and rhetorical propaganda 
for forces opposed to the goals of the counterinsurgents. The destruction that occurred by 
the United States military in its execution of counterinsurgency operations in the 
Philippines served the interests of Aguinaldo’s insurgency and the forces opposed to the 
war (despite the fact that to an extent the harsh methods oftentimes worked to root-out 
and defeat Aguinaldo’s insurgency). The political forces opposed to the war both in the 
Philippines and in the United States gained momentum as perceptions of atrocities both 
real and imagined trickled into the media echo chamber back in the United States. 
Tactical achievements on the battlefield in the Philippines meant little if they undermined 
political support for the war needed to achieve the strategic objective of Benevolent 
Assimilation in the Philippines. 
How could it be that crushing an insurgency with overwhelming force as the 
United States did in the Philippines actually worked in favor of the insurgency? Such a 
question leads one to ask whether or not killing the insurgents is in fact the best way to 
defeat the insurgency. Clearly, the United States viewed a Philippines governed by 
Aguinaldo as a threat to its strategic interests. Initially, the American public saw a war to 
defeat him and his followers as a worthy endeavor. It is quite clear that the war became 
less popular each day it continued. When the nature of counterinsurgency operations in 
the Philippines came to light back home, the media painted a portrait of an American led 
colonial conquest of pillage and plunder waged upon a hapless people incapable of 
standing up to the superior might of the dominant American military. This view came to 
personify America’s excursion into the Philippines in the minds of many of its citizens as 
well as in the American media, Congress and in a burgeoning “anti-imperialist”   political 
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movement made up of prominent members of social, political and media elites and many 
average citizens back home in the United States. The growth of this movement played 
into the hands of Aguinaldo. For Aguinaldo, the war was just as much a political as it was 
military. His strategy in the conflict was contingent on surviving long enough to change 
the political tides of the war back in the United States to turn against the conflict. 
Analyzing the political and propaganda war waged by the opponents of American 
intervention in the Philippines gives one a clear understanding the flaws of American 
counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines. It sheds light on how the practices of the 
anti-imperialist camp gained political momentum and how Aguinaldo nearly won the war 
despite the fact his insurgency was outmatched militarily by the United States and 
defeated on numerous occasions in face-to-face combat. This provides context to 
understand how the McKinley and Roosevelt Administration’s inability to control public 
perceptions of the war contributed to undermining the strategic objectives and foreign 
policy goals of the United States in the Philippines. 
The gory details of the fighting, and the perceived actions of the U.S. military 
during combat, altered the trajectory of political debate over the utility of the war in the 
United States almost as soon as the conflict in the Philippines started. The war was a 
political winner at first but later became a major roadblock to President McKinley’s re- 
election in 1900 and the Republicans chances of winning seats in the midterm elections 
of 1902. One need only look at the evolving political views of the era’s most prominent 
political figure, Theodore Roosevelt, to understand how the fighting in the Philippine- 
American War impacted politicians responsible for sustaining and managing the war 
effort. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt played a major role in 
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formulating policies that set in motion the chain of events that led to American 
annexation of the Philippines in the Treaty of Paris with Spain. Roosevelt was ardently 
pro-war and once remarked that during the Spanish-American War there was “not enough 
war to go around.”57 He approached fighting the insurgency in the Philippines with the 
same aggressive mindset he employed leading his band of “Rough Riders” against 
Spanish forces in Cuba. Such views were reflected in letter Roosevelt penned  to 
Secretary of State John Hay in August of 1899 where he argued a policy of brute force to 
defeat the enemy. Roosevelt wanted the United States to “assume aggressive operations 
and…harass and smash the insurgents in every way until they are literally beaten into 
peace; entertaining no proposition from them save that of unconditional surrender.”58 A 
strong pro-war sentiment became the hallmark of Teddy Roosevelt’s career in the 
McKinley Administration and in his future years as President of the United States. 
 
As the war progressed, Roosevelt found himself in a tenuous political position. 
Having ascended to the presidency upon McKinley’s assassination in 1901, Roosevelt 
was now in full control of the American war effort in the Philippines and managing a 
positive public relations image of the United States in order to maintain public support 
for the war. Throughout the duration of the war, as the nature of the fighting percolated 
into the media echo chamber, disapproval with the war reached a fever pitch. Media 
reports of indiscriminate killing and acts of cruelty toward Filipino civilians led the 
United States Senate to convene The Lodge Committee; a Special Select Committee 
tasked with investigating the actions of civilian and military leaders in the Philippines. In 
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the hearings, Senators such as Henry Cabot Lodge and William Hoar relentlessly lectured 
civilian and soldier alike on allegations of unseemly behavior in the execution of the war. 
During the hearings, which were more an interrogation then a friendly exchange of 
questions and answers, Senators prodded the Roosevelt Administration to reveal all of the 
illegal practices employed throughout the war. Tempers flared upon hearing allegations 
some in the military had either condoned or participated in violations of the laws of war. 
In the minds of the American public, such actions were anathema to a country that bound 
itself to the rule of law and prided itself as being part of a unique experiment in 
democracy, individual liberty and adherence to a strict moral code premised on Judeo- 
Christian values. 
At one point in the hearings, the Governor General of the Philippines William 
Howard Taft admitted that American troops regularly punished insurgents by whipping 
them and by implementing a form of torture known as The Water Cure.59 The water cure 
was a form of punishment that would make contemporary methods of interrogation used 
during the Iraq War (such as water boarding) appear benign in comparison. Pvt. Evan 
Wyatt of the 8th Infantry Unit U.S. Volunteers, a soldier familiar with the practice, 
described the practice in the following way: 
Water cure…consisted of laying a prisoner on his back and pouring water down 
his throat until he looked like a pregnant woman.” If the initial application did not work, 
the prisoner would be forced to vomit the water up, sometimes by having a soldier step or 
jump onto his stomach, and the process would be repeated.60 
 
Allegations of torture in the Philippines were not levied solely on low ranking 
enlisted personnel. In the media, reports later surfaced that implicated Generals Adna 
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Chaffee, J. Franklin Bell, Frederick Funston and Brig. General Jacob Smith with 
authorizing and condoning war crimes. Brig. General Jacob Smith was brought before a 
military tribunal for his role in sanctioning war crimes. The court martial was initially 
brought forth to prosecute Col. William Waller, a subordinate under his command. As the 
hearings unfolded, Waller made a stunning revelation as to why troops under his 
command acted as they did. He stated the orders came from his commanding officer Brig. 
General Jacob Smith. Waller stated Brig. General Smith had “instructed him to kill and 
burn, and said that the more he killed and burned the better pleased he would be; that it 
was no time to take prisoners, and that he was to make Samar a howling wilderness.”61 
Such allegations stunned the American public and revealed to them the horrors of the 
nature of fighting in the Philippine-American War. 
Ordering troops to flagrantly violate the laws of war was a serious offense; even 
in a day when the military regularly waged campaigns against Indian Tribes employing 
tactics reminiscent of such behavior. The Smith-Waller court-martial was rooted in 
allegations that the military failed to uphold standards of conduct outlined in General 
Order 100. General Order 100 set legal guidelines on the acceptable rules of war for the 
American military. Among its many statutes were laws forbidding torture, indiscriminate 
killing, property destruction and harsh treatment of civilians.62  General Order 100 was 
 
written during the Civil War and was later used as a source of legal doctrine for 
compliance with The Hague Conventions- a treaty signed in 1899 by the United States to 
establish norms for acceptable military conduct in combat. The irony that the United 
 
 
61 Los Angeles Herald, Volume XXIX, Number 190, April 9, 1902 
http://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=LAH19020409.2.3 
62 Lincoln, Abraham. General Order 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field. April 24, 1863.  http://lawofwar.org/general_order_100.htm 
56  
States had already violated a treaty it signed just two years previously was not lost on 
irate politicians, journalists and anti-war dissidents back home in the United States. 
Upon conviction, Brig. General Smith was punished by the Roosevelt 
Administration with a proverbial slap on the wrist. He was sentenced into  early 
retirement without a fine or prison sentence for the crimes committed under his 
command. Roosevelt’s benevolence towards Brig. General Smith was due in part to the 
fact that he didn’t particularly see anything wrong with his actions in fighting a war 
against an enemy he deemed to be savage in nature. The Roosevelt Administration 
advanced the argument that Smith’s actions were understandable given the barbaric 
character of the insurgents and their style of fighting. Such views were reflected in the 
public statements of Roosevelt’s Secretary of War Elihu Root: 
The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all obligations of 
good faith and all limitations which humanity has imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound 
themselves by the laws of war, our soldiers were called upon to meet every device of 
unscrupulous treachery and to contemplate without reprisal he infliction of barbarous 
cruelties upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed while punishing 
armed resistance, to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet had to do this with a 
population among whom it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe and who in 
countless instances used a false appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination.63 
 
Despite its best efforts to counter the heaping criticism of its policies in the 
Philippines, the Roosevelt Administration was unable to ultimately shape the legacy of 
the war in its favor in history books written in subsequent years. The historical legacy of 
the Philippine-American War has largely been one focused on the post-war debacle over 
war crimes and the brutal realities of combat in the Philippines. The allegations, public 
admissions,   sworn   statements   and   historical   documents   that   exist   provide   near 
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indisputable evidence that atrocities were committed by American soldiers during the 
war. It is these images that endure. 
The tragedy of the war, and the severity of the acts committed by some, does not 
negate the fact that a great deal of good was done by the United States in its 
implementation of counterinsurgency in the Philippines. In fact, many positive aspects of 
contemporary Filipino society today are a direct result of the counterinsurgency 
operations waged by the United States during the war. Policies and programs put in place 
by the United States have had a long lasting positive legacy on the Philippines. A once 
neglected Spanish Colony made up of disparate ethnic groups turned into a sovereign 
nation with a market economy, democratic values, stable central government and an 
enduring national identity. The positive results of the seemingly brutal American military 
campaign in the Philippines lend credence to the argument that the United States actually 
accomplished its strategic objectives in the Philippines. Such a situation implies that on 
the tactical level the military achieved success in completing its mission. In many 
circumstances in the Philippines, effective counterinsurgency policy actually protected 
innocent civilians from violent insurgents who showed no qualms about using force to 
coerce innocent civilians to acquiesce to their political authority. Police forces, schools, 
roads, bridges, hospitals, sanitation systems, economic development projects, 
communication systems and municipal governance structures were created by the United 
States in its implementation of counterinsurgency in the Philippines. Best practices 
learned in the Philippine-American War have served as a model for policymakers and 
military leaders tasked with drafting counterinsurgency doctrine, training programs and 
battlefield tactics to implement the strategic objectives of their contingencies today. 
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Despite coming across as heavy-handed and immoral, American military 
operations in the Philippines were tactically successful and in retrospect achieved 
American strategic objectives in the war. Understanding this reality requires an 
explanation of the conditions faced by the American military in the Philippines and the 
nature of the war they fought. Such a description is prerequisite to understanding how the 
United States fought the type of counterinsurgency campaign it did during the Philippine- 
American War how why it was tactically successful but perceived as a failure in the eyes 
of history. The war itself was not conducted in open-air territory as it had typically 
occurred during most of the major battles in the American Revolution and Civil War. 
The Philippines is a country whose climate and topography compound the difficulties in 
fighting a war against an asymmetrical opponent. The Philippines archipelago is 
composed of mountainous terrain, winding rivers, swamps, and thick brush. The weather 
was brutally hot in the summer months. During the rainy season, hurricanes and 
monsoons occurred regularly and made sustained military campaigns during that time 
period all but impossible. Suffocating heat and humidity from the tepid environment led 
to exhaustion, dehydration and a climate hospitable to tropical diseases such as Dengue 
Fever, Malaria and Cholera. Altogether, the conditions on the ground impeded military 
logistics, transportation, and timely communications between civilian leaders in Manila 
and troops stationed throughout the archipelago. Such a situation forced the regional 
leaders on the ground to make tactical military decisions without guidance from the 
military and civilian leaders in chain of command stationed in Manila. The situation 
impacted every facet of the war and provided context in which one can understand why 
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the nature of counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines varied in different military 
districts. 
The geographical terrain of the Philippine archipelago forced the military to split 
its troops into separate commands in order to pacify the insurgents throughout the 
countryside. The United States conducted counterinsurgency operations in the Philippine 
War in four different military districts on the main island of Luzon where the insurgents 
were strongest. It also had garrisons stationed on the islands of Samar, Leyte, and the 
Visayas. The United States occupation force was at times as high as 70,000 troops but 
was estimated to be on average composed of nearly 40,000 troops.64 Some believed that 
this number was not nearly enough to do the job. Others believed that early success in the 
war would render an oversized occupation force moot. Since each military district was 
faced with a differing degree of insurgency, it was hard for military planners  to 
accurately gauge how many troops were needed in each theatre. In areas where the 
insurgency was weak, American soldiers found themselves with little or nothing to do 
leading them to spend their time gambling, drinking or terrorizing the locals. One 
American estimate found that in nearly 44% of the Provinces of the Philippines there 
wasn’t a single occurrence of fighting.65 In other situations, American troops would find 
themselves ambushed, and outnumbered, by larger insurgent cadres hiding within the 
civilian population. When the Americans were confronted by an insurgent ambush, the 
attacks were strategically planned and oftentimes conducted in the most brutal fashion 
possible. It was a common occurrence to see the Filipino insurgents hack American G.I.’s 
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to death with long bolo knives in surprise ambushes. The brutal methods of killing were 
meant not just to instill fear into the minds of American soldiers, but also to send a 
message to natives supportive of the Americans and their war effort- they would suffer a 
similar fate if found to be providing material support to the Americans. 
The United States did not intend to see much resistance from the Filipinos at the 
outset of the war and as a result didn’t initially plan to fight a sustained 
counterinsurgency operation from start to finish. The Americans knew that they had 
vastly superior weaponry and military training in comparison to their Filipino 
counterparts. As a result of this imbalance, the United States inflicted heavy casualties on 
the separatist insurgent forces led by Emilio Aguinaldo as soon as fighting commenced. 
According to one estimate, 3,000 Filipinos died on the first day of war compared to  only 
60 Americans.66  Early decisive victories by the Americans reinforced the belief that    the 
war would quickly end. After inflicting heavy casualties in a number of face to face 
battles, Aguinaldo and his men realized that they couldn’t defeat the Americans by 
employing conventional methods of warfare against their larger and better equipped 
adversary. As a result, Aguinaldo and his insurgent forces recalibrated their strategy and 
retreated hastily into the Luzon Provinces to wage guerilla warfare against the Americans 
by hiding amongst the civilian population and picking and choosing their battles on their 
own terms.67 
 
After recalibrating his military strategy, Aguinaldo began his own campaign to 
secure the loyalty of the local population. He recruited soldiers, procured supplies and 
established political control over the native populace by means of creating a shadow 
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government loyal to his subordinates. Like the Americans, Aguinaldo also hoped to earn 
the support of the local populace in order to establish his own claim to power. Support 
from the populace was critical if the insurgents hoped to achieve their goal of expelling 
the Americans from the Philippines and setting up their own self-governing state. This 
tug-of-war for winning the hearts and minds of the populace would occur in each 
province and village of the Philippines. The outcome of the war would subsequently be 
determined by the side whose tactics and strategy could best accomplish this end goal. 
As the war shifted paradigms from conventional to guerilla warfare, the United 
States found itself faced with the reality that a quick and decisive victory wouldn’t occur 
as originally planned. The military did not train its troops in the style of warfare it was 
now confronted with. The soldiers fighting in the Philippines were  volunteers and 
enlisted personnel without previous combat experience. In 1899, there were very few 
professional soldiers in the ranks as the nation had largely demilitarized in the aftermath 
of the Civil War. Many of the leaders who had fought in the Civil War were old and gray 
and ill-prepared to lead units into combat. As a result, American soldiers were typically 
young and inexperienced. Psychologically, they yearned for combat, were deeply 
nationalistic and, to a certain extent, virulently racist. Trigger happy, they were all too 
eager to wield their skill with their newly acquired Krag-Jorgensen rifles. These factors 
worked against conducting a war intended to foster support from the civilian population. 
Fighting against a band of insurgents hiding amongst the civilian population 
meant there were typically exceedingly long periods of calm between military 
engagements with the insurgents. This fomented the creation of a military itching for 
combat and oftentimes had the effect of making the engagements which came about more 
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brutal and heavy-handed then they ideally ought have been to achieve their tactical 
objectives. The troops that fought the Philippine-American War had neither the military, 
cultural or educational training in the art of counterinsurgency warfare needed to fully 
understand the impact of seeking combat and instigating warfare. A lack of proper 
training meant that they were unaware of the fact that the more damage and carnage that 
took place under their watch, the more likely their actions would undermine, rather than 
encourage, the ability of the United States to achieve its strategic objectives in the 
Philippines. In an era of growing empires, the United States saw the establishment of a 
colony in the Philippines as a chance to establish themselves as a blossoming world 
power to be reckoned with. This goal couldn’t be accomplished without tactical success 
on the battlefield and the portrayal of a public relations image back home framing the war 
as a necessary short-term endeavor to achieve long term strategic objectives beneficial to 
the United States in the future. 
The soldiers were not the only ones unprepared for combat. Civilian leaders in the 
Philippines were just as guilty of incompetency in their operational methods. The First 
Philippine Commission, the civilian governing body responsible for managing the war, 
was a bureaucratically deficient organization ill-equipped to perform civilian oversight of 
the military in the Philippines. There was no historical precedent for how military and 
civilian leaders should jointly combine to manage a nation building operation and 
counterinsurgency war at the same time. Harvard Professor Jacob Schurman was 
appointed by President McKinley to serve as the first civilian Governor of the Philippines 
Commission. From the outset, Schurman clashed with the commanding military leader 
Brig. General Elwell Otis. They battled over policies regarding war planning, military 
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strategy, diplomatic relations with Filipino leaders, municipal governance, supply and 
manpower logistics and political communication with their superiors in Washington. A 
breakdown in communication between Otis and Schurman had major consequences for 
the war effort. It spawned inconsistent communication within the chain-of-command, 
relaxed legal oversight over military affairs and stunted the creation of a unified military 
strategy. More importantly, squabbling in the ranks impeded a coordinated public 
relations campaign needed to justify the war back home in the United States. As a result 
of this state of affairs, anti-imperialist newspapers and their allies back home controlled 
the propaganda war and successfully chipped away at public support for a war that had 
had skyrocketing levels of approval upon when it first started. 
The leader of the Filipino Insurgency, Emilio Aguinaldo, was keenly aware of this 
situation and he took advantage of it as best as he could. Writings in his personal papers 
reflect great knowledge of American Politics and the value of political propaganda as a 
tool of insurgency. Aguinaldo calibrated his strategy to influence the American public to 
turn against the war and abandon it altogether. He did this by documenting American 
excesses and atrocities against the civilian population and publicizing them for domestic 
and foreign consumption: 
But the abuses of the Americans were now becoming intolerable. In the 
marketplace at Arroceros they killed a woman and a little boy under the pretext that they 
were surprising a gambling den, thus causing the greatest indignation of a  great 
concourse of people in that vicinity.68 
 
The best chance for Aguinaldo to defeat the Americans was to defeat the will of 
the American public to continue supporting the war effort. Aguinaldo understood that the 
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best way he could accomplish this feat would be to sway the American electorate to favor 
the anti-war presidential candidate Democrat William Jennings Bryan in the 1900 
presidential election. Aguinaldo undoubtedly felt that Bryan’s anti-imperialist platform 
would work to his political advantage. It was unlikely that four more years under the 
President McKinley, whose policies were supportive of American intervention in the 
Philippines, would lead to American withdrawal and an abandonment of their 
counterinsurgency campaign against Aguinaldo’s insurgency. To create political 
conditions favorable to his cause, Aguinaldo had to appear that the United States was 
failing to defeat his insurgency, even though in reality, his forces were near defeat and 
constantly on the defensive: 
In order to help the cause of Philippine Independence in the coming presidential 
election in the United States of America which will take place in early September of this 
year, it is very necessary that day comes, that is to say, during these months of June, July 
and August, we should give the Americans some hard fighting.69 
 
Aguinaldo was not the only military leader trying to influence American Politics. 
In order to maintain domestic support for the war back home in the United States, Brig. 
General Otis had to stay on the right side of public opinion to maintain a steady stream of 
funding from Congress. In the beginning of the war, Americans cheered the prospect of 
war with Spain and were supportive of the foreign policy of President McKinley which 
had acquired the Guam, Puerto Rico and the rights to the Philippines from the hapless 
Spanish in the Treaty of Paris. Though no official survey data exists to measure public 
opinion at the beginning of the Philippine-War in 1898, a Literary Digest poll of 192 
newspaper editors at the beginning of the conflict showed that that a solid majority of the 
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media elite (newspaper editors) from across the country backed the war effort.70 
Likewise, President McKinley also felt the public supported the war effort and its goals. 
In a letter to his friend Charles Dawes, McKinley voiced his personal opinion on the 
matter which corroborates the belief that a large swath of the electorate supported 
annexation of the Philippines and its accompanying strategic objectives: “You and I don’t 
want the Philippines, but it is no use disguising the fact that an overwhelming majority of 
the people do.”71 The successes the United States achieved at the outset of the war, and 
the public support in favor of annexation of the Philippines in the United States, paint a 
picture that clearly shows that the mood of the American public and its support for the 
strategic objectives enunciated by the McKinley Administration to justify American 
intervention in the Philippines. 
Once fighting commenced in the Philippines, public opinion in favor of the war 
steadily declined. An antiwar faction emerged sharply critical of the war effort and the 
McKinley Administration’s handling of it. A proxy war back home in the United States 
emerged between allies of the McKinley Administration and “anti-imperialist” peaceniks. 
As the grim reality of a bloody counterinsurgency campaign came to light in the press, 
two competing factions organized themselves. On one side, the  McKinley 
Administration, Republicans in Congress, religious leaders and pro-war  newspapers 
pitted themselves against, pro-peace advocacy groups, intellectual and social elites, 
congressional Democrats, anti-war newspapers and their strange bedfellow ally- Emilio 
Aguinaldo and his Filipino nationalist insurgency. Throughout the duration of the 
Philippine-American  War,  these  two  diametrically  opposed  parties  would  engage  in 
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intense political warfare. Each camp worked assiduously to sway public opinion and their 
elected representatives in Washington of the righteousness of their cause. Each side 
calculated that the conflict would come to a head with the presidential election of 1900. 
Leading anti-war groups such as the Anti-Imperialist League believed that the election of 
Democratic Senator William Jennings Bryan would end the war and America’s colonial 
expedition into the Philippines. Supporters of the war saw the re-election of McKinley as 
a justification of American exceptionalism and the mandate of a foreign policy grand 
strategy that would cement the United States as a global power. Supporters of the 
Philippine-American War realized they could seize the political and moral high ground 
by linking the enemy (Aguinaldo) with William Jennings Bryan. Aguinaldo had been 
vocal in American media outlets at the time and it was well-known that he favored the 
Democratic Party’s candidate. William Randolph Hearst, a newspaper editor whose 
Morning Journal was famous for pro-war bombastic rhetoric against America’s enemies 
throughout the duration of the Spanish-American War, was more than happy allow his 
newspapermen to link America’s enemy with their anti-war adversaries in  the 
Democratic Party: 
Is there not material here for some pretty solemn reflections? What do Democrats 
think of the sort of management that has enabled the enemies of their country to greet 
their party as an ally…? The Democratic Party is as patriotic a party as ever existed. Its 
only trouble is indiscreet leadership. Aguinaldo’s proclamation is a cold shower bath that 
ought to bring the inebriated leaders to their senses.72 
 
On the surface, it appears that General Otis knew that a negative view of the 
execution of the war would compromise ability of the military to achieve the strategic 
objectives of the United States in the Philippines. He knew that if the American press 
turned   against   his   leadership   and   the   behavior   of   troops   under   his  command, 
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congressional support and a steady stream of resources for the war would soon dry up. 
Critiques of his leadership poured into the press almost immediately. In an article written 
in the San Francisco Chronicle in 1898 journalist E.W. Harden wrote a scathing critique 
of Otis and his military leadership: “(Otis) was too weak a man for the important office 
he fills and exhibits his incompetency by struggling with little matters of detail to the 
detriment of matters of graver importance.”73 
As a result of the drafting an article critical of his leadership, General Otis banned Harden 
from reporting in the Philippines. Newspapers critical of his leadership in the Philippines, 
such as La Democracia, and Freedom, were banned and accused of providing political 
cover to the insurgents.74 Otis saw censorship as a means to protect American soldiers 
and their leaders from further examination of their conduct by the press. Newspaper 
articles critical of American policy in the Philippines would undoubtedly decrease 
political support for the war effort. Such censorship was also needed to mask the brutal 
nature of the war that was unfolding on the ground. Even in an era where communication 
and  media  censorship  were  easier  to  practice  then  they  are  today,  leaked  stories of 
atrocities made their way into the press in the United States nonetheless. Soldiers wrote 
letters home and troops cycling in and out of the theatre found ways to tell their story to 
the press. Otis took a beating in the media for his ambivalence to such behavior. Otis 
fought his critics by issuing unabashedly optimistic reports that victory was on the 
horizon and the insurgents led by Emilio Aguinaldo would soon be defeated. Upon 
resigning his position as commander in the Philippines in May of 1899, Otis relayed an 
upbeat and optimistic assessment back home stating the war would soon end in victory: 
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“The War has terminated. Leading Filipinos express confidence in early pacification of 
the islands…leading insurgents surrendering.”75 As he sailed back to the United States, 
General Otis was optimistic that his policies would lead to the full pacification of the 
insurgency. He put forth a public relations image that sugar coated the nature of the 
fighting and the prospects for a quick and decisive victory. His half-hearted efforts to 
censor media reporting during the war sowed questions of doubt about the nature of the 
war and its execution. 
In a span of a year, both General Otis and Jacob Schurman resigned from service 
in the Philippines. McKinley appointed future President William Howard Taft to lead the 
Second Philippines Commission and General Arthur MacArthur to lead  the military 
outfit. Taft was responsible for issuing orders to the regional commanders and 
coordinating supplies and manpower to the troops in the field in order to accomplish their 
military objectives. The civilian leadership in Manila decided to give commanding 
officers in the field a great degree of leeway to implement their preferred tactics and 
strategies in order to counter Aguinaldo's insurgent forces. This would prove to be big 
mistake. The lack of oversight of military operations by the Philippines Commission 
allowed lower-level officers to decide for themselves which tactics and strategies to 
employ against the enemy. In addition this state of affairs, the mountainous terrain and 
winding rivers of the archipelago hampered the ability of commanders to communicate 
with central command in Manila. As a result of this challenge, General MacArthur left 
his subordinates to decide for themselves on the best means to pacifying the insurgency 
to achieve the strategic objective of Benevolent Assimilation. McKinley’s strategic 
objectives in the Philippines could only be accomplished through a pacification campaign 
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that could establish military dominance over Emilio Aguinaldo's insurgents, earn the trust 
and support of the natives and prop up a civilian government capable of providing basic 
public services to the Filipino populace.76 The really of the situation on the ground meant 
that the nature of counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines was neither uniform nor 
directly controlled by civilian authorities, who were in theory, responsible for managing 
the war effort. 
Creating a politically stable pro-American colony in the Philippines would not 
come easily. The United States quickly found itself being pulled into a nation-building 
operation of epic proportions. In addition to pacifying the insurgency, Americans had to 
rebuild the Filipino society from scratch. The enemy was not to be underestimated. Prior 
to losing a conventional war against American forces, the native Filipinos had previously 
finished fighting a war against Spain. They were willing to continue fighting at all costs 
to achieve their independence. In order to expel the Spanish, Aguinaldo and his men 
worked alongside the United States to expel their former colonial masters. A period of 
successive wars decimated the Philippine economy, its public infrastructure and its 
political system. 
The United States assumed the burden of rebuilding the Philippines into a society 
cast in its own image. This meant that American soldiers trained to fight conventional 
wars became tasked with conducting national building operations where they had to train 
police forces, build public infrastructure and municipal governing systems capable of 
carrying out basic public services such as public education, sanitation, mail distribution, 
medical  care,  food  distribution,  agricultural  management  and  tax  collection services. 
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These tasks were compounded by language and cultural differences which inhibited 
communication between American soldiers and the Filipino civilian population. 
Under Brig. General Otis’s command, American soldiers lacked adequate 
resources, manpower, intelligence, knowledge of the theatre terrain, and most 
importantly, tactical guidance on how to implement President McKinley's Benevolent 
Assimilation strategy; all of which are prerequisites to pacifying the insurgency 
successfully. Otis had subdivided the theatre into four departments (Northern Luzon, 
Southern Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao-Jolo) giving each commander a region  to 
oversee their own separate counterinsurgency operation. These jurisdictions would later 
change when Arthur MacArthur assumed leadership and the insurgents traversed the 
archipelago in search of more favorable terrain to wage guerilla warfare against the 
Americans. As it became clear to Otis that the United States could only pacify the 
insurgency with a substantial military presence, the McKinley Administration sent   more 
troops into combat. In November of 1899, the United States had 53 garrisons stationed 
throughout the Philippines. By March of 1901, that number increased to 639.77  The 
United States was heavily invested in the Philippines and the success of the war on the 
ground depended on the ability of American troops to improvise and adapt to conducting 
a successful counterinsurgency campaign instead of a conventional war. Even if the war 
could be won tactically, the Americans wouldn’t have achieved their strategic objectives 
if McKinley and Roosevelt couldn’t sell the utility of their foreign policy to the American 
people in the presidential election of 1900. This provided incentives to both the military 
and civilian leadership in the Philippines to get their act together quickly. 
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Perhaps the best case study of tactical success in conducting counterinsurgency 
operations in the Philippines came when Brig. Gen. Samuel Young assumed leadership of 
the First District of Northwestern Luzon in 1898. Brig. General Young effectively 
accomplished his goals and implemented a model counterinsurgency strategy that stands 
as proof that that McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation strategy was not an idealistic goal 
that was impossible to achieve. The counterinsurgency doctrine that guided military 
operations in the First Luzon District was robust and comprehensive. When Brig. Gen. 
Young issued General Order 43, tasking his subordinates with creating a stable civilian 
government in the First Luzon District, it was clear that he had an idea as to what he 
wanted to do and how he wanted to accomplish his tactical objectives in the First Luzon 
District.78 Surprisingly enough, Young’s goals were accomplished quite efficiently and 
effectively. In an effort to restore normalcy to the lives of citizens in the First Luzon 
District, American troops in the First Luzon District created nearly 63 towns with town 
councils, police forces and a combined 203 schools by early 1900.79 They also brought 
desperately needed medical supplies, foodstuffs and economic aid to the native Filipinos 
who had been deprived of such things ever since their country became engulfed in war 
against the Spanish in the year’s immediately preceding American entry into the 
Philippines. 
The counterinsurgency strategy in the First Luzon District was not implemented 
without its fair share of trouble along the way. As the Americans integrated their troops 
and resources into the Filipino populace, they were initially not greeted as liberators   and 
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encountered stiff resistance from locals who were skeptical of their presence.80 Many of 
these individuals saw the United States as a colonial power and not a benevolent force 
with good intentions. In some situations, Filipino natives served as spies and even 
volunteered to give aid and shelter to members of Aguinaldo's insurgency while at the 
same time they were claiming to support American rule. Upon entering the First Luzon 
District, American troops quickly learned that the insurgent forces were well organized 
and had made strides toward infiltrating the local populace and establishing a shadow 
government.81 The insurgents engaged in psychological warfare and cut off supplies and 
resources from villagers that aided the United States. In some cases they performed 
assassinations of key leaders and destroyed entire villages where they felt that the natives 
were openly aiding the United States.82 The insurgents were brutal fighters. They wielded 
long machetes called bolos that they used to hack their opponents to death in surprise 
ambushes on US troops stationed in the area. They would even use locals as human 
shields and felt no qualms in burning or destroying the property of those who did not 
support their cause or acquiesce to their demands. Finding the insurgent leaders and 
convincing (or coercing) them into supporting American rule would prove to be the main 
roadblock towards effectively implementing a successful counterinsurgency in the First 
Luzon District. 
The American troops were able overcome these hurdles by building a 
sophisticated intelligence network within the First Luzon District. This allowed the US 
troops to preempt Aguinaldo's strategy before it could be implemented.  By striking  with 
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brutal force, American troops crushed Aguinaldo's insurgents in brutal face to face 
combat when they could selectively engage the enemy. In one mission, Lt. Col. Robert 
Howze and his soldiers killed over 520 insurgents when they attempted to engage 
Aguinaldo's loyalists in a surprise attack.83 To the chagrin of soldiers desperate to fight in 
face to face combat, the insurgents oftentimes chose to engage Americans on their own 
terms. They employed sneak attacks and surprise ambushes that were best suited  against 
a larger and better equipped occupation force. In order for the United States to effectively 
defeat Aguinaldo’s insurgents in the First Luzon District, it had to find ways to root-out 
insurgent elements from the civilian population. The only practical way to separate the 
insurgents from the civilian population in the First Luzon District was to gather 
intelligence on the extent of the insurgent networks within it. 
General Arthur MacArthur who became the commanding officer after General 
Otis exited the conflict, tasked Lt. William T. Johnson with collecting intelligence on the 
insurgents. Johnston authored a report entitled: "Investigation into the Methods Adopted 
by the Insurgents for Organizing and Maintaining a Guerilla Force” to accomplish this 
goal.84 Lt. Johnson’s report was based on intelligence gathered from an insurgent defector 
named Crispulo Patajo. Patajo was well aware of the insurgent infrastructure in the First 
Luzon District. By coming to the side of the United States, he was granted amnesty and 
spared the inevitable death sentence that awaited belligerent insurgents. Patajo's 
knowledge of the insurgents and their agents within the civilian governments set up by 
the  United  States  proved  to  be  an  invaluable  resource  to  the  United  States  in 
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counterinsurgency operations in the First Luzon District.85 This intelligence coup allowed 
the United States to root out the insurgents and establish full control of a major portion of 
the First Luzon District in five months.86 After tracking down many of their fellow 
comrades, forces loyal to Aguinaldo began to renounce their allegiance to him. Instead, 
they decided to join forces with the Americans in hopes that they would offer them a 
better standard of living under their political rule. This would have never been possible 
without an amnesty policy towards for Aguinaldo’s ex-comrades. On June 5, 1900 
Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur made such a request: 
Propose immediate issue of amnesty offering complete immunity for past and 
liberty for future to all who have not violated laws of war and who will renounce 
insurrection and accept sovereignty of the United States…87 
 
An amnesty policy towards former insurgents ensured that Aguinaldo’s followers 
wouldn’t fight until the bitter end. It also fit perfectly into America’s plans to assimilate 
the insurgents back into civilian life. By offering the insurgents better opportunities and 
converting them to the Americans side rather than killing them, General MacArthur was 
able to achieve tangible tactical battlefield successes in his counterinsurgency campaign 
in the First Luzon District. In the First Luzon District, the United States military was 
able to implement an effective counterinsurgency campaign by adapting and improvising 
its approach to defeating the insurgents. By crushing Aguinaldo's insurgent forces when 
confronted, gathering intelligence on infiltrators hiding within the populace, rebuilding 
the local economy and infrastructure and offering former belligerents a pathway back into 
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civilian life, the United States was able to achieve its tactical objectives in pacify the 
insurgency in the First Luzon District. 
The successful implementation of counterinsurgency strategy in the First Luzon 
District served as a model example for successful counterinsurgency campaigns 
throughout the Philippines. However, many commanders chose to adopt more heavy 
handed measures to their counterinsurgency campaigns. The most notorious case of 
heavy-handed  counterinsurgency  tactics  came  on  the  island  of  Samar  in  the  Fourth 
District of Southern Luzon. In this campaign, General Jacob H. Smith ordered his troops 
to “kill everyone over ten and turn the interior into a howling wilderness.”88 In a reprisal 
attack for a surprise ambush on American soldiers, Smith’s troops blockaded the island, 
destroyed crops, burned its villages and waged unrelenting warfare on the local 
population in an attempt to crush the insurgency once and for all. William Keene, a 
participant in the campaign, recounted that: “We did not take any prisoners. We shot 
everybody on sight.”89 In the aftermath of the conflict, when the American public and 
Congress realized what had happened, Brig. General Smith found himself court-martialed 
for violating the laws of war. 
Well intentioned counterinsurgency tactics in the Second District of Southwestern 
Luzon turned into a public health fiasco ending in the deaths of thousands of innocent 
civilians. Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell repatriated civilians from their homes and 
into concentration camps in an effort to physically separate the friendly civilians from the 
insurgents hiding amongst them. By concentrating large numbers of civilians and all of 
their possessions into cramped living quarters, Brig. General Bell fomented a cholera 
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epidemic and the subsequent deaths of nearly 11,000 Filipinos.90 Ironically, the American 
public felt compelled to fight the Spanish-American War after seeing ghastly newspaper 
images of Spanish concentration camps in Cuba. By adopting coercive  measures to 
pacify the insurgency, the United States performed tactically successful operations at the 
cost of losing the moral high ground it held at the beginning of the war. By adopting near 
identical war measures as their Spanish adversaries in Cuba, the American public 
withdrew its support for the war effort and pushed Congress to investigate the unseemly 
behavior of its civilian and military leaders in the Philippines. 
By 1903, the United States had effectively accomplished its strategic military 
objectives in the island. Emilio Aguinaldo was defeated and the Americans were able to 
establish civilian rule and establish military bases and trading outposts throughout the 
archipelago. The Philippines went on to become an American colony before receiving its 
independence on July 4, 1946. The Philippines adopted democracy and free-market 
capitalism and its leaders allied themselves with the United States in World War II and 
throughout the Cold War. For all intents and purposes, America’s counterinsurgency 
expedition in the Philippines was tactically successful in that it achieved the strategic 
objectives of President McKinley's Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation. Scholars such 
as Brian McAllister Linn, the foremost expert on counterinsurgency warfare in the 
Philippine-American War, have called the Philippine-American War "the most successful 
counterinsurgency operation in US History."91  As a military campaign the war ended    in 
 
victory. Politically, the war was a failure. The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations’ 
execution of the war effort was conducted in such a heavy-handed fashion that a war 
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supported by large swaths of the electorate in 1896 lost nearly all of its public and 
political support by 1902 when the war conveniently ended. If a more charismatic 
candidate had been nominated by the Democratic Party in 1900 and defeated President 
McKinley, there is compelling evidence to believe that the Democrats would have 
followed their party platform and withdrawn American troops from the Philippines 
immediately. The counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippine-American War will go 
down as one of tactical success but political failure. Despite making strides towards 
achieving a popular strategic objective, the nature of the counterinsurgency campaign and 
the images of wartime atrocities (both real and imagined) led to noticeable decrease in 
public support for the war effort throughout the entire duration of the war. Instead of 
ending in pomp and circumstance and parades and pageantry, as many wars do, the 
Philippine-American War instead ended in the most embarrassing of circumstances in 
congressional investigations, court-martial hearings and public recriminations of the 
Roosevelt Administration, its top generals and the very notion of American 
exceptionalism and manifest destiny abroad. 
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Case Study 2: The Vietnam War 
 
Stopping the spread of Communism was a top priority of  American Foreign 
Policy in the years leading up to the Vietnam War. There was a growing belief in the 
early 1950s that the communist menace would spread country to country around the 
globe. As more countries fell under the Soviet sphere of influence it was believed that 
freedom and prosperity would stand little chance of surviving. In a press conference on 
August 7, 1954, President Eisenhower advanced the argument that losing the entire 
Asiatic region to communism would be a defeat that the United States could not afford to 
incur. Allowing Southeast Asia to come under the Soviet sphere of influence was seen as 
anathema to the values of President Eisenhower who felt passionately that the United 
States should advance freedom, democracy and capitalism to all corners of the world: 
79  
But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of 
Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk 
about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of 
materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions 
and millions of people.92 
According to Paul Warnke, a former General Counsel in the Department Defense 
in the Johnson Administration, the fall of China to Mao Zedong's Communist Party in 
1949 had spooked the foreign policy establishment in the United States into believing 
that country after country in Southeast Asia would fall into communist hands unless the 
United States actively committed itself to preserving non-communist regimes in the 
region.93 In 1954, the French suffered a humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu to a 
communist insurgency led by Ho Chi Minh. In an effort to counter what was believed to 
be a spreading communist disease in Southeast Asia, the Eisenhower Administration 
attempted to halt the falling dominoes in Southeast Asia by propping up a non- 
communist regime in South Vietnam under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem. 
 
With the Domino Theory as its justification for action, the United States gradually 
committed its financial and military forces to the fledgling regime in South Vietnam. 
Soon thereafter, critics emerged that questioned the validity of the Domino Theory and 
the intellectual argument made in favor of committing American resources to South 
Vietnam. In 1964, Political Scientist Hans Morgenthau argued in a Washington Post Op- 
Ed that the Domino Theory was drafted “neither by reason nor by historic experience."94 
Domino Theory critics such as Jerome Slater emerged in Security Studies literature in the 
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years after the conflict. In The Domino Theory and International Politics: The Case of 
Vietnam Slater debunks the Domino Theory and takes its criticism a step further arguing 
that: 
Even if the premises had all been true (of the Domino Theory) it is doubtful that 
the Vietnam War would have been justified, for the consequences of the fall of Southeast 
Asia (the most plausible version of the domino theory) would not have been so 
threatening to U.S. national security or other truly vital national interests as to require a 
major war.95 
The underlying belief that the Vietnam War was unjustified spawned the anti-war 
movement that would ultimately undermine the ability of the United States to fight the 
conflict long enough to achieve its strategic objectives in Vietnam. The primary strategic 
objective of American intervention in Vietnam was to preserve a viable non-communist 
regime in South Vietnam that could serve as a bulwark against further communist 
infiltration into Southeast Asia. Images of self-immolating Buddhist monks protesting 
against the Diem Regime caused great concern within the Kennedy Administration. After 
much frustration, President Kennedy famously declared that: “We’re going to have to do 
something about that regime.”96 Shortly thereafter, Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown in a 
military coup and killed backed by the United States. 
The anti-war movement provided some of the most vivid images which altered 
public perceptions of the utility of continuing to fight the Vietnam War. In the beginning 
of the Vietnam War, the anti-war movement was a barely noticeable blip of leftist 
organizations and intellectuals on college campuses. Over time, its impact would 
ultimately grow to the point where it played a decisive role in cutting off political support 
for the war in the halls of Congress. Melvin Small argues that when the war began in 
 
 
95 Slater, Jerome. The Domino Theory and International Politics: The Case of Vietnam. Security Studies 
no. 3 (2):186-224. 1993., 216 
96 Associated Press, & Hamill, Peter. Vietnam: The real war: a photographic history. 2013 
81  
1964, the American public was preoccupied with Civil Rights rather than the escalating 
war that was taking place in Vietnam.97 This accurate assessment of the limited impact of 
the anti-war movement on American public opinion at the outset of the Vietnam War was 
reflected in a Gallup Poll in 1965 which revealed that only 25% believed it was a mistake 
to send troops to fight in Vietnam.98 A unanimous vote in the House of Representatives 
and a near unanimous vote in the Senate confirmed initial American political support for 
fighting the Vietnam War in order to achieve the initial strategic objectives set forth by 
The Johnson Administration in Vietnam.99 Despite the fact that the United States had 
boots on the ground in Vietnam during the Kennedy Administration, the American public 
saw August 7, 1964 as the beginning of the Vietnam War. At this moment of time, the 
American public and their elected representatives in Washington believed that fighting 
the Vietnam War to achieve the strategic objective of preserving a viable non-communist 
regime in South Vietnam was a worthy endeavor. 
Hawkish national security advisors surrounding President Johnson gradually 
escalated America’s commitment in Vietnam due to their belief that Vietnam was of 
great strategic importance in the broader context of the Cold War. Alongside the hawks 
in his cabinet was one lone dissenter that urged a different path in Vietnam. The leading 
critic of employing conventional methods of warfare in Vietnam was Undersecretary of 
State George Ball. On July 1, 1965, Ball penned a memorandum to President Johnson 
entitled A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam. In this memorandum, Ball was  highly 
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critical of American military strategy in Vietnam. Ball's recommendations in A 
Compromise Solution in South Vietnam have come to represent the historical narrative 
portrayed in the post-Vietnam era among many historians that argue that the United 
States could not win the Vietnam War by employing conventional battlefield maneuvers 
such as aerial bombing campaigns and search-and-destroy missions.100 Ball's main 
criticism of American intervention in Vietnam was premised on the belief that 
conventional methods of warfare could not achieve victory in a guerilla war against an 
enemy that hid within the native population: 
No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a 
guerrilla war--which is at the same time a civil war between Asians--in jungle terrain in 
the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the South 
Vietnamese) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side.101 
 
It was readily apparent to Ball that the United States could not win the Vietnam War 
because of the strategy that it was employing.  While this was indeed true, Ball’s  views 
on military strategy in Vietnam have morphed into a revisionist historical narrative that 
some use to argue that the United States was incapable of winning the Vietnam War 
regardless of the strategy that was employed on the battlefield. 
Modern Vietnam War historians such as David Fitzgerald agree with the 
revisionist historical narrative. Fitzgerald is quick to point out the reasons why the United 
States lost the Vietnam War without focusing on how the United States could have won 
the war. Fitzgerald’s opinion is buttressed by three points: 
1) The United States was ill-prepared to fight the war. 
2) The South Vietnamese government was weak and corrupt. 
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3) The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese were well equipped and better organized.102 
Each of Fitzgerald's criticisms of the United States and its battlefield conduct in Vietnam 
raise broader questions about the military strategy that was employed in the war. Why 
was the United States military not prepared to fight a winning war in Vietnam? Why was 
the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) incapable of supporting itself? What made 
North Vietnam, an impoverished third-world communist country, and their Vietcong 
allies, capable of defeating the world's most powerful military? What factors inside the 
United  States  spawned  such  views  within  the  broader  American  population?   What 
images created a perception that the United States was losing the Vietnam War? Each of 
these questions raise the possibility that an alternative scenario may have been possible in 
the Vietnam War if circumstances on the ground developed differently. 
By following the popular revisionist narrative that has been advanced since the 
Vietnam War ended, one can find an easy way to logically infer that the Vietnam War 
was unjustified and doomed to failure from the beginning. This has been the lasting 
legacy of Vietnam in the eyes of historians that crafted the post-war narrative. Yet if one 
takes a closer look at how the Vietnam War was fought one can see a plausible and clear 
causal path that can lead one to the conclusion that the Vietnam War could have played 
out differently and subsequently led to the achievement of American strategic objectives 
laid forth in the beginning of the war. I intend to showcase how images of atrocities and 
perceptions of violations of the laws of war by the United States in Vietnam created a 
domestic political dynamic which stunted the ability of the United States to achieve its 
strategic objectives, in spite of the fact that the military itself was performing tactically 
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successful counterinsurgency operations making progress towards achieving the strategic 
objectives set forth in the beginning of the Vietnam War. 
Scholars such as Guenter Lewy, Mark Moyar and Andrew Krepinevich examine 
the nature of fighting in the Vietnam War from a perspective that places a greater 
emphasis on policy, strategy and the tactics employed by the US military in Vietnam. 
Each of these scholars focuses their analyses on the major policy decisions that were 
ordered by top civilian and military commanders throughout the duration of the Vietnam 
War. Learning about the nature of military operations conducted in Vietnam helps one to 
gain a better understanding as to why the United States performed the way that it did on 
the battlefield throughout the course of the Vietnam War. Collectively, each of the 
aforementioned scholars paint a different picture as to why the Vietnam War turned out 
the way that it did for the United States. Scholars that focus specifically on military 
strategy contribute to the historical narrative of the Vietnam War by painting a picture 
that shows that individual political decisions, rather than tactically successful military 
operations, led to the dynamic where the United States failed to achieve its strategic 
objectives in Vietnam. 
In America in Vietnam, Guenter Lewy advances the argument that a seemingly 
endless supply of facts can cause one to come to many different conclusions about what 
transpired on the battlefield in the Vietnam War: 
Like pieces in a kaleidoscope the "facts" of the Vietnam War could, and still can, 
be put together in a multitude of configurations which in turn lead to different political 
and moral judgments and conclusions.103 
 
Lewy goes on to argue that many historians formed their opinions on the Vietnam War 
by selectively cherry picking primary source documents from the Pentagon Papers that 
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justified their predetermined ideological belief that the Vietnam War was unnecessary 
and unjustified. Lewy reiterated the claim that many of these historians: "have rejected as 
tainted and unreliable documents from the same source which they deemed inconvenient 
and out of line with their political views."104 A selective sampling of primary source 
documents designed to avoid an uncomfortable historical truth is troubling to scholars 
that seek to understand whether or not the United States employed tactically successful 
military strategies that were making progress towards achieving the strategic objectives 
set forth in the beginning of the Vietnam War.  Lewy leads one to logically infer that a 
further analysis of the policies and strategies that were employed throughout the Vietnam 
War is needed to find the answer to this question. 
According to Lewy, one such strategy that may have changed the outcome of the 
war was the deployment of US Marines into the population centers of Vietnam in order to 
perform counterinsurgency operations. He believes that this decision should have been 
made instead of sending the Marines into the countryside in order to conduct search and 
destroy missions against VC outposts that were believed to be providing the lifeblood to 
the insurgency (but were really not). Lewy argues that this strategic decision was "a 
watershed moment in the American involvement in Vietnam that was made in haste and 
without careful deliberation.105 He cites the importance of Johnson's signature to NSAM 
328 on April 6, 1965 as the turning point in which the United States decided to employ 
search-and-destroy missions into the countryside rather than engaging in 
counterinsurgency  operations  in  the  population  centers  along  the  coast  of        South 
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Vietnam.106 This decision undermined the American war effort by stunting the 
pacification of the VC insurgency by shifting American troops away from providing 
security and stable governance to the citizens in the hamlets and villages where they were 
most needed in order to pacify the insurgency in a timely fashion. This dynamic changed 
the nature of the fighting from a more cautious counterinsurgency strategy to a more 
brutal form of conventional warfare that led to more killing and destruction for both 
parties. This state of affairs worked against establishing a stable and viable 
noncommunist regime in South Vietnam. It created a political dynamic in the United 
States where more gruesome images of war were created because of the nature of the war 
being fought. These images were then sent into the American media echo chamber and 
progressively changed public opinion against the war. As Lewy reveals, “no headway 
could be made against the insurgents until their presence in the populated areas was 
effectively challenged."107 Failing to protect the population centers from insurgents 
caused the United States a great degree of blood and treasure throughout the first four 
years of the Vietnam War that arguable shouldn’t have come about had the United States 
employed a sustained counterinsurgency approach. It was this failure to do so which 
turned the American public against the war effort to such a high degree that tactical 
progress being made in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive was irrelevant to the broader 
American electorate which had by that time had just elected a president who promised to 
end the Vietnam War. 
 
 
 
 
106 National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 328.Presidential Decisions with Respect to Vietnam.. The 
White House. Washington, DC. April 6, 1965. 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/nsams/nsam328.jsp 
 
107 Lewy, America in Vietnam, 53. 
87  
Lastly, Lewy advances another crucial counter-argument that may have changed 
the result of what transpired on the battlefield in Vietnam earlier in the conflict. If the 
goal of establishing a viable noncommunist regime in South Vietnam was to be 
accomplished, the United States needed to ensure that troops in South Vietnam’s Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) could work side-by-side with the United States to 
effectively defeat the VC and establish political order and stability within South Vietnam. 
Lewy argues that this goal could have been accomplished if the United States  had 
decided to bring ARVN troops under their command rather than allowing them to act 
autonomously. He cites the fact that this view was held by Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara. However, the decision to integrate ARVN and American troops was 
ultimately rebuffed by General Westmoreland and the GVN.108 Lewy goes on to argue 
that the historical record shows that President Johnson himself believed that the United 
States and ARVN troops should have been integrated. However, he ultimately decided 
against implementing such a policy at Westmoreland’s insistence.109 A consequence of 
not bringing ARVN troops under the command of the United States was that it allowed 
ARVN to operate autonomously and without American oversight. It was well known that 
ARVN and the GVN political leadership were corrupt and privy to fighting in a fashion 
where war crimes and torture often went unpunished. These allegations fueled  the 
antiwar movement and fed into the narrative that the United States tacitly supported 
committing atrocities by casting a blind eye to the behavior of their battlefield allies. It 
was also one more crucial tactical error which prolonged the war and turned it into a 
more bloody conflict then it had to be had General Westmoreland heeded the advice of 
 
 
108  Ibid., 47. 
109 United States. Department of Defense.. The Pentagon Papers; the Defense Department history of United 
States decision-making on Vietnam. Boston: Beacon Press. 1971.,  II, 475 
88  
his superiors. If the decision was made by President Johnson to bring ARVN troops 
under American control, Lewy implies that is likely that the heavy-handed tactics ARVN 
troops employed on the battlefield would have been mitigated. Such a situation, would 
have made it easier for the United States to win the "hearts and minds" of the South 
Vietnamese as it would have shown to the local population that the United States and 
South Vietnam could offer the population better political, economic and security support 
then their VC counterparts. Lewy leads one to conclude that changes in policy and 
strategy at key points during the war may have changed the nature of the war from a 
conventional to a counterinsurgency style war. The logical conclusion one can gather 
from Lewy's arguments are that American perceptions of the nature of the fighting in 
Vietnam would have been different if a counterinsurgency war was employed by General 
Westmoreland earlier in the war when it would have been more effective against the VC 
insurgency. 
In Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in 
Vietnam, Mark Moyar describes the nature of counterinsurgency operations that took 
place in Vietnam and the development of their implementation throughout the duration of 
the Vietnam War. In this compelling study, Moyar describes specific counterinsurgency 
programs implemented during each phase of the Vietnam War and their effectiveness in 
pacifying the Vietcong Insurgency. By and large, counterinsurgency tactics implemented 
throughout the Vietnam War were narrowly focused and oftentimes conducted solely by 
Special Forces and their South Vietnamese counterparts. 
Moyar’s most useful analytical observations come in his assessment of 
counterinsurgency programs such as the Strategic Hamlets, Civilian Irregular Defense 
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Groups, Revolutionary Development Cadres, Combined Action Platoons and the Phoenix 
Program. The development and implementation of each of these programs showed that 
counterinsurgency efforts at different points of the Vietnam War were, contrary to the 
opinion of its critics, effective at defeating the Vietcong and securing the loyalty of the 
South Vietnamese populace to the South Vietnamese Government (GVN). One such 
example, the joint Marine-ARVN Combined Action Platoons showcased the ability of the 
United States and the GVN to work alongside each other to achieve their shared military 
objectives by employing counterinsurgency strategies against the Vietcong: 
CAP platoons inhibited guerilla and shadow government activity in the hamlets 
rather effectively, and they improved the fighting capabilities of the territorial forces. 
They allowed the Allies to engage the enemy more often than did most American units 
involved in search-and-destroy operations.110 
 
Moyar’s most poignant arguments to buttress his belief that counterinsurgency 
operations in Vietnam were effective come from interviews he describes with former VC 
guerillas, NVA soldiers and their political leaders. He points out that Former VC Minister 
of Justice Truong Nhu Tang believed that: “In some locations…Phoenix was dangerously 
effective. In Hau Nghia Province, for example, not far from our old base area, the Front 
infrastructure was virtually eliminated.”111 Likewise, he points out that Maj. Gen. Le Van 
Duong, Deputy Director of the National Defense Academy, stated that: “In some regions, 
the people on our side suffered heavy losses because of Phoenix.”112 
Moyar argues that the United States gained the upper-hand over the VC in the 
rural villages and hamlets after the Tet Offensive. As the United States began to actively 
assist the GVN in nation building efforts, living conditions for the civilian population 
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improved and the people welcomed the US-GVN presence in their areas which they had 
failed to do earlier in the war: 
In the latter stages of the war, the GVN had a great deal more to offer, including 
economic prosperity, Land to the Tiller titles, relative freedom from destructive military 
encounters, and the possibility of serving in the territorial forces near one’s family.113 
 
Moyar’s conclusions imply that at the end of the Vietnam War, at precisely the 
time the United States was withdrawing from the conflict, the Vietcong had lost political 
support from the civilian population and were severely weakened due to their tactical 
defeat in the Tet Offensive. This was due in part to effective counterinsurgency 
operations. The United States and their South Vietnamese allies employed 
counterintelligence operations, economic reforms, psychological warfare, bribes and even 
extortion to pacify the VC insurgency. Moyar’s citation of a captured VC Directive from 
Quang Nam Province supports this conclusion: 
The enemy has tricked and bribed the youths in our liberated areas to side with 
him and has poisoned the minds of the students and teenagers in his areas and debauched 
them in an attempt to enroll them in his anti-revolutionary forces. Recently, in our 
province which is one of the enemy’s accelerated pacification priority areas, the enemy 
has implemented these plans, met with some success, and caused a number of 
difficulties….114 
 
Moyar’s description of a demoralized and nearly-defeated Vietcong leads one to 
believe that the United States had the chance to make a major breakthrough in defeating 
the Vietcong insurgency after the Tet Offensive due in part to its effective employment of 
counterinsurgency. Yet despite the recorded success of American counterinsurgency 
programs in Vietnam, the war ultimately ended in failure for the United States and the 
GVN. Instead of hearing about the positive political developments counterinsurgency 
tactics had brought about in South Vietnam, the American public saw images of naked 
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children running from napalm attacks, public executions and congressional testimony 
from former soldiers in groups such as the Vietnam Veterans against the War. One 
soldier who was highly critical of counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam was Kenneth 
Barton Osborn. Osborn served as a military intelligence officer near Da Nang from 1967- 
1968. He claimed during his time working within the Phoenix Program in Vietnam the 
United States and its GVN allies murdered and tortured the VC suspects they detained in 
an effort to coerce them into giving up more intelligence on their guerilla infrastructure: 
I never knew an individual to be detained as a VC suspect who ever lived through 
an interrogation in a year and a half, and that included quite a number of individuals. 
There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any of those individuals 
was, in fact, cooperating with the Vietcong, but they all died and the majority were either 
tortured to death or things like thrown from helicopters.115 
 
Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in 
Vietnam is an insightful analytical study of American military strategy in Vietnam. It 
provides specific details of counterinsurgency operations that often receive little attention 
in contemporary discussions of the Vietnam War. Moyar’s use of primary sources and 
interviews with participants in counterinsurgency operations throughout the course of the 
Vietnam War provide a compelling argument in favor of the opinion that 
counterinsurgency warfare worked on the battlefield in the Vietnam War when it was 
employed. Moyar’s claims that counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam made tactical 
progress in the latter portion of the war lead one to conclude that the Vietnam War may 
have ended differently if the United States had continued employing counterinsurgency 
tactics instead of withdrawing from the conflict before they were completed. 
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If counterinsurgency operations were tactically successful in Vietnam then why 
were they so often supplanted by conventional military tactics instead? Andrew 
Krepinevich argues in The Army and Vietnam that the United States implemented a 
losing strategy in Vietnam because: "the Army was well trained in conventional wars but 
inefficient and ineffective in defeating insurgent guerilla forces in a "low-intensity" 
conflict."116 He is quick to fault the military and its overreliance on The Army Concept 
which fostered a culture that favored conventional methods of warfare as opposed to 
counterinsurgency. From the Pentagon brass to the boots on the ground, The Army 
Concept is described by Krepinevich as a deeply entrenched organizational culture in the 
military that believed superior airpower, heavy artillery and conventional tactics best 
suited for a war against a large army in continental Europe could fight and win any war. 
General William Westmoreland, the Commander of the Military Assistance Command 
Vietnam, was the biggest proponent of The Army Concept as described by    Krepinevich. 
His decision to employ conventional methods of warfare throughout the entire duration of 
his command inhibited the ability of the United States to pacify the insurgency that was 
undermining the legitimacy of the GVN. 
Krepinevich argues that the belief that VC and NVA troops could be defeated 
through a conventional war of attrition was false. Yet this was precisely what 
Westmoreland’s strategy in Vietnam entailed. Westmoreland, he argues, continued to 
employ search-and-destroy operations, aerial bombing campaigns and large-unit warfare 
despite the fact that these tactics were not successful in pacifying the VC insurgency and 
caused unnecessary civilian casualties and bloodshed. Such tactics were employed 
because leaders in the military establishment believed that the United States could win 
116 Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988., 4 
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any war where it had superior firepower. As Krepinevich reveals: “U.S. military leaders 
believed in the morale-raising and life-saving value of massive firepower whose success 
they had witnessed in World War II and Korea.”117 Westmoreland’s approach to military 
strategy reflected this deeply entrenched view of how wars were fought and won by the 
United States. 
Krepinevich reveals that Westmoreland undermined America’s ability to fight 
counterinsurgency warfare effectively by creating a flawed military strategy to fight the 
war. Not only had the United States purged counterinsurgency warfare from its military 
doctrine and training programs, but ARVN troops responsible for “the other war” as 
counterinsurgency was known, were corrupt, inadequately funded and led by military 
commanders that were poor soldiers.118 Despite having influence over ARVN, 
Westmoreland never integrated their units into the MACV to improve their flawed 
fighting abilities. This state of affairs was noticed by astute military observers such as 
General Matthew B. Ridgeway, the American military commander who led a joint US- 
Korean military apparatus in the Korean War. Upon analyzing the behavior of the MACV 
and ARVN he quipped: “I could never understand why they had a dual command in 
South Vietnam. Why in hell didn’t they put the ARVN under Westmoreland?”119 
The American military employed a flawed military strategy at the outset of the 
Vietnam War due to the fact that the military establishment came of age in a post-World 
War II era where conventional methods of warfare were successful in defeating powerful 
military adversaries. Nations such as Germany and Japan had larger and better equipped 
militaries then the ragtag band of VC insurgents and their NVA allies. By the 1960s 
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America’s biggest strategic threat, the Soviet Union, had begun funding insurgencies in 
the third-world in order to broaden their sphere of influence across the world. One of 
President Kennedy's closest advisors, Walter W. Rostow, advanced the argument that the 
Soviets actively worked stoke insurgencies in the third-world in the years preceding the 
Vietnam War in order to topple their western backed regimes. If the United States 
intended to stop democracies from falling to communism, Rostow argued that action  was 
required  to  preserve  regimes  friendly  to  the  United  States.120  In  the  years preceding 
 
American intervention in Vietnam, communist backed insurgencies in the Philippines 
(1948), Malaya (1951), and Vietnam (1954) confronted western powers. As a 
Congressman and Senator, President Kennedy had traveled abroad and personally saw 
first-hand how the French failed to pacify communist insurgencies in Algeria and 
Vietnam.121 Upon inheriting America's commitment in Vietnam in 1961, President 
Kennedy was well aware that a war against a communist backed insurgency was on the 
horizon in Vietnam if the United States continued to back a noncommunist regime in 
South Vietnam against its Soviet backed communist neighbor North Vietnam. 
President Kennedy’s early actions in office show that he endorsed the concept of 
preparing the military to fight insurgent movements that posed a threat to the national 
interests of the United States. Kennedy relayed these beliefs in a commencement speech 
at West Point on June 6, 1962: 
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by 
guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by 
infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy 
instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been 
strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries 
to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest   and 
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ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the 
kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a 
whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and 
wholly different kind of military training.122 
 
Kennedy’s speech marked the beginning of a policy initiative designed to integrate 
counterinsurgency warfare into American military doctrine. Kennedy personally ordered 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to add counterinsurgency training to the 
curriculum at West Point and the Army War College.123 At that moment in time, it 
appeared that the United States was preparing to alter its military doctrine in an effort to 
train its next generation of military officers in counterinsurgency warfare. America’s 
growing commitment in Vietnam, and the prospects of a future war in the country, would 
be the likely battlefield for these young officers if President Kennedy’s desired policies 
were put in place in the military at that time. 
It was quite clear that President Kennedy believed that the growing conflict in 
Vietnam would be best fought using a counterinsurgency strategy. On February 3, 1961 
President Kennedy signed National Security Action Memorandum 2. This executive 
action instructed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to prepare the military for 
counter-guerilla warfare.124 However, the Army brass stonewalled Kennedy’s orders to 
include counterinsurgency warfare in its military doctrine and training programs. At the 
time, the military hierarchy was opposed to reshaping its doctrine and force posture in 
order to accommodate a large-scale use of counterinsurgency warfare. Army Chief of 
Staff General George Decker rebuffed Kennedy's policies by arguing that: "any good 
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soldier could handle guerillas."125 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer 
stated that the Kennedy Administration was: "oversold on the importance of 
counterinsurgency" and subsequently leaked a story to the press expressing  these 
views.126 Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, the Chief of the Military Assistance 
Advisory Group from 1960 to 1962, argued that the United States could successfully use 
conventional methods of warfare to defeat the Vietcong and their unconventional guerilla 
tactics.127 Lieutenant General Harold K. Johnson, later Army Chief of Staff from 1964- 
1968, was critical of President Kennedy’s efforts to mold the Special Forces into 
counterinsurgency specialists. He publicly opposed their use in the Civilian Irregular 
Defense Group and Strategic Hamlet Programs (despite their success in pacification 
operations).128 
The views of the aforementioned military leaders were undoubtedly present in the 
mind of President Kennedy on January 28, 1962 when he received The Howze Board 
Report. The Howze Board was set up to assess the Army's readiness to engage in 
counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. The findings in The Howze Board Report 
showed that the military was failing in its efforts to include counterinsurgency into its 
doctrine and training programs: 
The tactical doctrine for the employment of regular forces against insurgent 
guerilla forces has not been adequately developed, and the Army does not have a clear 
concept of the proper scale and type of equipment necessary for these operations.129 
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It was at this decisive point in time that President Kennedy should have fired the 
aforementioned military leaders and replaced them with capable civilian and military 
officers that were well schooled in counterinsurgency warfare in theory and practice. The 
situation was so bad that the Army Director of Special Warfare, William E. Depuy,  later 
admitted that at the time of his command that he didn't know anything about 
counterinsurgency warfare.130 
Kennedy's reluctance to exert his executive authority over the military 
establishment was a sign that civil-military relations were dominated by the military at 
that moment. Less than a decade before, President Truman fired the legendary General 
Douglas MacArthur when he failed to obey his orders in the Korean War. President 
Kennedy would have been successful in selling his counterinsurgency program had he 
made a bold statement by firing the military leaders that were undermining his executive 
authority. Unlike President Truman, who had abysmal public approval ratings during the 
Korean War, President Kennedy had approval ratings as high as 83% during his short 
time in office and had proven that he could use the bully pulpit to enlist public and 
congressional support for his New Frontier political agenda.131 If Kennedy had  dismissed 
 
the generals that were opposed to his counterinsurgency program, none of which were as 
beloved by the general public as General MacArthur, Kennedy would have sent a clear 
message to his own civilian and military leaders that he was serious about  implementing 
a counterinsurgency program in the military during his administration. 
President Kennedy had a number of prominent counterinsurgency advocates in 
the chain of command that he could have given political power and support to lead his 
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counterinsurgency initiative. These leaders included George Ball, Sir Robert Thompson, 
General Creighton Abrams and Robert Komer. Each of these leaders advocated for the 
implementation of counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam. The public statements and 
private opinions of each of these leaders has been captured in the historical record and 
clearly show that they would have moved the military away from conventional methods 
of warfare in Vietnam had their expertise been employed to make executive decisions 
during the Kennedy Administration. 
George Ball served as the Under Secretary of State for both President Kennedy 
and Johnson. He had a minimal impact on military policy formulation during his tenure at 
the State Department. He was known to be more of a devil’s advocate rather than an 
advisor entrusted to craft major policy initiatives in Vietnam. Despite his status as an 
outsider, Ball’s understanding of the nature of the war being fought in Vietnam was 
superior to the military establishment and the civilian advisors that kowtowed to their 
wishes. While he was known for being the lone voice against escalation in Vietnam, if 
Ball had been in a position where he was entrusted to make strategic decisions during the 
Vietnam War, his leadership would have saw the implementation of a counterinsurgency 
program rather than the conventional approach to fighting the war. Ball criticized the 
employment of a conventional war in Vietnam and argued in an 18 June 1963 
Memorandum that the United States would find itself engaged in a guerilla war rather 
than a big-unit war as the military establishment believed.132 Ball’s deep understanding of 
 
the nature of the warfare that had to be employed in Vietnam clearly shows that he could 
have implemented a counterinsurgency based approach to fighting the Vietnam War if he 
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had been entrusted with the proper authority to do so. His recollection of the state of the 
war in Vietnam after his advice was ignored reflects such an opinion: 
Ever since 1961-the beginning of our deep involvement in South Viet-Nam- we 
have met successive disappointments. We have tended to overestimate the effectiveness 
of our sophisticated weapons under jungle conditions. We have watched the progressive 
loss of territory to Viet Cong control. We have been unable to bring about the creation of 
a  stable  political  base  in  Saigon.  This  is  no  one’s  fault.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  the 
struggle.133 
 
Another civilian advisor that could have been employed to work in a more 
substantial fashion on counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam was Sir Robert Thompson. 
Thompson gained notoriety in military circles after employing a robust British 
counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya in the 1950s. Internal Kennedy Administration 
deliberations reveal that in 1963 Thompson was worried that the Vietcong were 
infiltrating the populace and sowing the seeds for future armed conflict and political 
duress.134 His warnings went unaddressed by leaders in the Pentagon. In April of 1963 he 
was employed by South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem to operate the Chieu Hoi 
Program. The program was designed by Diem to bribe and coerce the VC into laying 
down their arms and declaring allegiance to the GVN. According to Pentagon Analysts, 
the program was cost-effective and proved that seeking out VC defectors would cost less 
than killing them in search-and-destroy missions.135 His wisdom was recalled years later 
by Robert Komer in an interview with the Rand Corporation: 
His (Thompson’s) prescriptions could have been decisive (and he was prescribing 
it then) from 1957-1963 when the insurgency was mostly Vietcong and mostly a guerilla 
and subversive operation.136 
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Yet the Chieu Hoi Program was never incorporated into a broader 
counterinsurgency strategy due to a lack of funding and poor coordination between the 
GVN and the United States and its incompatibility with Westmoreland’s overall strategic 
plan in Vietnam. At the time of its implementation, the military establishment was dead 
set against an integrated approach of combining American and Vietnamese troops into 
one cohesive fighting unit. Such a commitment would have meant a much deeper 
commitment in resources than either Kennedy or Johnson was willing to commit at the 
beginning of the war. Johnson’s opinions were documented in the Pentagon Papers on the 
importance of keeping the fighting of American troops to a minimum: “Our committing a 
good many American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of 
Asia to help protect their own land.”137 
The advice and guidance offered by counterinsurgency experts such as Sir Robert 
Thompson was altogether ignored at the time when fledging counterinsurgency programs 
such as the Chieu Hoi and the Strategic Hamlets Program were beginning  to make 
tactical progress in the early 1960s. When these programs needed resources and attention 
from the most important policymakers in the Pentagon, the military establishment fought 
tooth and nail against further efforts to bolster these limited but tactically successful 
attempts at employing counterinsurgency tactics in Vietnam. 
If the advice of consultants such as Sir Robert Thompson was adopted, a military 
leader such as General Creighton Abrams would have been the perfect candidate to 
employ the counterinsurgency strategy. A native of Massachusetts, General Creighton 
Abrams became the Head of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam in 1968. 
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Before he took over the reins of the MACV in 1968, General Abrams had worked closely 
with military advisors in Vietnam that worked alongside the South Vietnamese. He was 
well aware that a guerilla war was being waged by the Vietcong within the villages and 
hamlets of South Vietnam. General Abrams served as deputy to General William 
Westmoreland until he obtained command of the MACV in 1968. For much of the war, 
his opinions on military strategy were bottled up due to his strong loyalty and affinity  for 
General Westmoreland and his belief that his best advice could not change General 
Westmoreland’s steadfast commitment to conventional warfare.138 Abrams oversaw an 
investigation on military strategy in 1966 that culminated in the publication of the 
Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) 
Study. According to John Nagl, the results of General Abrams’ study showed that only a 
military strategy premised on counterinsurgency warfare would allow the United  States 
to achieve its strategic objectives in Vietnam: 
The conclusions of the study were striking; it repudiated the army’s current 
emphasis on search-and-destroy operations and urged a move toward pacification through 
winning over the population to the government’s cause.139 
 
Another prominent proponent of counterinsurgency warfare was Robert 
"Blowtorch" Komer. Komer was known for his brash style and his forceful efforts to 
prod the military establishment into supporting counterinsurgency operations in the 
Vietnam War. Komer was appointed Special Assistant to President Johnson and his 
efforts to implement a counterinsurgency program in Vietnam came to fruition when the 
program known as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support   (CORDS) 
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was created in 1967.140 If CORDS had been implemented earlier, and on a larger-scale, 
the successes that were achieved under the program would have come earlier in the war 
when the Vietcong were building the foundation of their insurgency and shadow 
government. If the successful implementation of CORDS occurred in 1963 instead of 
1967, it would have stunted the growth of the VC and made training competent ARVN 
soldiers and GVN political leaders easier. These factors would have expedited the 
pacification of the Vietcong insurgency and fomented the creation of a stable and viable 
non-communist regime in South Vietnam.  An October 1970 Memorandum to   Secretary 
of Defense Melvin Laird reveals the effectiveness of CORDS in training ARVN troops 
and producing competent GVN leadership making this scenario altogether more likely to 
have occurred: 
Some progress has been made in improving RVNAF combat leadership during 
the past year. These changes should lead to improvements and MACV undoubtedly 
played a significant role in bringing them about…The MACV-CORDS system for having 
better provincial and district officials appointed works quite well, but no other MACV 
staff section uses it.141 
 
Komer’s personal recollections of CORDS show that the military establishment 
did little to train and equip its troops to engage in counterinsurgency warfare. This made 
its implementation more effective because the military had not poisoned  the program 
with conventional military doctrine or battlefield tactics: 
There was no pacification program in a real sense before we got in the act. There 
was no doctrine already well laid down. We wrote the bible and made up the program as 
we went along. The very fact that nobody else had done anything in a big way made it 
much easier for us.142 
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Under Komer’s watch, a new counterinsurgency doctrine and a joint U.S.-GVN 
inter-agency civil-military organization was created. CORDS was composed of a diverse 
assortment of federal  agencies including the MACV,  CIA, State  Department,   USAID, 
U.S.  Information  Agency  and  even  the  U.S.  Joint  Public  Affairs  Office.143 Komer’s 
 
assessment of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and how they needed to be 
employed in order to be effective on the battlefield were published in The Handbook for 
Military Support of Pacification in February of 1968: 
Pacification, as it applies in the Republic of Vietnam, is the military, political, 
economic, and social process of establishing and re-establishing local government 
responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of 
sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground 
government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of  the 
people in the government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of 
self-sustenance and expansion...The key to pacification is the provision of sustained 
territorial security. Territorial security is security from VC local forces and guerilla  units 
and VC/NVA main force units, if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the 
protection of the people within the hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies.144 
 
If Komer had created CORDS during the Kennedy Administration, the United 
States would have also saved large sums of money in its war effort. Conservative 
estimates show that the United States spent an estimated $333 Billion (in 1986 dollars) in 
Vietnam by employing a military strategy premised on search-and-destroy missions and 
massive aerial bombing campaigns in order to defeat the enemy.145 In one year alone, FY 
1969, territorial forces performing counterinsurgency operations received only about 2% 
of a combined U.S. and GVN budget of $21.5 Billion Dollars.146 
If these aforementioned leaders had been employed to shape policy and strategy 
from the outset of the Vietnam War it is plausible that a scenario would have occurred 
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where the added benefits of saving money and pacifying the Vietcong insurgency at an 
earlier time would have allowed the United States to fight the Vietnam War more 
effectively and efficiently. Such a scenario would have made it easier for the United 
States to achieve its strategic objective of preserving a stable and viable non-communist 
regime in South Vietnam. The positive results that would have occurred under a 
counterinsurgency based approach to fighting in Vietnam would have led to a different 
result on the battlefield that would have changed the trajectory of the war and allowed the 
United States to make significant progress at an earlier time in achieving its tactical 
military objectives. 
Counterinsurgency warfare was not present in any way shape or form in Army 
military doctrine until tangentially described in the 1962 Army Field Manual FM-100-5. 
When it was described in FM-100-5, the Army had intertwined counterinsurgency and 
conventional tactics in a fashion that made implementing a purely counterinsurgency 
based approach in Vietnam impossible.147 The only military  organization  properly 
trained in counterinsurgency warfare in the years preceding Vietnam were the Special 
Forces, whose overall presence in Vietnam paled in comparison to the number of Army 
regulars. The counterinsurgency structures that were employed early in the war like the 
Strategic Hamlets, Chieu Hoi and CIDG Programs were all dismantled or incorporated 
into conventional military units that rendered them useless in their stated purpose of 
pacifying the Vietcong insurgency. 
The joint American-South Vietnamese war effort failed because the United States 
sent an Army into Vietnam to fight against a large conventional army, such as the  Soviet 
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Union, rather than the VC insurgency and NVA forces it was pitted against. 
Understanding the policies, strategies and tactics implemented by these parties and their 
offshoots will help one to understand why the United States fought a style of warfare that 
made it impossible to achieve its main strategic objective of preserving a viable non- 
communist regime in South Vietnam. 
The NVA was an Army of conventional forces subdivided into battalions, 
platoons and individual infantry units based in North Vietnam. For the majority of the 
Vietnam War, the United States did not fight conventional NVA units in head-to-head 
combat. Instead, the United States found itself confronted with an enemy, the VC, which 
was not readily identifiable nor organized into conventional military units that could be 
engaged directly in conventional terms. The VC were communist backed insurgents 
native to South Vietnam and loyal to North Vietnam’s Premier Ho Chi Minh. The VC 
immersed themselves within the populace and waged guerilla warfare against MACV and 
ARVN troops. The political wing of the VC, the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI) aimed to 
wrestle political control from the GVN and undermine its governing mandate over South 
Vietnam by establishing a shadow government. In the process, they sought to infiltrate, 
extort, and intimidate the local populace into submitting to their authority. Since it was 
difficult to distinguish civilian from enemy, the United States often razed entire villages 
or targeted large swaths of territory in hopes that it could defeat VC cadres. Images 
created from these heavy-handed operations made their into American households as war 
correspondents and television news anchors like Walter Cronkite reported on the status of 
the war effort on an almost nightly basis throughout the duration of the entire Vietnam 
War.  Images  of  aerial  bombing  raids  and  Agent  Orange  defoliation  campaigns   led 
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Americans to see the nature of the war effort as being brutal, destructive and tactically 
unsuccessful in making progress towards achieving the strategic objectives of setting up a 
politically legitimate non-communist regime in South Vietnam. 
A closer look at the opinions of President Johnson show that he wanted the South 
Vietnamese to assume as much of the fighting commitments in South Vietnam as 
possible. However, he also knew the importance of maintaining a cohesive fighting force 
in order to accomplish success on the battlefield. Internal debates within the Johnson 
Administration in 1965 show that he considered integrating ARVN and MACV units in 
order to allow the two armies to work alongside each other.148  However, this decision 
 
was  ultimately  rebuffed  by  General  Westmoreland  at  the  Honolulu  Conference     in 
 
If this decision had been made it would have forced the MACV and ARVN to adopt a 
unified strategy to fight the war. The United States would have been responsible for 
ARVN troops and their behavior on the battlefield. Instead of working in  one cohesive 
unit alongside the South Vietnamese, high ranking military officials such as Defense 
Secretary Robert McNamara and General William Westmoreland showed more interest in 
tallying the body count of Vietcong insurgents and NVA regulars rather than measuring 
the outputs that were more consequential to achieving their military objectives, such 
as pacified provinces under GVN leadership. Metrics to gauge political support for the 
GVN from within the South Vietnamese populace were also ignored.150 Gen. 
Westmoreland believed that the best way to win the war would be to: "hurt the enemy 
across the spectrum of his efforts until he concluded that he could not win and 
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thus seek and agree to a political settlement."151 Gen. Westmoreland's own Chief of 
Intelligence, Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson, later remarked that: "Westmoreland's interest 
always lay in the big-unit war; pacification (a term synonymous for counterinsurgency) 
bored him."152 As a result of this decision, counterinsurgency warfare was given little 
attention and all but ignored until the failures of a purely conventional military strategy 
became evident in 1967. 
After waging a predominantly conventional military strategy in the early years of 
the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson convened a meeting in Hawaii in 1967 in an 
effort to craft a new strategy that would change the course of the war in favor of the 
United States and South Vietnam. After conventional tactics failed to bring about an end 
to the conflict in the wars earliest days, it was apparent that the United States needed to 
adopt an alternative approach if it hoped to achieve its tactical military objectives in 
Vietnam. In retrospect, it was a sign of progress that the US military showed an ability to 
adapt by changing its military strategy during the war. Gen. Westmoreland was a strong 
proponent of conventional warfare and even giving credence to the idea that the military 
should begin constructing a new military doctrine and counterinsurgency strategy under 
his leadership showed that even the biggest proponents of conventional warfare knew that 
they couldn’t defeat the VC insurgency under their current conventional approach. 
A counterinsurgency doctrine that was to be coordinated by the MACV, CIA, and 
ARVN troops began to take form under the leadership of Robert Komer. If the United 
States was to achieve its goal of preserving a non-communist regime in South Vietnam, it 
had to pacify the VC insurgency, dismantle its shadow government and build political 
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support for its preferred GVN leaders. It would also need to keep enough of a military 
presence in the country to hold off NVA regulars from invading South Vietnam. In order 
to pacify the Vietcong insurgency, the MACV needed to improve its intelligence 
gathering operations if they were to be successful in locating the VC infiltrators that were 
hiding in the villages and hamlets under GVN control. On July 9, 1967, the MACV 
issued Directive 381-41. MACV Directive 381-41 laid out the command structure and 
objectives for Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX). Reliable and accurate 
intelligence was critical to infiltrating and undermining the VCI in South Vietnam. A 
comprehensive effort was made to create an effective intelligence network that could 
share resources with all of the key stakeholders involved in counterinsurgency operations 
in Vietnam. The coordinating committees which worked together to coordinate 
intelligence included: 
The National Police, the Special Police Branch, the National Police Field Force, 
the Chieu Hoi amnesty program, the RD cadre, the Military Security Service, the military 
intelligence and current operations staff, the PRUs, and others.153 
 
Together these units would work side by side in an effort to purge South Vietnam of 
guerillas that were sympathetic to the VC. 
MACV Directive 381-41 also created a command structure that could effectively 
place the intelligence gathered in the field into the hands of a fighting force capable of 
uprooting the Vietcong from their sanctuaries in South Vietnam. These forces became 
known as Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs).154 A PRU was a security force 
composed of South Vietnamese natives tasked with the responsibility of capturing and 
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soliciting information from Vietcong loyalists. PRUs extracted intelligence from captured 
Vietcong guerillas in order to undermine future attacks by the VC. This task was done 
quite effectively. PRUs were assigned to regions where the South Vietnamese knew the 
terrain and the people living in the area. PRU units often utilized their own knowledge 
and interpersonal networks in South Vietnam order to accomplish their objectives. The 
overall purpose of the PRU units were not to kill those who were suspected of being loyal 
to the Vietcong (although this happened regularly) Instead, they tried to capture and 
extract intelligence from the prisoners whom they believed were part of the VCI hoping 
that such intelligence coups could lead to even more in the future. The success of the 
PRU units were described by historian Thomas Thayer as: "the single most effective anti- 
VC forces...No other force came close to this."155 
ICEX was but one component of what became known as the Phoenix Program. 
The Phoenix Program also had a political component to it that was crucial to the overall 
effectiveness of the counterinsurgency strategy that was employed. In addition to being a 
military conflict, the Vietnam War was also a political struggle between communist and 
anti-communist political ideologies. This made the war a political struggle. The goal of 
the political component of the Phoenix Program was to build support amongst the 
populace for the noncommunist GVN leadership. Winning the military war against the 
Vietcong was only half the battle in this endeavor. In addition to being fighters, the VC 
were also an extension of South Vietnam's Communist Party, the People's Revolutionary 
Party. The VCI operated as its shadow government and even had a functioning civil- 
military  leadership,  intelligence  apparatus,  tax  levying  system  and  political  outreach 
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program.156 It was an expansive insurgent network that up until the creation of the 
Phoenix Program, the Americans had been unable to infiltrate and dismantle. 
The Phoenix Program was also a political tool for President Johnson to assuage 
the concerns of his Democratic supporters that opposed further escalation of the Vietnam 
War. In the 1964 presidential election, Johnson reassured the American public that he 
was against further escalation in Vietnam and that the United States was: "not about to 
send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys 
ought to be doing for themselves."157 His failure to live up to this promise as the war 
continued caused his public approval ratings to plummet from 83% at the peak of his 
presidency to 56% in his last days in office.158 Johnson supported Komer's 
counterinsurgency strategy because doing so would mean that fewer Americans would 
die and more of the fighting responsibilities would be turned over to the South 
Vietnamese. In a best case scenario, a counterinsurgency strategy would help the 
Americans win the war and achieve its strategic objectives in Vietnam. Johnson was well 
aware of what was at stake politically. Each day, antiwar activists harangued him for not 
bringing about an end to the military conflict in Vietnam. Johnson's concerns are clearly 
displayed in a message he sent to General Westmoreland and Special Assistant Komer in 
which he told them to: "search urgently for occasions to present sound evidence of 
progress in Vietnam."159 
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To Johnson's delight, the Phoenix Program showed signs of success in its 
implementation. The Phoenix Program was composed of a number of separate actors that 
had to coordinate and collaborate with one another in order for the counterinsurgency 
program to achieve its goal of pacifying the VC insurgency and establishing GVN 
political authority. Since no sustained counterinsurgency program had existed prior to its 
implementation, its development was done on the fly. As circumstances changed on the 
ground, so did the doctrine and implementation of the Phoenix Program. The Phoenix 
Program combined hard-power and soft-power tools to merge a diverse cadre of military 
and civilian units into one hierarchical command structure capable of pacifying the 
Vietcong insurgency and establishing GVN political authority in South Vietnam. The 
Phoenix Program became an effective tool in the battle to win the "hearts and minds" of 
the Vietnamese people. Its intention was to practice a: "rifle shot" rather than a shotgun 
approach to the real target: important political leaders and activists within the VC 
infrastructure."160 The program encouraged VC to defect to the GVN and hand over 
intelligence about their sources in the VCI. It also helped the Americans and their South 
Vietnamese allies gain additional knowledge of future VC military operations and their 
spies present within the GVN political infrastructure. The Phoenix Program implemented 
effective counterintelligence operations to find spies and, as a result, was able to sway 
captured VC to relinquish their allegiance to the VC. A harsh reality of the Phoenix 
Program was that if VC infiltrators didn’t renounce their loyalty to the VC, the faced the 
prospect of coercive interrogation, imprisonment or even death. Such   counterinsurgency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 MACV, Dir 381-41, 2 
112  
tactics worked. Estimates show that in 1966, 20,000 Vietcong defected and by 1969 that 
number had increased to 47,000.161 
Successful implementation of the "rifle shot" approach envisioned in MACV 
Directive 381-41 was seen in a carefully executed pacification program that was 
undertaken in the Quang Dien District of Thua Thien Province in April of 1968. In this 
counterinsurgency campaign, MACV and ARVN troops worked in tandem with one 
another, without the use of aerial bombing or artillery support, to effectively pacify the 
VC and dismantle their political network. The accelerated pacification was able to 
convince many VC to surrender and to renounce their loyalty to the Communist Party.162 
This came about under the leadership of General Creighton Abrams who had assumed the 
leadership of the MACV in 1968 and was effective in waging the counterinsurgency 
strategy that he had been constrained from implementing as the deputy to General 
Westmoreland. 
In addition to providing security for the local population, the Phoenix Program 
also encompassed economic development and public works projects that were just as 
important as the security component of the pacification plan. These projects were 
designed with the specific intent of shifting political support to the GVN and away from 
the VC. Without new roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, food storage warehouses and 
economic policies designed to sustain their agrarian lifestyle, the local populace had 
turned to the VC earlier in the Vietnam War when they felt that the VC offered them a 
 
 
 
 
 
161Brooks, Douglas J., THE PHOENIX PROGRAM: A RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT: A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty of Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree  of 
Master of Arts.1989. http://www.hoosier84.com/phx.pdf., 30 
162  Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam , 169 
165  Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 319 
113 
 
better standard of living than the GVN could bring them. Pacifying the VC insurgency 
wouldn’t have been possible if these objectives weren’t completed. 
In an effort to address this challenge, Komer crafted initiatives such as the Joint 
Medical Program, Village Development Program, the National Highway Development 
Program and the Miracle Rice Program.163 Together, these programs turned out to be a 
success in tackling issues that could not be accomplished without a coordinated 
government approach between the US, GVN and the local population. Without the 
creation of "hamlet schools," there never would have been: "18,178 low-cost classrooms 
built and over 20,000 teachers trained for 1.25 million students."164 USAID played a 
major role in building and sustaining these new infrastructure development programs. 
The Land to the Tiller Program was another success that showed similar results. An 
independent study conducted by the Control Data Corporation stated that the program: 
Helped turn a once-disaffected, politically neutral mass of potential  and 
sometimes actual revolutionaries (formerly providing rice, information, labor  and 
military manpower to the enemy) into middle-class farmers in support of the regime.165 
 
The accomplishments made in infrastructure and economic  development 
programs were the result of counterinsurgency operations conducted under the Phoenix 
Program. Like a search-and-destroy mission, these programs had specific tactical 
objectives and benchmarks for success. These programs turned out to be far more 
effective in accomplishing American military objectives than were conventional military 
operations. Having been created years after the Vietnam War began, and devoted limited 
manpower and financial resources, Robert Komer reflected on the Phoenix Program as a 
lone bright spot America's Vietnam military strategy: 
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Given the small proportion of total U.S. resources we got, and the fact that the 
pacification was wholly Vietnamized from the outset, I'll contend that it was clearly the 
most cost-effective major U.S. sponsored program of the Vietnam War.166 
The Phoenix Program undoubtedly improved the quality of living for the South 
Vietnamese. It also made great progress towards infiltrating and dismantling the VCI. 
Despite its achievements, the legacy of the Phoenix Program has been sullied by 
accusations of prisoner abuse and torture. These allegations came forth due to reports that 
revealed that captured VC were shipped off to interrogation centers where they were 
questioned by GVN agents and subjected to physically coercive interrogation techniques 
which were seen by critics of the Phoenix Program as acts of torture.167 The fact that the 
American led Phoenix Program worked in such close quarters with violent South 
Vietnamese interrogators sullied the reputation of the Phoenix Program in the United 
States Congress. Allegations of torture spawned congressional hearings and fact-finding 
missions to South Vietnam from powerful politicians. Yet the fact-finding missions came 
up empty as it became evident that Americans were not engaged in the alleged acts of 
torture. Anti-war Congressman Jerome Waldie visited Vietnam on one such mission in 
1971 and to the chagrin of his antiwar supporters, Waldie declared that he: “saw nothing 
in any of the (Phoenix Program) centers to which I had access that led me to believe that 
abuses, in fact, did occur in the province interrogation centers."168 Despite this state of 
affairs, American perceptions of the nature of the war back home didn’t change as the 
war continued to become more and more unpopular as it progressed despite the tactical 
successes being made on the ground in counterinsurgency operations. 
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The tactical achievements that occurred on the ground under the Phoenix Program 
reveal a state of affairs that show by 1968 the situation on the ground had for the first 
time in the war shifted in favor of the US and GVN. The Tet Offensive had been a major 
military defeat for the Vietcong. VC and NVA leaders, such as General Tran Van Tra, 
later admitted that they were severely weakened after the Tet Offensive.169 Their multi- 
pronged attack in the population centers of South Vietnam surprised and shocked the 
American public and ultimately fed into the argument being perpetrated by anti-war 
activists that despite all of the blood and treasure spent in Vietnam, the VC were still 
strong enough to wage a major assault that surprised the military and its South 
Vietnamese allies. 
It was precisely at this moment that if the United States had decided to continue 
its counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam that it would have finally turned the corner 
and pacified the VC insurgency allowing it to achieve its established its goal of leaving a 
viable non-communist regime in South Vietnam. Not only were the military ranks of the 
VC decimated in the Tet Offensive, but their political base of support from within the 
South Vietnamese populace withered away as well. Rather than securing the loyalty of 
the populace and improving the local economy, the VC were blamed for the spike in 
fighting and destruction that was incurred under their watch during the Tet Offensive. 
The locals took them to task for failing to live up to their promise of providing a better 
standard of living than the Americans and GVN could offer.170 By 1968, the change in 
the South Vietnamese citizen’s attitudes towards the GVN was 360 degrees different 
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from where they were in the beginning of the Vietnam War. The infrastructure and 
economic development projects put in place under the Phoenix Program were beginning 
bear fruit in the years following their implementation. American military leaders, such as 
Col. Walter Clark, began to notice the South Vietnamese people were shifting their 
loyalties away from the VC and to the GVN: 
In 1971 and 1972, as the GVN presence became stronger and the Vietcong 
became weaker in my province, there was considerable evidence that the villagers 
believed the mandate of heaven indicated that they should support the GVN.171 
 
Even the VC knew that they were beginning to lose the hearts and minds of the 
South Vietnamese. According to a captured VC document, COSVN Resolution 9, such 
feelings were clearly beginning to form in the minds of VC leadership: “The enemy 
constantly uses economic measures, psychological warfare, decadent culture, etc., to 
influence and dominate all political, economic and cultural aspects in the rural areas.”172 
With the Vietcong on the run, and their influence waning, the United States   need 
 
only have stayed the course long enough to continue efforts to train competent and 
capable South Vietnamese political leaders. The United States had more than enough 
military power to hold off the main NVA units that posed a strategic threat to South 
Vietnam. Instead of following this course of action, the United States chose to withdraw 
from South Vietnam. In its place, it left a fledgling GVN that had yet to nurture viable 
political leaders capable of claiming their newfound political mandate. To add insult to 
injury, the United States withdrew its military forces completely. This allowed the 
NVA’s  main  units  to  invade  South  Vietnam  and  squash  ARVN  and  its      political 
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leadership. As a result of this situation, the GVN was destroyed and the United States 
failed in achieving its strategic objective of preserving a viable non-communist regime in 
South Vietnam. 
Despite the clear tactical breakthroughs made in counterinsurgency operations in 
the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, the political situation back home in the United States 
would not allow the military to continue the war it had most recently turned to its favor. 
Near unanimous congressional support to achieve the strategic objectives initially set 
forth in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 by President Johnson turned into 
bipartisan outrage and calls ending the Vietnam War with “peace and honor” and 
“Vietnamization” upon the election of Richard Nixon by 1968. Images of  college 
students staging mass protests, rioting, burning draft cards and chanting anti-war hymns 
became commonplace in newspapers, magazines, and television news shows each 
evening. The organizers of the protests conducted them in a manner in which they would 
receive maximum exposure from the media. Oftentimes, anti-war protestors would   even 
resort to violence to create a maximum shock effect from their protests.173 Though few 
 
probably knew it, anti-war protests concomitantly served the interests of Ho Chi Minh 
and the Vietcong. The North Vietnamese and their Vietcong allies had an ironclad will to 
win the war. As their leader Ho Chi Minh famously told the world: “You will kill ten of 
us, we will kill one of you, but in the end, you will tire of it first.”174 The Vietnamese 
endured far more casualties in the Vietnam War then their American counterparts. Even 
at a time when the VC were running for the hills in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, 
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North Vietnamese political leaders knew they would achieve victory in Vietnam if they 
could keep the political winds in the United States against the war and its continued 
execution. U.S. News and World Reports picked up on this development: “There is 
agreement among most thoughtful observers here [Saigon] that the Communists are very 
impressed by the anti-draft and anti-war demonstrations to affect the U.S., to fight.”175 
The My Lai Massacre was the defining event of the Vietnam War that personified 
American soldiers violating the laws of war indiscriminately. On March 16, 1968 
American soldiers descended on Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province in  South 
Vietnam in a routine search-and-destroy mission. Approximately 400-500 civilians were 
killed in a raid on the village. During the My Lai Massacre, un-armed civilians were 
indiscriminately targeted and killed. Tommy Lee Moss, a soldier witnessing the 
massacre, stated that he saw: “Vietnamese place their hands together and bow to greet the 
Americans, only to be beaten with fists and tortured, clubbed with rifles, and stabbed in 
the back with bayonets.”176 
 
After the event was revealed in the media by wartime journalist Seymour Hersh, a 
series of court-martial hearings ensued on members of the Charlie Company, 11th Brigade 
of the Americal Division. In the trial proceedings, 26 officers were charged with war 
crimes. However, only one soldier was convicted, Lt. William Calley. Calley was 
convicted of murdering 22 civilians after nearly 79 hours of deliberations and sentenced 
to life in prison. Due to the political brouhaha that ensured in the aftermath of the trial, 
President Nixon washed his hands of it by commuting Calley’s sentence and ultimately 
pardoning him completely. In the eyes of the American public, the damage had been 
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done. The Americans perceived, and rightfully so, that their soldiers had indiscriminately 
killed civilians in violation of the laws of war. Such acts of wanton destruction carried 
out by Americans in uniform served to undermine the ability of the United States to 
maintain the moral high ground over their communist adversaries. The My Lai Massacre 
shocked the American public and their political leaders. At precisely the time the 
Americans were making tactical headway against their VC adversaries, events like My 
Lai served the political interests of Ho Chi Minh in the battle to win the hearts and minds 
of the American public. Similar events as told by many former soldiers in groups such as 
Vietnam Veterans against the War corroborated viewpoints that the events of My Lai 
were not a single isolated incident. Collectively, the perceptions created from alleged war 
crimes committed at the behest of American soldiers in Vietnam served to undermine 
public support for the Vietnam War in the eyes of the American public and their political 
leaders. Such atrocities added legitimacy to the arguments anti-war protestors were 
making to end the war. As the last American troops exited Vietnam in 1975, America’s 
quest to achieve its strategic objectives in Vietnam ended. For Ho Chi Minh and his VC 
allies, their insurgency officially ended as their communist movement took control over 
the entirety of South Vietnam. 
The Vietnam War has been viewed by many contemporary historians as an 
unnecessary and unjustified war that was doomed to failure from the outset. Whether or 
not one agrees that the Vietnam War was a strategic blunder within the context of the 
Cold War is a debate for another day. The reality is that the United States fought the 
Vietnam War with the stated goal of preserving a viable non-communist regime in South 
Vietnam. Despite poor strategic planning and wrongheaded military strategy initially, the 
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United States surprisingly found itself in a position to accomplish its strategic objectives 
in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. By the time that a carefully tailored 
counterinsurgency military strategy was implemented and began to have tactical military 
success, the American public had turned against the war and demanded that it be ended 
immediately. This occurred because images of a heavy-handed conventional war caused 
more killing and destruction then should have if a sustained counterinsurgency strategy 
was employed throughout the war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Study 3: The Iraq  War 
 
The decision to invade Iraq in order to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein was 
initially supported by a plurality of the American public and their elected representatives 
in Washington. The decision was controversial at the time but it was nonetheless seem as 
a worthy endeavor based upon the promises made to the American public by the Bush 
Administration regarding the threat Saddam Hussein posed to the national security 
interests of the United States. History will judge whether or not the war was necessary 
and justified or if it was a strategic blunder. Nonetheless, the Iraq War had a dual purpose 
according to the principles laid forth by the Bush Administration. The stated strategic 
objectives laid forth by the Bush Administration. 
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1) To overthrow Saddam Hussein (for being a national security threat to the United 
States) 
2) To build a stable and democratic Iraqi Government 
 
Prior to the advent of the conflict, many Americans and their representatives in 
Congress were supportive of going to war to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein in 
order to bring democracy to Iraq. According to a Pew Research Survey conducted in 
October of 2002, 62% of Americans supported removing Saddam Hussein from power 
with 38% opposed.177 The Authorization for Use of Military Force against  Iraq 
Resolution of 2002 passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 297-133 and 77-23 
in the United States Senate.178 Despite overwhelming bipartisan support invading  Iraq, 
and an approximate 2-1 majority in favor of deposing Saddam Hussein’s regime, public 
support for the war steadily declined throughout the duration of the conflict. A failure to 
receive UN Security Council authorization for the use of force, the development of a 
post-invasion insurgency, a failure to find weapons of mass destruction or links between 
Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda were at the root of the decline in public support for the 
Iraq War. Mounting casualties, graphic images of slaughter by al-Qaeda militants, 
unseemly behavior by American defense contractors and prisoner abuse by American 
soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison molded new public perceptions of the utility of  continuing 
a war to achieve American strategic objectives in Iraq. By April 2008, a Gallup Poll 
revealed that 63% of Americans believed that the War in Iraq was a mistake.179 The 
steady decline in support for the Iraq War took place within the context of a tactically 
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successful counterinsurgency waged by the United States in Iraq which clearly showed 
that the United States was making tangible progress towards achieving the initial strategic 
objectives set forth by President Bush at the outset of the conflict. Such a situation 
implies that images, perceptions (both real and imagined), played a role in shaping 
American public opinion and influencing and congressional support for the Iraq War 
despite the progress made by American soldiers in counterinsurgency  operations 
designed to achieve the strategic objectives of the United States in Iraq. This case study 
will attempt to provide an understanding of the dynamics which created negative 
perceptions of America’s tactically successful counterinsurgency operations in the Iraq 
War and how these images undermined public and political support for achieving the 
strategic objectives set forth at the beginning of the Iraq War. 
In areas such as An-Bar Province, Ninewa Province, and later Baghdad, the 
United States made significant strides towards training the Iraqi Security Forces, 
decreasing violence, eliminating Al-Qaeda in Iraq and conducting democratic elections. 
Successful (and effective) counterinsurgency operations designed to create security, 
economic growth, public infrastructure, healthcare and education systems were all 
inherently positive tactical accomplishments from counterinsurgency operations 
conducted throughout the course of the Iraq War. Positive images of quelling violence, 
training police, building schools and holding free and fair elections are not the images 
which ultimately influenced American perceptions of the Iraq War. Instead, images of 
enhanced interrogation techniques like water boarding, the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, 
trigger happy defense contractors and President Bush’s pre-emptive “Mission 
Accomplished” speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln have endured.   These   images, 
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and the nature in which they played a role in diminishing public and political support for 
continuing the Iraq War, ultimately played a significant role in electing anti-Iraq War 
Senator Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election. Obama campaigned against the 
Iraq War and favored withdrawing American troops from the country in order to focus on 
the ongoing war in Afghanistan. By 2011, Obama’s policies were consummated and the 
last American combat troops returned home from Iraq. 
In both the Philippine War of 1898 and in the Vietnam War, American military 
commanders’ literally crafted and implemented counterinsurgency based strategies on the 
fly. In both of these wars, military regulars were not thoroughly trained nor schooled in 
the intricacies of conducting counterinsurgency warfare. Yet in each case American 
soldiers improvised counterinsurgency tactics that were successful in achieving tactical 
objectives throughout the course of each war. Despite the fact that the US military had 
institutional experience and had successful employed counterinsurgency operations 
during the Vietnam War, the military establishment wanted nothing more than to wash its 
hands of the practice. This Pentagon made the strategic decision to promote generals 
favorable to conventional methods of warfare after Vietnam. This had the  effect of 
wiping out the institutional memory of counterinsurgency warfare from the  Armed 
Forces altogether. After failing to pacify the Vietcong Insurgency, policymakers and 
military leaders shifted their focus to the conventional threats posed by the Soviet Union. 
Since the Soviets postured and trained its military to fight conventional wars, it was only 
natural that the United States would continue to follow suit as the Cold War progressed. 
This meant that American military training programs, research and development  projects 
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and contingency planning maintained its focus on finding better ways to employ 
conventional methods of warfare. 
As a result of this strategic choice, thoughts of engaging in large-scale 
counterinsurgency operations abroad were given little consideration throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. In 2000, George W. Bush argued in debates with Vice President Al Gore that 
if elected to the presidency he would not engage in nation building projects abroad.180   At 
the dawn of the 21st  Century, it appeared that the military was no longer concerned  about 
 
counterinsurgency warfare. This would prove to be problematic as the United States 
would eventually find itself fighting a war in Iraq where conventional methods of warfare 
proved to be ineffective in achieving the tactical and strategic objectives in the war.   If 
the United States wanted to quell sectarian strife endemic throughout the country in the 
aftermath of the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, it would have to adapt to the 
circumstances on the ground which required a new strategy and form of warfare to be 
employed if the United States wanted to accomplish the tactical and strategic objectives it 
set forth in the beginning of the Iraq War. 
Despite warnings from some quarters of the political spectrum, policymakers in 
the Bush Administration did not feel compelled to prepare the military to prepare for and 
fight anything other than a purely conventional war to destroy Saddam Hussein's Army 
and Republican Guard. After destroying Saddam Hussein's military was defeated in a 
swift and decisive campaign, President Bush and his closest military advisors believed 
the war in Iraq would soon end. President Bush went so far as to address the world from 
an aircraft carrier under a banner that read Mission Accomplished. This event was a major 
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turning point in the Iraq War. It marked the end of a conventional war which the United 
States was trained to fight and subsequently won in a swift and decisive campaign. It also 
marked the beginning of another war the United States military was not prepared to fight; 
a guerilla war against insurgent groups hell-bent on displacing the United States as the 
governing authority in Iraq. 
Instead of being greeted as liberators as Vice President Cheney famously 
proclaimed on Meet the Press on March 16, 2003,181 American troops were greeted with 
overt hostility in Iraq by Sunni, Shiite and the Al Qaeda militants that gravitated to the 
conflict to claim political power for themselves. An unforeseen spike in conflict in the 
post-Saddam era shocked American military leaders. The Pentagon brass was in denial 
that a guerilla war between multiple insurgencies was taking root in Iraq. These views 
were reflected by General Tommy Franks who noted on July 10, 2003 that: “Guerilla and 
insurgency operations are supported by the people, and I've demonstrated to my own 
satisfaction that the people of Iraq do not support the violence that we're seeing right 
now."182 
Sunni and Shiite militias saw the post-Saddam power vacuum as a chance to 
 
vanquish their ethnic rivals and the United States military quickly found itself in between 
a sectarian struggle that had been bottled up under Saddam Hussein. At first, the United 
States chose to adopt conventional tactics to quell the violence. Historians, such as 
Matthew Flynn, argue that the belief that conventional tactics could be employed to quell 
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a sectarian struggle between opposing insurgencies was based on a false understanding of 
how insurgencies can be effectively pacified: 
An examination of history reveals that conventional military force alone seldom if 
ever defeats an insurgency. Yet history is replete with examples of great military powers 
trying to do just this-that is, use conventional military force to defeat an insurgency.183 
One lesson that the United States should have learned from Vietnam was that 
conventional warfare could not be used to effectively pacify an insurgency. In Vietnam, 
aerial bombing campaigns and search and destroy missions only strengthened the resolve 
of Vietcong insurgents instead of crushing their will to fight. In Vietnam, the United 
States refused to abandon conventional tactics until it was too late to win the war. This 
was partly due to the fact that American military commanders, such as General William 
Westmoreland, were trained exclusively in conducting conventional warfare style 
operations and had the utmost confidence in employing conventional methods to beat 
their enemies. Historian Adam Joyce notes this observation: "For decades, since at least 
1976, the institution (Army) had formally resisted involvement in asymmetric conflicts, 
defining its central mission as defeating conventional enemies on the field of battle."184 
 
In order for the United States to pacify the growing insurgency in Iraq, they had to 
kill, capture or co-opt the insurgents by separating them from local population, 
establishing governing institutions, train police forces, earn the trust of the civilian 
population, and provide a higher quality of living than could be offer under the rule of the 
insurgents seeking to exert their political authority. Early efforts by American military 
commanders in Iraq made these goals difficult to accomplish.  Like their predecessors   in 
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Vietnam, Lieutenant Commander Ricardo Sanchez, General Raymond Odierno and 
General John Abizaid chose to adopt heavy-handed wide sweeping search and destroy 
missions in order to quell insurgent forces.185 As was seen when such conventional tactics 
were applied in the beginning of the war, the American military made little headway in 
pacifying the insurgency. 
The failure of conventional military tactics was most clearly evident in Operation 
Vigilant Resolve in the city of Fallujah in al-Anbar Province. After Saddam Hussein was 
overthrown, the citizens of Fallujah attempted to negotiate a political settlement with the 
Americans. Tribal leaders in Fallujah wanted to be afforded self-governance over their 
own affairs. They wanted the Americans to leave their city as soon as possible. This 
warning implied that the Iraqis would turn against the Americans if they continued to 
maintain a military presence in the city. According to a Gallup Poll conducted in March 
and April of 2004, only a third of the Iraqi people believed that America’s presence in 
Iraq was doing more good than harm and 71% of the nearly 3,500 respondents stated that 
they viewed the U.S.-led coalition as “occupiers” rather than “liberators.”186 
The terms set by tribal elders in Fallujah ran contrary to the governing plans 
Ambassador Paul Bremer had for post-Saddam Iraq. Bremer wanted to establish a strong 
central government in Baghdad capable of controlling the entire country. Self-governing 
political entities be they cities, provinces or regional ethnic enclaves ran contrary to his 
strategic plans. Bremer’s opposition to self-governance enraged tribal leaders in Fallujah 
whose political support and trust were needed in order to establish civilian rule over the 
city.  In  Fallujah,  tribal  leaders  had  a  great  deal  of  sway  over  their       constituents. 
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Throughout the duration of the Iraq War, political and military leaders in Iraq would soon 
realize earning their support was essential to defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq and other 
extremist elements making up the insurgency. 
During the spring of 2004, Fallujah was a tinder box ready explode. The spark 
which started hostilities came when Sunni insurgents brutally killed four Americans 
defense contractors and dragged their dead bodies through the city streets of Fallujah. 
The Marines responded by waging an extensive conventional reprisal attack designed to 
squash the insurgency and assert American authority over the city. The conventional 
response by the United States had the opposite effect of its stated intention. It was noted 
that after Operation Vigilant Resolve, attacks throughout the country jumped from 200 
per week in the first three months of 2004 to over 500 per week in the summer.187 
 
Conventional tactics designed to pacify the insurgency actually created more hostility and 
antagonism towards the United States. The ferocity of the insurgency in Fallujah led 
many Americans back in the United States to call into question the utility of the war 
effort and raised questions as to whether or not the United States could achieve its 
strategic objectives in Iraq. 
During this time period, two key images from the first Battle of Fallujah played 
an important role in altering American perceptions of the Iraq War. The first image was 
the site of four dead American defense contractors being dragged through the streets of 
Fallujah. This ghastly image sent a message to the American public that the Iraqis didn’t 
see the Americans as liberators and implied America’s nation building efforts designed to 
bring democracy to Iraq were neither welcomed nor appreciated. The  second image 
which molded American perceptions of the Iraq War from this time period came from 
187 Marston & Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare 292. 
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leaked pictures of American soldiers abusing inmates at the Abu-Ghraib  detention 
facility. Rick Rowley argues that the appalling images from Abu-Ghraib prison played a 
major role in turning the Fallujans against the American presence and directly led to the 
uptick in violence experienced shortly thereafter: 
Fallujah boiled with anger. The marines were reentering the city at the same time 
that stories of prisoner abuse and torture at Abu-Ghraib prison had begun to circulate in 
the press. Thousands of Fallujans had sons, brothers, and fathers in American detention 
centers and were humiliated and outraged at the treatment their families were subjected 
to. Rocket and mortar attacks, roadside bombs, and ambushes became daily   occurrences 
for the marines.188 
Americans were beginning to turn against the war in greater numbers. Political 
activists such as Cindy Sheehan emerged to protest the war. The anti-war movement was 
largely successful in prodding Democrats such as John Kerry, Joe Biden and Hillary 
Clinton, who had supported the war initially, to turn against the conflict. It was noted by 
Rachel Kleinfield that by 2006: "over thirty thousand Iraqis had died in what had become 
a communal conflict, Iranian-funded proxy war against America."189 Many Americans 
believed violence was spinning out of control and images of Americans killed or 
wounded in combat reinforced these views with visual evidence. This had the impact of 
convincing Americans that coalition forces could not achieve the strategic objectives set 
forth by the United States in the beginning of the war. 
 
Throughout the entirety of Iraq, coalition forces were met with  hostility, 
especially in al-Anbar Province. Between September 2003 and September 2004 the 1st 
Brigade Combat Team of the 1st  Division suffered 500 casualties in an attempt to   pacify 
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the insurgency in al-Anbar Province’s capitol city of Ramadi.190 A post-mortem of the 
political security situation al-Anbar Province published in September of 2006 by Marine 
Corps intelligence officer Colonel Peter Devlin raised further questions of America’s 
military and political strategy employed to defeat the insurgency in Iraq. The Devlin 
Report revealed that the Americans were losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the 
Iraqi populace in al-Anbar Province and that they had proven themselves incapable of 
preserving security and resolving political differences between Sunni tribal leaders and 
the Shia led government in Baghdad.191 The failure of the United States to control the 
political and security situation had also created a void being filled by al-Qaeda in Iraq: 
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has become the “dominant organization of influence in al- 
Anbar Province, surpassing nationalist insurgents, the Iraqi Government, and the MNF 
(multi-national forces) in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni.” 
AQI had become “an integral part of the social fabric of Western Iraq,” and the people of 
Anbar had come to “see it as an inevitable part of daily life and, in some cases, their only 
hope for protection against a possible ethnic cleansing campaign by the central 
government.192 
 
The failures experienced by the coalition forces to bring peace and stability to 
Iraq spawned a shift in the tactical approach to fighting the insurgency. Over the course 
of the next three years, coalition forces executed a robust counterinsurgency campaign in 
al-Anbar Province which ultimately ended with the expulsion of al-Qaeda in Iraq, a 
decrease in violence and new political and economic opportunities for the civilian 
population. Understanding the dynamics the counterinsurgency campaign al-Anbar 
Province  provides  one  with  a  better  understanding  as  to  how  tactically    successful 
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counterinsurgency operations, making strides towards achieving popular strategic 
objectives, can exist within the context of a war viewed negatively by large swaths of the 
American public and their like-minded allies in Congress. 
With the insurgency growing in al-Anbar Province, American soldiers on the 
ground shifted tactics to adjust to the new dynamics on the ground. At this time, military 
commanders began to take seriously the idea of employing a sustained counterinsurgency 
strategy to change the political and security dynamic on the ground. Between August 
2005 and July 2006, the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team stationed in Mosul and Tal 
Afar in Ninewa Province improvised an effective counterinsurgency scheme to restore 
stability and security. In early 2004, violence was rampant in Mosul with nearly 150 
insurgent  attacks  per  week.193   Coalition  forces  reacted  to  their  task  at  hand  by first 
 
sealing off the porous border with Syria which had served as an avenue for al-Qaeda to 
funnel in weapons, supplies and foreign fighters into Iraq. They employed the brilliance 
of Special Forces units to apply their cultural knowledge, foreign language expertise and 
diplomatic skills to extract intelligence on the insurgency from the local population. They 
did this by setting up telephone hotlines where information on the insurgents could be 
transmitted confidentially. 
Receiving greater amounts of intelligence from the civilian population  was a 
direct result of the public relations campaign the Americans waged in order to explain to 
the civilian population why their presence was preferable to that of al-Qaeda. Coalition 
forces invested a great deal of their efforts in training the Iraqi Army and police forces. 
Placing the Iraqi’s in control of their own security was a prerequisite for achieving 
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America’s strategic objectives in Iraq. Without being able to protect their own country 
from threats both foreign and domestic, a free and stable self-governing Iraq would cease 
to exist. Such efforts bore fruit shortly after their commencement. Significant progress 
was made towards quelling violence in Ninewa Province and transitioning power back to 
the Iraqi people during this time. In September of 2004, there were nearly 300 mortar 
attacks  in  Mosul.  By  the  time  coalition  forces  withdrew  in  2006,  that  number  had 
plummeted to 6 per month.194 
Coalition forces improvised a brilliant campaign to change Iraqi perceptions of 
their presence in the country. They operated television shows, radio programs and 
distributed leaflets explaining the purpose of their presence in Mosul and the scope of 
their mission. Coalition forces backed promises made to the citizens of Ninewa Province 
by creating the Ninewa Reconstruction and Development Management Cell. This outfit 
rebuilt aging public infrastructure and spurred economic growth by utilizing the expertise 
of the Army Corps of Engineers in order to rebuild Mosul’s dam, airport and government 
run companies.195 Schools, roads, sanitation programs, public parks were also 
constructed. These counterinsurgency tactics were successful. They were but one facet of 
a new approach to fighting the Iraq War which relied less on heavy-handed conventional 
methods of warfare and more on counterinsurgency tactics better suited to achieving 
America’s strategic objectives in Iraq. 
 
Success in counterinsurgency operations in regional areas such as Ninewa and al- 
Anbar provinces occurred in the absence of a centralized counterinsurgency strategy from 
top leaders in the Pentagon. When the United States began military operations in Iraq   in 
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2003, Austin Long of the National Defense Research Institute pointed out that current 
version of the Army Field Manual being utilized in the field provided few specific details 
on how to conduct an effective counterinsurgency operation.196 Despite Robert Komer's 
efforts to craft a viable counterinsurgency doctrine during the Vietnam War, his efforts 
were effectively forgotten by the military establishment in the years thereafter. Such 
views were reinforced by contemporary scholars such as James A. Russell, an Associate 
Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate 
School: 
Despite the pressure on (General) Casey, however, no school solution 
materialized a la Vietnam that allowed systemic biases at senior levels to impose 
themselves on commanders leading engaged forces. Ironically, the lack of a school 
solution can be explained partly by the lack of a doctrinally approved joint approach to 
fighting an insurgency before 2006, when the Army and Marine Corps jointly released   a 
draft of FM-324 Counterinsurgency.197 
 
When Army Field Manual 3-07.22 was published in 2004 it correctly observed 
that the overwhelming use of firepower by the United States caused the civilian 
population to join forces with the insurgents and disengage from any sort of diplomatic 
efforts to reconcile with American forces on the ground.198 In order for the United States 
to achieve its strategic objectives in Iraq, a military doctrine was needed which could 
effectively guide the military’s behavior throughout Iraq. During a time period when 
American military strategists were busy drafting a new joint-military counterinsurgency 
doctrine at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, a chorus of counterinsurgency proponents 
outside of the military coalesced around the employment of such a strategy. 
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The movement for a new approach to the war came from a diverse assortment of 
academics, military historians and think-tank scholars. Academics, such as Tufts 
Professor Greg Mills, argued that in order to change course in Iraq the United States 
needed to adopt a successful counterinsurgency strategy that could effectively build a 
civilian governing system based on an effective intelligence gathering system predicated 
on learning the nuances of Iraqi culture.199 After these conditions were met, he argued, an 
atmosphere would be created that would allow the United States to work alongside the 
native Iraqis in rebuild their society. 
A watershed moment towards the implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy 
came after a group of Army and Marine Corps scholars drafted The Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual in 2006.200 One of the scholars playing a major role in drafting the 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual was General David Petraeus. General Petraeus came to 
prominence when President Bush appointed him to serve as the head of coalition forces 
in Iraq. He became the face of counterinsurgency in Iraq and received most of the public 
accolades for the results of the counterinsurgency campaigns which took place prior to, 
during and after his tenure as head of the coalition forces in Iraq. 
Upon taking command, General Petraeus immediately went to work on reducing 
acts of violence prevalent throughout much of Iraq. In order to stop Iraq from falling into 
a state of civil war, Petraeus oversaw the creation of an Iraqi Police Force within the 
Multi-National Security Transition Command.201  By September 2007, the   Multinational 
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Transition Command had trained over 160,000 individuals at a price of nearly $19 billion 
dollars.202 Petraeus dealt with challenging scenarios in the management of the Iraqi 
Security Forces. Cases of desertion and even treason were prevalent amongst the ranks of 
the Iraqi Security Forces throughout the conflict. Despite these challenges, General 
Petraeus effectively oversaw a campaign which led to noticeable decreases in violence 
throughout Iraq. This development was indisputable and was even acknowledged by 
critics of counterinsurgency such as Michael A. Cohen: "There is little question that 
civilian casualties in Iraq declined in the latter end of 2007 and 2008. And U.S. military 
doctrine (at least nominally) did shift in the direction of outreach toward the Iraqi 
population."203 
Understanding  how  coalition  forces  effectively  accomplished  a  reduction    in 
 
violence is contingent upon understanding counterinsurgency warfare itself. During 
General Petraeus’s 2007 confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, he argued that a successful counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq would only 
come about through the establishment of regional and federal political institutions that 
could effectively disperse oil revenues, develop the economy, establish the rule of law 
and provide basic public services for its citizens.204 Petraeus believed that these goals 
could be accomplished. The United States had the resources and manpower  to 
accomplish to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. It was noted by astute military 
observers such as Colonel Thomas X. Hammes that as early as 2004, the coalition  forces 
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in Iraq had the ability and the institutional resources to rebuild the Iraqi economy and 
deliver public services such as sanitation, water and power.205 
General Petraeus was able to effectively change the previous conventional 
strategy by utilizing the vast resources that were at his disposal in an efficient and 
effective way. He engaged in diplomacy with former insurgents and would even broker 
agreements with militiamen and tribal sheiks that had fought against  the Americans 
earlier in the war. In exchange for their loyalty, Iraqis promised to help the United States 
expel Al Qaeda from Iraq. Al-Qaeda had brought nothing but death and destruction to 
Iraq since they funneled into the country after the deposition of Saddam Hussein.   Tribal 
leaders were more than happy to broker agreements with the Americans in return for cash 
bribes and promises of political power.206 Turning tribal leaders and the local population 
against al-Qaeda became known as the “Anbar Awakening”. Despite its controversial 
nature, the deal brokered by coalition forces was tremendously effective in quelling 
violence and establishing civilian rule of law in Iraq. 
The lynchpin which allowed for the United States to achieve tactical success in its 
employment of counterinsurgency in Iraq was the creation of its intelligence gathering 
apparatus. C.E. Caldwell once famously stated that: "In no class of warfare is a well- 
organized and well-served intelligence department more essential than in that against 
guerillas."207 His writings in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual show that General 
Petraeus was well aware of the value of good intelligence. His approach to intelligence 
gathering was premised on the creation of a bottom up network that would serve as an 
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effective bridge between the local populace and the military.208 To meet this challenge, 
Petraeus created the Human Terrain System (HTS). HTS brought social scientists and 
soldiers together in an effort to create a more effective intelligence gathering system that 
could achieve the goal of bridging the gap between the local populace and the military.209 
The effectiveness of the deployed Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) was noted by a Brigade 
Commander of the 56th Stryker Force: 
If someone told me they were taking my HTT (Human Terrain Team), I’d have a 
platoon of infantry to stop them. . . . The HTT has absolutely contributed to our 
operational mission. Some things we’ve looked at—solving problems in a lethal 
manner—we’ve changed to nonlethal options on the basis of the HTT information.210 
 
HTTs played a critical role as the cultural intermediary between the Iraqi people and the 
US military. HTTs helped to explain the cultural nuances of the Iraqi people to soldiers 
on the ground responsible for learning who the power brokers were in the areas where 
they were trying to pacify the insurgents. Altogether, the decline in violence seen 
throughout Iraq would not have been possible without the Human Terrain System. 
To some, the American experience with counterinsurgency in Iraq was a success. 
General Petraeus earned accolades from all corners of the political world for his 
implementation of an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. Republican Senator 
John McCain lavishly praised Petraeus upon his retirement from the CIA stating that he 
would:  "Stand  in  the  ranks  of  America’s  greatest  military  heroes.  His  inspirational 
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leadership and his genius were directly responsible – after years of failure – for the 
success of the surge in Iraq."211 
Likewise, Sen. Hillary Clinton, an opponent of The Surge, complimented Petraeus by 
calling him: "an extraordinary leader and a wonderful advocate for our military," shortly 
after the effective implementation of his counterinsurgency strategy in 2008.212 
Despite accolades given from many corners of the political world, some analysts 
are still highly critical of the legacy of America's experience with counterinsurgency 
operations in Iraq. Austin Long is quick to point out that expelling al-Qaeda in Iraq from 
areas such as Al-Anbar Province happened independent of the doctrinal change from 
conventional to counterinsurgency warfare.213 Critics of counterinsurgency, such as 
Michael A. Cohen, argue that the United States sanitized the military doctrine of 
counterinsurgency and hid its brutal nature under the guise of benevolence.214 Voices in 
the media were also highly critical of the Iraq War and the utility of the war effort in 
which the counterinsurgency campaign was implemented. An article in Mexico's paper 
La Journada published in November of 2007 stated that: "the grotesque cultural mask of 
counterinsurgent anthropology does not change the brutal nature of an imperialist 
occupation."215 While critics are quick to point out the flaws of counterinsurgency 
operations in Iraq, from my perspective, they fail to understand that the successful 
implementation of counterinsurgency in Iraq was the most effective way of bringing 
stability to the country at the time. Otherwise, Iraq would have turned immediately into a 
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failed state with large swaths of the country falling under the control of extremist groups 
like al-Qaeda in Iraq. The tactically successful counterinsurgency operations in Iraq filled 
the political power vacuum by setting up governing institutions for the Iraqi’s to settle 
their own fate. If counterinsurgency operations had not succeeded in achieving this goal, 
many more thousands of civilians would have inevitably died if a full-scale sectarian civil 
war broke out in Iraq in the aftermath of the deposition of Saddam Hussein. 
The Iraq War was an event that forged a permanent impression on the American 
psyche that will last for generations to come. Political imagery of Vice President Cheney 
claiming that American troops would be “greeted as liberators” are oftentimes coupled 
with those of President George W. Bush in a flight suit declaring premature victory under 
a “Mission Accomplished” banner. Images of combat in Iraq are most typically 
personified in photos of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib or grisly depictions of American 
defense contractors violating the laws of warfare by indiscriminately killing civilians. 
However, the lasting images that will likely be replicated in history books of the future 
will be those of the faces of the nearly 190,000 casualties incurred by all parties in the 
war as well as the $2.2 trillion dollars spent by the United States to achieve its strategic 
objectives in Iraq.216 
 
Few Americans (other than perhaps the soldiers who served in Iraq) conjure up 
images of The Counterinsurgency Field Manual and its defining impact on the tactical 
military turnaround that took place during The Surge. Nor do they remember images of 
soldiers working with Iraqi civilians in an effort to jumpstart the Iraqi economy and 
rebuild the schools, roads, bridges, sanitation facilities and hospitals destroyed in the war. 
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The metrics of success in America’s employment of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq 
will likely become statistics for military analysts and historians rather than long term 
benefits to American Foreign Policy or signs of increased regional clout for the United 
States in the Middle East. Regime instability endemic throughout much of the Middle 
East (as well as in modern day Iraq) Even the most powerful images that would justify 
the Iraq War from the perspective of the Bush Administration (purple stamped thumbs on 
Iraqi’s voting in their first free and democratic election) will fail to endure the times of 
time as the defining moments of America’s experience in Iraq. 
The Iraq War will undoubtedly go down as a tragedy in the minds of many 
Americans. Still, there may be a silver lining to the dreary picture oftentimes portrayed 
by the war’s harshest critics. The Iraq War proved decisively that the United States 
cannot employ conventional tactics and methods of warfare to win a military conflict 
against an insurgency. Conventional tactics such as the practice of search and destroy 
missions or massive aerial bombing raids did not accomplish the end goal of winning 
over the hearts and minds of the Iraqi civilian population needed to defeat al-Qaeda in 
Iraq and other extremist elements in the insurgency. America’s employment of tactically 
successful counterinsurgency operations in Iraq proved that a military power can reduce 
violence, rebuild a nation torn apart by war and earn the support of the local population to 
establish a political regime suitable to the population’s needs. 
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Chapter  IX Conclusion 
 
The three case studies that I have described show that the doctrine of 
counterinsurgency has been successful in its implementation in three separate wars 
throughout American history. In each conflict in some way shape or form, the United 
States employed counterinsurgency strategies in order to accomplish the following goals: 
1) To root out enemy insurgents. 
2) To build a successful intelligence gathering system capable of understanding imminent 
threats from insurgent forces within the native populace. 
3) To create a civilian governing structure capable of managing economic development 
programs and public services that promote general welfare. 
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4) To earn the respect of the native populace in order to effectively carry out the strategic 
objectives of the United States in the region. 
 
Despite the successful implementation of counterinsurgency strategies in each 
conflict studied, there was one trend that I noticed that came up in my research over and 
over again. For over a century, the United States military establishment has strongly 
favored the use of conventional warfare over counterinsurgency. A reluctance to embrace 
counterinsurgency warfare, and permanently incorporate its teachings into doctrine, 
training programs and integrate its leaders into positions of power in the military 
hierarchy, effectively caused the doctrine to become forgotten after each war. It was 
surprising to learn that after tactically successful counterinsurgency campaigns in the 
Philippines and in portions of Vietnam, the United States military establishment became 
even more adverse to the idea of employing counterinsurgency. Even after its successful 
implementation in Iraq, counterinsurgency critics still feel that the military is foolish to 
employ it. 
From my study, I have concluded that despite tactical success, the media molded 
public perceptions of counterinsurgency warfare by focusing their collective efforts on 
bringing attention to images of atrocities rather than accomplishments of the tactically 
successful counterinsurgency operations performed by the military. It seemed as if the 
more success counterinsurgency methods had on the tactical level, the more controversial 
the doctrine became. Successful counterinsurgency operations such as the campaign to 
pacify the First Luzon District in the Philippine War, the Phoenix Program in Vietnam 
and The Surge in Iraq weren’t able to rally the American public around to supporting a 
war at the levels they had when the United States chose to support the war deemed to be 
vital to the national interests of the United States. 
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Despite its failure to achieve widespread recognition within the American military 
establishment throughout the 20th Century, counterinsurgency made a comeback in the 
Iraq War with its successful employment in Iraq. The creation of the Army and Marine 
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM-324, and its subsequent implementation in 
Iraq, renewed interest in a doctrine long ignored by the military, political and academic 
communities in the United States in the aftermath of  the Vietnam War. 
For resuscitating the art of counterinsurgency warfare, General Petraeus  is 
perhaps the most important figure in the history of American counterinsurgency 
operations. Without his tactically successful implementation of counterinsurgency in The 
Surge, it is likely that counterinsurgency methods would not have been used in 
subsequent wars, as it was shortly thereafter in the Afghanistan War. The successful 
implementation of counterinsurgency in Iraq spawned a renewed focus on the doctrine. 
Academics, military strategists, journalists and historians are now publishing a plethora 
of books, journal articles and policy papers on the subject. This state of existence will 
ensure that counterinsurgency teachings will become widespread within the ranks of the 
American military establishment for years to come. For the time being, the American 
military establishment has  finally  learned that  conventional methods are  not  the   most 
effective ways to address every armed conflict, especially in the 21st  Century where no 
 
military can compare in size and strength to that of the United States. The military would 
be wise to never forget this lesson if it hopes to avoid the failures of the past. 
Ultimately, tactical success in counterinsurgency cannot alone determine victory 
in war. The United States needs to be keenly aware of how its actions are perceived by 
the American public. Public perceptions of war ultimately shape the outcome of the 
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conflict. As we saw in the Philippines, Vietnam and Iraq, when images of atrocities and 
war crimes (both real and imagined) came to light in the media, the once overwhelming 
public support for war steadily declined. In each case study the idea of employing 
counterinsurgency warfare to defeat violent insurgencies deemed to be a threat to 
American national interests was condoned by large swaths of the electorate and their 
elected representatives in Washington. It was only after a grisly image of American 
behavior in war was forged in the minds of the American public and their political 
leaders in Washington that critics of counterinsurgency warfare gained the upper-hand 
and obtained an ability to paint tactically successful counterinsurgency military 
operations, making strides towards achieving initially popular strategic objectives, as 
being unworthy military endeavors worth ending altogether. 
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